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ABSTRACT

MALEBRANCHE’S AUGUSTIANISM AND THE MIND’S PERFECTION
Jason Skirry
Karen Detlefsen
This dissertation presents a unified interpretation of Malebranche’s
philosophical system that is based on his Augustinian theory of the mind’s
perfection, which consists in maximizing the mind’s ability to successfully
access, comprehend, and follow God’s Order through practices that purify
and cognitively enhance the mind’s attention. I argue that the mind’s
perfection figures centrally in Malebranche’s philosophy and is the main hub
that connects and reconciles the three fundamental principles of his system,
namely, his occasionalism, divine illumination, and freedom. To demonstrate
this, I first present, in chapter one, Malebranche’s philosophy within the
historical and intellectual context of his membership in the French Oratory,
arguing that the Oratory’s particular brand of Augustinianism, initiated by
Cardinal Bérulle and propagated by Oratorians such as Andre Martin, is at the
core of his philosophy and informs his theory of perfection. Next, in chapter
two, I explicate Augustine’s own theory of perfection in order to provide an

v
outline, and a basis of comparison, for Malebranche’s own theory of
perfection. In chapter three, I present Malebranche’s theory, along with
showing its compatibility with his theory of divine illumination. In chapters
four and five, I reconcile the mind’s ability to perfect itself with Malebranche’s
strict occasionalism. In the end, I argue that Malebranche is not a full-blown
occasionalist, but rather an instrumental occasionalist, which ultimately leaves
metaphysical room for the mind to freely control its attention and produce its
own attentive desires.
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Introduction
In Anglo-American philosophy, the seventeenth-century philosopher Nicolas
Malebranche is typically seen as an innovative Cartesian philosopher who is
best known for his theocentric doctrines of occasionalism and divine
illumination, in which God is the only active causal agent in the universe as
well as the metaphysical and epistemological ground for all knowledge.
Arguably, interest in Malebranche stems from these two doctrines because
they provide unique and innovative insights into the nature of, and problems
with, Cartesian theories of causation and knowledge. Early modern scholars
have, nonetheless, taken an interest in Malebranche’s system as a whole, with
book length treatments examining the creative ways in which he uses
Cartesian principles to support his own philosophical and theological agenda.1
This work has ultimately defined Malebranche and the great attention paid to
his occasionalism and divine illumination has given the impression that they
are the immovable points in his system and that all other aspects, most
notably his theory of freedom, must be understood in terms of, and ultimately
conform to them.

1

See Daisie Radner (1978), Steven Nadler (1992), Tad Schmaltz (1996), and Andrew Pyle (2003).
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There is no doubt that a proper understanding of these two doctrines
within the context his Descartes’s system is absolutely vital for understanding
Malebranche’s own metaphysics and epistemology. With such an intense
focus on these particular aspects of Malebranche’s Cartesianism, however,
scholars have inadvertently missed another aspect of his system that is just as
vital, his Augustinianism. Of course, Malebranche’s connection to Augustine,
through his membership in the French Oratory, is well known, and scholars
have duly noted Augustine’s influence on Malebranche’s thought, from his
theory of divine illumination to God’s dispensation of grace.2 But Augustine’s
influence goes much deeper than this. In fact, it goes to the heart his system
informing its bedrock theory, namely the mind’s perfection. Here,
Malebranche

follows

the

rich

philosophical

tradition

of

intellectual

eudaemonism, whereby the soul, through the attainment of wisdom, achieves
happiness.
This tradition begins with Plato, and passes through the works of
Plotinus to Augustine, who, in turn, provides the metaphysical and
theological framework for Malebranche’s own theory.3 At its core is the idea

2

See Nadler (2000), p. 3 and (1992), pp. 101-108; Pyle (2003), p. 508; Patrick Riley (1992), pp. 1-3.
Gary Hatfield (1986) argues that Augustine influenced Descartes in a similar way. In fact, he argues
that Descartes’s Meditations is patterned after Augustine’s own three-staged method of perfection, pp.
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3
that the mind, through its reason, is in some way connected, or at least in
contact with, a rational order that structures the material and moral realms.
The method by which the mind connects, and maintain contact with, the
rational order begins with the mind purifying itself by turning away from the
distractions of the sensible world along with exercising and strengthening its
rational attention so that it can properly focus on it. By doing this, the mind
will gain direct access to the rational order, enabling it to put itself in harmony
with it. Knowledge acquisition, in this case, requires an interior cultivation of
the mind, whereby the mind must develop the proper dispositions and
intellectual habits in order to acquire knowledge and then use it as guide for
its intellectual and sensible life. We see this method most notably in Plato’s
Phaedo, in Plotinus’s early work On Beauty, and in Augustine’s Confessions.
Malebranche, in his Treatise on Ethics, follows the same method and believes
that the mind, through its intimate union with God, can perfect itself by
turning its attention inwards and upwards, away from the body’s desires,

48-51. Stephen Menn (2002) also provides a detailed analysis and explication of the structural and
conceptual parallels between Augustine and Descartes. So my division between Cartesianism and
Augustinianism is used only to underline the Augustinian origin of Malebranche’s theory of perfection
and the proclivity of Malebranche scholars to focus on issues that uniquely concern Descartes’ system.
For illustrative purposes, see chapter two in Pyle (2003) and Schmaltz’s (1996) introduction. In section
1.3.2, I argue that Malebranche, just like Arnauld and La Forge, recognized Descartes’ use of
Augustine, and it probably reinforced his own Augustinianism. The direct source, following Henri
Gouhier (1948), is more likely the Oratorian André Matin.
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towards God and his immutable Order. By attending to God’s Order, the
mind can act according to it, with the ultimate goal of unifying itself with God
by fully participating in it. It is this goal that frames and guides Malebranche’s
philosophical agenda.
Malebranche’s Augustinian theory of the mind’s perfection is not just
historically interesting in its own right, but also philosophically important as
well. Although the mind’s perfection has received little attention by early
modern scholars, it figures centrally in his philosophy and is the main hub
that connects the three fundamental principles of his system, namely, his
occasionalism, divine illumination, and theory of freedom. Without this
central piece, early modern scholars have had serious problems reconciling
occasionalism with the mind’s freedom, as well as providing a proper
interpretation of the relationship between the mind and God’s illumination
that adequately accounts for the cognitive and volitional resources that
Malebranche attributes to the mind. I argue that a proper understanding of the
mind’s perfection and its essential role in Malebranche’s system can not only
mitigate these problems, but also provide a unifying theory for his philosophy
as a whole.

5
In order to see this, we need to undergo a Gestalt shift. That is,
Malebranche’s system needs to be examined, not from the perspective of his
Cartesianism, but from his Augustinianism. Given that seventeenth-century
Augustinianism was neither a monolithic nor systematic movement, we need
to pinpoint Malebranche’s brand of Augustinianism by examining the
Augustinian tradition in the French Oratory and see how this tradition
influenced Malebranche not only in terms of his philosophical persona, but also
in terms of his metaphysics in general and the mind’s perfection in particular.
With this in hand, we can then begin to develop an interpretation of the
mind’s perfection by examining Augustine’s own theory of perfection. This
will provide us with the philosophical blueprint we need to construct
Malebranche’s account and to see how it constitutes the central hub of his
system. From this perspective, we will see that Malebranche actually
attributes cognitive and volitional resources to the mind, giving the mind
directional control over its attention so that it can acquire knowledge through
God’s divine illumination, and in turn perfect itself.
The mind’s self-perfection, however, requires that the mind be
responsible in some way for its own perfection. Given the general consensus
that Malebranche is a full-blown occasionalist, making God causally
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responsible for the mind and all of its modal changes, it appears that the mind
cannot be responsible in any way for its own perfection. Typically, early
modern scholars have examined the mind’s free will and responsibility from
the perspective of his occasionalism, assuming that occasionalism is the
immovable point of his system and that all other aspects of his system must
conform to it. From this, they try to figure out how Malebranche could
possibly attribute responsibility to the mind without ascribing causal powers
to it. Such examinations, though insightful and resourceful, inevitably end up
with unsatisfying results. A better way to deal with the problem is to examine
it not from the perspective of his occasionalism but from his theory of
perfection. This makes better sense given that his theory of perfection, not his
occasionalism, is at the center of his system, and that his occasionalism is more
malleable than we might think.
As we will see, Malebranche, throughout his writings, consistently
argues that the mind has self-perfecting powers, but it is not clear that he was
a full-blown occasionalist in terms of the mind’s modifications. In fact, I argue
that Malebranche’s brand of occasionalism leaves metaphysical room for the
mind’s self-perfecting powers. By looking back at scholastic and Cartesian
accounts of divine causation, we will see that Malebranche’s arguments for
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occasionalism do not exclude the mind’s ability to direct its attention, and that
since God’s governance of minds and bodies through general laws requires
him to use occasional causes to diversify his effects, the mind’s ability to
perfect itself does not come into conflict with his occasionalism. In the end, by
examining his philosophy from the perspective of his Augustinianism rather
than from his Cartesianism, I present Malebranche in a much different, and
arguably, better light.

1.

1.1

Malebranche’s Augustinianism

Introduction

As a devote Oratorian, Augustinianism figures centrally in Malebranche’s
spiritual and intellectual life. In fact, it provides the fundamental principles of
his thought. In particular, it inspired Malebranche to put the mind’s perfection
at the heart of his system, and provided him with the moral and intellectual
precepts for achieving it. So in order to understand Malebranche’s conception
of the mind’s perfection and the central role it plays in his philosophy we need
to identify and explicate his Augustinianism. To do this properly, we need to
study it from both a historical and philosophical perspective. This will provide
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us with the comprehensive picture we need to anchor our interpretation of
Malebranche’s philosophical system.

1.2

Malebranche’s Spiritual and Intellectual Influences

In 1664, there were two major events that shaped the spiritual and intellectual
life of Malebranche that represent different, yet complementary, aspects of his
thought, namely his Cartesianism and Augustinianism. The more well known
of the two events is Malebranche’s fortuitous discovery of Descartes’ book
Treatise on Man while browsing the bookstalls on rue St. Jacques (or perhaps the
rue des Augustins).4 His early biographer, Father Yves Andre, recounts a
popular story known amongst Malebranche’s friends about his physical
reaction to reading Descartes’ book. “The joy of learning about so many recent
discoveries caused him such violent palpitations of the heart that he was
forced to put the book down and interrupt his reading in order to breath more
easily”.5 What Malebranche discovered in Descartes’ book was a new
mechanical account of human physiology that provided him with a new way

4

Robert Remsberg (1940) believes that it was on rue des Augustins, arguing that Father Yves André
(1886) inaccurately placed the event on rue Saint-Jacques, which was then picked up and retold by
Henri Gouhier (1926). p. 135fn. Nadler (2000) follows this tradition and places the event also on rue
Saint-Jacques, p. 3. Unfortunately, Remsberg offers no evidence to support his claim and given that rue
Saint-Jacques was a major hub for bookshops in the seventeenth-century (it had up to seventy-one
bookshops by the end of sixteenth-century), we can assume that the event probably happened there. See
Phillips (1997), p. 263.
5
See Andre (1886), pp. 11-12; cf. Gouhier (1926), p. 49.
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of understanding the physical world that was, in his eyes, more satisfying
than the scholastic theories he was taught while studying at the College de la
Marche (1654-1656). Unlike an Aristotelian world of causally interacting
substances, each with its own individual nature and activities, determined by
its matter and substantial form, the Cartesian world is filled with matter in
motion, which is governed by a set of laws decreed by God at creation.
Descartes believes that the material structures that make up the universe, such
as the human body, can ultimately be explained in these terms. In addition, he
replaced the sense-based epistemology of Aristotelian physics by building his
physics on the metaphysical knowledge of the soul and God; knowledge
gained through the intellect alone. As Descartes’ philosophy radically changed
Malebranche’s understanding of the physical world, its metaphysical
grounding on principles derived from knowledge of the soul and God aligned
perfectly with his brand of Augustinianism. This brings us to the other major,
but less well known, event that shaped Malebranche’s life in 1664, his
ordination into the priesthood of the Oratory of Jesus Christ at Paris on 20th of
September of that year.6 But first, some background.

6

Gouhier (1926), pp. 19.
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The French Oratory was an Augustinian congregation founded in 1611
by Cardinal Bérulle (1575-1629). Bérulle was one of the main spiritual leaders
of the Catholic Reformation in France and is most known, at least in
philosophical circles, for encouraging Descartes to publish his new
philosophical method after he demonstrated it, at the expense of the featured
speaker, the chemist and mechanist Chandoux, at a public lecture in Paris at
the end of 1627, famously known as L’Affaire Chandoux.7 Bérulle’s interest in
Descartes’ new method stemmed from his desire to find a new Christian
philosophy for the Catholic Church that would successfully replace the ailing
scholastic Aristotelian theology of the universities, which had been under
serious attack from various groups, such as Christian reformers, Platonists,
humanists and other anti-Aristotelians, who objected to it on various religious,
philosophical, and moral grounds. Generally, Aristotelian scholastic theology
was attacked for its contribution to Church corruption, with its perceived
incompatibility with the central doctrines of Christianity, such as God’s
creation and providence of the universe, and the immortality of the soul. It
was also attacked for its apparent academic pedantry, with its obsessive logic
chopping and endless debates about abstract concepts that had nothing to do
7

Bérulle’s influence on Descartes’s work is debatable. See Stephen Menn (2002), p. 48, and Richard
Watson (2007), p. 144 for contrasting opinions.
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with living a good Christian life. Bérulle believed that a new Christian
philosophy that could address these issues would not only strengthen the
intellectual foundation of the Catholic Church, but also provide a theological
bulwark against the Protestant reform movement, in his case the French
Calvinists (or Huguenots), who intentionally bypassed the authority of the
Church, and looked to the early Church Fathers for new ways of living a pure
Christian life. This general attitude goes back to the fourteenth-century and is
expressed in the works of Petrarch and Erasmus on one side, and Luther on
the other.8 It peaks in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries and Bérulle’s
interest in finding a new philosophy is representative of the general desire
during this time to find a new systematic Christian philosophy that could not
only surpass Aristotelianism in its explanatory power in physics, medicine
and morality, but also, more importantly, in supporting Christian theology.9
Bérulle’s search for a new Christian philosophy was the intellectual
side of his reform plan for the Church in France. The institutional side of his
plan was to establish the French Oratory. He founded the Oratory to support
the Catholic reform program, which attempted, after the religious wars ended
with the Edict of Nantes in 1598, to enact the reforms promoted by the Council
8
9

See Menn (2002), pp. 41-47.
I closely follow Menn (2002), pp. 18-24, and (1997), pp. 35-38.
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of Trent (1545-1563), whose overall goal was to expand and deepen the
commitment of the faithful to Catholicism and properly educate the clergy to
fulfill this task.10 Bérulle specifically established the Oratory to reform the
secular clergy, who in turn, could “re-Christianize” the French people.11
Through an intense program of religious devotion and scholarship, he hoped
to transform the spiritual lives of the secular priesthood while instilling deep
loyalty to the Catholic cause.12 He also believed that his congregation would
produce an educated and dedicated priesthood that could critically defend the
Catholic faith and challenge the Protestant opposition.
By this time, the Oratory, which was founded in Rome by Philip Neri in
1575, had spread throughout Italy and had established a handful of houses in
southern France. The Oratory’s rapid expansion was mainly the work of
Neri’s close associates Francesco Maria Tarugi and Antonio Talpa; the former
eventually becoming the archbishop of Avignon. Both hoped that the Oratory
could provide a model for clerical reform, a model that happened to be in line
with Bérulle’s mission in France.13 Bérulle knew of Neri’s work and learned
about the Congregation’s mission and works from his friends Francois de
10

Henry Phillips (1997), p. 9, and Remsberg (1940), pp. 120-121.
Menn (2002), p. 22, and Phillips (1997) pp. 29-41.
12
Gouhier (1926), p. 19
13
John Patrick Donnelly (1994), p. 197.
11

13
Sales, who founded an Oratorian community in Savoy in 1599, and JeanBaptiste Romillion, the superior of an Oratorian house in Provence. He was
particularly attracted to the Oratory’s model of clerical reform and its liberal
rules for membership, worship, and study. Encouraged by Brulard de Silly
and the archbishop of Paris, Bérulle founded the French Oratory in 1611,
incorporating the houses in southern France.14
Consistent with the loose confederate relations amongst the Oratories,
the French Oratory was independent of the Italian or Philipine Oratory. Its
internal government, reflecting its beginnings as a free association of priests,
was republican in nature. A superior general, who was elected for life by the
General Assembly, represented all the Oratorian houses but had limited
executive power. All of his decisions had to be approved by the Assembly
and he could not make permanent changes when the Assembly was not in
session.15 Constitutionally, the Assembly was the power center of the Oratory.
The Assembly, which convened triennially, was made up of elected
representatives from each house, and decided all questions that concerned the
congregation as a whole. At the house level, there was also an elected
superior, who held a three-year term, which governed each house. Though the
14
15

Donnelly, 203.
Donnelly, 205; cf. H.G. Judge (1961), p. 49.
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superior was considered first among equals, he, nonetheless, had to
participate in the everyday duties of the house.16 Closely following the
Philipine model, the members took no formal vows and did not have a fixed
set of priestly duties, thereby giving members the free time for other spiritual
and intellectual pursuits. They lived in community, but had to support
themselves by private means and contribute to the expenses of the house. As
members of a “free association”, they also had the liberty to leave the order at
any time. The members were also not bond to uphold any particular
philosophical system and could freely engage in, at least privately, any aspect
of the Christian intellectual tradition. The Oratory’s republican government
and its liberal conditions of membership separated the Congregation from the
monastic orders, which had autocratic systems of government, demanded that
its members follow a strict set of rules after taking formal vows of poverty,
chastity and obedience, and, in the case of the Jesuits, constitutionally bound
to subscribe, teach and defend Thomistic Aristotelianism.17
Politically, the French Congregation was gallican in spirit, in opposition
to the Jesuit’s strong ultramontane desires, and, therefore, intensely loyal to

16

Remsberg, 146.
Roger Ariew (2002) suggests that the Jesuits in practice incorporated other forms of Aristotelianism,
such as Scotism, p. 48.

17

15
the French crown. Bérulle himself was deeply involved in politics and close to
the French crown. He was chaplain to Henry IV and was briefly appointed
councilor of state during the reign of Louis XIII.

He also brokered the

marriage of Louis XII’s sister, Princess Henreitta-Marie, to Charles I of
England. His most infamous political plot was to encourage Louis XIII and
Richelieu’s blockade of La Rochelle (1627-28), a major Huguenot city, which
lasted fourteen months, leading to the starvation and death of thousands of
people. For this, Richard Watson has branded Bérulle a “genocidal maniac”.18
Nevertheless, Bérulle, through his political machinations, was able to gain the
trust of the French crown, and the Oratory continued to nurture that trust. As
a consequence, the Oratory’s fortunes became tied to the French crown, which
increased during the reign of Louis XIV and fell at the height of the French
Revolution, finally being dissolved in 1792.19 After sixty years, it was
eventually reestablished in 1852, receiving papal decree in 1864.
Of course, the Oratory was also responsible to the pope and regularly
sent new statutes to Rome for approval. In fact, Pope Paul V (1605-1621), who
officially approved the French Oratory by the bull Sacrosanctae romanae
ecclesiae on May 10, 1613, pushed for the establishment of Oratorian colleges,
18
19

Watson, p. 147.
Remsberg, p. 148.

16
which was not part of Bérulle’s initial plans for the order.20 Bérulle founded
the first school in Dieppe in 1616 and by 1710 there were 72 Oratorian colleges,
close behind the Jesuits’ 117.21 The popularity of Oratorian colleges had a lot to
do with its educational program. Oratorian education departed from the
Jesuit’s standard ratio studiorum by placing mathematics, natural science,
history, and modern languages earlier in the curriculum, and by teaching
them, at least for the first few years, in French rather than in Latin.22 The
Oratory’s progressive curriculum, and its royalist politics, made Oratorian
colleges popular among political elites, who sent their children there to be
educated.23 As a consequence, the spread of Oratorian colleges throughout
France encroached upon the Jesuit’s educational monopoly, which was
already under constant pressure by the University of Paris, where, ironically,
they also had a college.24 This contributed to the intense political and
intellectual rivalry between the two that was started by Louis XIII and
Richelieu in their attempt to keep Jesuit power in check. Such power politics
continued under Cardinal Marazin and Louis XIV.25

20

Remsberg, p. 149, Ariew, p. 47.
Phillips, p. 76.
22
Remsberg, pp. 149-150.
23
André Robinet (2000), p. 290.
24
Phillips, p. 101.
25
Remsberg, pp.145-148.
21

17
The theological and intellectual spirit of the Oratory was Bérulle’s
Augustinianism. At this time, Augustinianism, a term that will be qualified
shortly, was the main rival of Aristotelian scholasticism in France.26 Bérulle’s
personal admiration for Saint Augustine and his concern with finding a new
Christian philosophy put him on the Augustinian side of the movement and
naturally based the Oratory on Augustinian principles.27 Strategically, this
gave him a clear advantage over scholastic theology in the Church’s
theological war with Protestantism. Augustine’s thought and doctrinal
authority had always loomed large in Western Christendom and what
Christians took as axioms of Christian philosophy, such as the soul’s
immateriality and God’s creation of the universe ex nihilo, were essentially the
work of Augustine. His metaphysical works on God and the soul, and his
theological works on free will and grace were the chief authority after the
scriptures by which theological positions were measured and controversies
resolved.28 During the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries Augustine’s
authority became the ultimate prize as both Protestants and Catholic
reformers tried to link their theology and tradition back to the “pure”

26

Phillips, pp. 136-137.
Remsberg, p. 122.
28
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Christianity of the early Church Fathers prior to the Church’s institutional
corruption and before it was yoked to scholastic theology. In the end, it came
down to a battle over what group could legitimately claim to possess the true
essence of Christianity. By grounding Oratorian theology on Augustinian
principles, Bérulle attempted to combat Protestant claims to pure Christianity
on common ground, by focusing on the Bible and the works of the early
Church Fathers without appealing to scholastic theology, which the
Protestants associated with the Church’s irredeemable corruption, and,
therefore, rejected outright.29 In terms of his intellectual reform, Bérulle
believed that a new Christian philosophy could be built on an Augustinian
foundation, which would effectively replace Aristotelianism, and, in turn,
strengthen the Church. So his Augustinianism separated the Oratory
intellectually from the scholastic tradition just as the Oratory’s internal
government and membership requirements separated it institutionally from
the traditional monastic orders. Both clearly identified the Oratory as part of
the Catholic reform movement.
Of course, seventeenth-century Augustinianism was not a monolithic
movement with a common doctrine, a coherent theological and philosophical
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agenda, or an institutional structure comparable to scholastic Aristotelianism.
Generally speaking, since Augustine was the theological and philosophical
stitching that held together the tapestry of the Western Christian tradition, the
term “Augustinian”

could be legitimately used, with some minor

qualifications, to describe most Christians in Western Christendom, which
makes any use of the term relatively uninformative.30 Even if we limit our
discussion to the Western Christian intellectual tradition and try to split it
neatly into Aristotelian and Augustinian camps, we still cannot say, as
Stephen Menn rightly points out, that there was a single Augustinianism to
which all Augustinians professed; rather, we must recognize that there was, in
fact, a variety of Augustinianisms.31 This is not to say, however, that it is
conceptually useless to categorize the many different ways in which
seventeenth-century philosophers and theologians used Augustine or to find
common intellectual bonds that could help circumscribe an Augustinian
tradition, one that developed alongside Aristotelian scholasticism. For our
purposes, identifying Bérulle’s particular Augustinianism and tracking its
evolution in the Oratory are necessary for understanding the spirit and
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conduct of the Oratory, and more importantly, Malebranche’s Augustinianism
and how it influenced his philosophy.

1.3

Remsberg’s Wisdom-Science Model

Robert Remsberg, in his important but relatively unknown work, “Wisdom
and Science at Port-Royal and the Oratory”, provides an interesting model for
identifying different Augustinianisms in seventeenth-century France that
gives us a basic framework for examining Malebranche’s Augustinianism.
Remsberg constructs his model out of the ways in which philosophers and
theologians understand the relationship between wisdom and science,
however the content of the two might be conceived or defined. For him, the
way a thinker (or tradition) understands this relationship is more revealing
than what the thinker believes to be the content of wisdom and science.32
Indeed, it reveals the necessary context for understanding the thinker’s
methodology, system and goals. He believes that this relationship is key to
understanding

the

fundamental

philosophical

differences

between

Aristotelians and Augustinians, and, more importantly, to identifying a single
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Augustinian

intellectual

“tradition”

and

distinguishing

the

various

Augustinianisms that stem from it.33
Remsberg argues that the distinction between wisdom and science goes
back to the earliest days of the Western intellectual tradition and is seen, for
example, in how the two are contrasted in language, for example, the words
sapientia and scientia in Latin.34 Wisdom and science are seen as different
modes of knowledge, with science ranging from ordinary knowledge gained
through observation to more sophisticated kinds of knowledge achieved
through rational systems of inquiry, and with wisdom marking the highest
form of knowledge—knowledge traditionally achieved by the proverbial
“wise” person, who is seen as a model or guide for life. How we conceive both
wisdom and science is necessarily determined by how we conceive the
relation between them.35
Remsberg suggests that there are two ways of conceiving the wisdomscience relation. One way is to understand science as the essential foundation
of wisdom, making wisdom the achievement of the scientific enterprise.
Wisdom, in this case, is the knowledge achieved by discovering the causes of
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particular events, and from this, generating principles that can order
individual experiences, explain similar events in the future, or provide the
necessary ingredients for mastering a field of study.36 Such knowledge is
necessarily about the world, whether in the material or moral realms, and
depends on the mind’s relation to it. Achieving wisdom is the result of the
mind’s good use of its natural rational faculties, resulting in intellectual virtue.
Thus, wisdom is not reserved for the rare wise person, but for those who
properly use their reason in their particular field of inquiry, whether concrete
or theoretical. Remsberg argues that Aristotle is representative of this
conception of the wisdom-science relation and is seen, with various
modifications, in works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Thomism of the Jesuits,
and other Aristotelians. 37
Now, the second way reverses the relation and sees wisdom as the
necessary foundation for science.38 Wisdom, in this case, is not derived from
scientific inquiry, but is a higher knowledge that makes all other knowledge
possible. Specifically, it is the higher knowledge of eternal truths, those truths
that are the intellectual structure of the moral and material realms, and
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provide the mind with the principles for understanding them. According to
this position, wisdom, defined as the possession of immutable truths, cannot
be derived from the mutable truths of the world that are acquired through the
senses, but only discoverable through rational processes. This means that the
mind is directed towards itself, not towards the world as the “Aristotelian”
position implies. The mind, however, being part of the contingent world,
cannot be the source of these truths; they belong to an ontologically higher
realm to which the mind has access. Plato is an obvious representative of this
position, and as his indirect intellectual descendent, via Plotinus and other
neo-Platonists, Saint Augustine.
Briefly, Augustine believes that wisdom is a form of divine revelation
that is based on the intimate relationship between God and the mind by which
God “illuminates” the mind so that it can see the truth, just as the sun
illuminates the surface of the earth for the eyes to see it (Sol. 30).
Let it [the mind] then remember its God to whose image it was made,
and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it worship the
uncreated God, by who it was created with a capacity for him and able
to share in him. In this way it will be wise not with its own light but by
sharing in the supreme light, and it will reign in happiness where it
reigns eternal. For this is called man’s wisdom in such a way that it is
also God’s (De Trin. 14.15).
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Now this is not a gift that is reserved for a few pious Christians, but is
something that is given to all people, Christian or pagan, and it is up to each
person to recognize it.
Then where are these standards written down, where can even the
unjust man recognize what being just is, where can he see that he ought
to have what he does not have himself? Where indeed are they written
but in the book of light called truth…as for the man who does not do
justice and yet sees what should be done, he is the one who turns away
from that light, and yet is still touched by it. But the man who does not
even see how one ought to live has more excuse for his sin, because not
knowing the law he is not a transgressor, yet from time to time even he
is touched by the brilliance of truth everywhere present, when he
receives a warning reminder and confesses (De Trin. 14.21).
God does not just illuminate the mind with moral truths but also with the
mathematical and physical truths he used to design the world. Without access
to God’s divine order, genuine knowledge of the material world is impossible.
Wherever you turn she [wisdom] speaks to you through certain traces
of her operation. When you are falling away to external things she
recalls you to return within by the very forms of external things.
Whatever delights you in corporeal objects and entices you by appeal to
the bodily senses, you may see is governed by number, and when you
ask how that is so, you will return to your mind within, and know that
you could neither approve or disapprove things of sense unless you
had within you, as it were, the laws of beauty by which you judge all
beautiful things which you perceive in the world (De lib. arb. 2.16.42).
Augustine also explains this in terms of angelic knowledge.
For this reason, since the holy angels with whom we shall be equated
after the resurrection…always see the face of God…there can be no
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doubt that they have first come to know the universal creation, in
which they themselves were the first to be established, in the Word of
God himself, in whom are the eternal ideas even of things which were
made in time…Only after that do they know creation in itself, by
glancing down below, as it were, and then referring it to the praise of
the one in whose unchangeable truth they originally see the ideas
according to which it was made (De Gen. ad litt. 4.24.41).
With knowledge of the divine order, the mind can base its scientific
investigations on solid principles. Scientific knowledge is not acquired
through the senses, but by the mind comparing its sensible experiences with
the divine order and judging them accordingly. Indeed, the core Augustinian
discipline of meditative, or cognitive, reflection that trains the mind to turn
away from the distractions of the world and focus its attention on God and its
relationship to him is designed to exercise the mind’s rational capacities and
moral disposition so that it can effectively receive God’s illumination. This
practice is seen very earlier on in his philosophical works, particularly in the
Soliloquia, where he illustrates this process through a dialogue between his
soul and Reason in which Reason exercises Augustine’s rational faculties so
that he can discover some important truths about himself and God. For
Augustine, the path to wisdom is the path to God.
Therefore he who journey towards wisdom, beholding and considering
the whole created universe, finds wisdom appearing unto him
graciously on his way and meeting him in every purpose or
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providence; and his eagerness to press along that way is all the greater
because he sees that the way is rendered beautiful by the wisdom he
longs to reach (De lib. arb. 2.17.45).
Remsberg uses Augustine’s conception of the wisdom-science relation
to identify an Augustinian tradition that is methodologically distinct from the
scholastic tradition. He recognizes, however, that the tradition is neither
monolithic nor systematic. Even though all Augustinians subscribe to
Augustine’s wisdom-science relation, and the meditative discipline that goes
along with it, they have interpreted it in a variety of ways. Remsberg identifies
two general lines of interpretation that correspond to the two themes that are
dominant in Augustine’s work, namely, knowledge and grace. In seventeenthcentury France, Remsberg contends that the Jansenists represents the latter,
and the Oratorians the former.

1.3.1

The Augustinianism of Jansenism

Given their mutual devotion to Augustine, the relations between the
Jansenists and Oratorians were naturally rather close. The founders of
Jansenism, Cornelius Jansen and Saint-Cyran (Jean du Vergier), were
generally tied to the Oratory through their similar Catholic reform program,
and personally tied to it through Saint-Cyran’s friendship with Bérulle and
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Charles de Condren, the second Superior General of the Oratory.39 In fact,
Jansen made his nephew an Oratorian, and Saint-Cyran, who privately
supported the Oratorian cause and helped found an Oratorian house at
Louvain, was at one point thrown in jail for his association with the treatise De
Virginitate by the Oratorian Seguenot.40 In this treatise, Seguenot argues
against the Trentine doctrine that attrition (repentance based on the fear of
eternal punishment) is sufficient for the soul’s reception of sacramental
absolution, and contends that the soul can receive forgiveness for its sins and
receive God’s grace only by achieving the hard-won disposition of contrition
(repentance based on the love of God).41 Richelieu, who supported the
Trentine position, discovered, through Condren, that Seguenot’s work was
inspired by Saint-Cyran. Saint-Cyran was subsequently arrested and spent
four years in jail (1638-1642), only being released after Richelieu’s death. After
the death of Saint-Cyran in 1643, the dispute exploded with Antoine
Arnauld’s De la Frequente Communion, a work that was an apologetic for
Jansenism in general and a defense of Saint Cyran’s position in particular. In
the end, the work popularized Jansenism and made Arnauld the unofficial

39

Nigel Abercrombie (1936), p. 167.
Remsberg, p. 70.
41
Remsberg, p. 17; Abercrombie, pp. 188-189.
40

28
leader of the Jansenist party. Historically, the dispute appears to be the result
of political intrigue, personal animus, and doctrinal pettiness. But
theologically, it went to the heart of the Jansenist reform movement, which
called for all Christians to live a pure Christian life.
In general, Jansenism is a very austere and deeply introspective
theology that focuses on the severe weakness of the soul and the desperate
need for God’s grace to overcome it. It requires its congregants to follow a
strict moral code that demands rigorous self-examination. They do this by
following an intense meditative program that requires them to examine their
soul and its relationship to God. Through this examination, congregants
recognize, and come to terms with, the fragility of their own human nature
and the necessity of God’s grace for salvation and the performance of good
works. Neophytes are advised to undergo this meditative program for at least
a year before entering the fold, and all congregants must use it to prepare their
souls for communion and the reception of absolution that comes with it. Some,
such as the lawyer Antoine Lemaitre, his brother Isaac, known as De Saci, and
to a limited extent the famous Blaise Pascal, left public life and entered into a
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life of solitude that involved penitential exercises, mediation and prayer.42
Such requirements went well beyond the measures espoused by the Council
of Trent, setting a high bar for practicing the Christian faith, necessarily
excluding those that did not follow this strict regimen. It also irritated some
people, like Richelieu, who lost many good lawyers and other influential
people to the Jansenists.
Jansenism bases its rigorous spiritual program on a particular brand of
Augustinianism that developed out of Saint-Cyran and Jansen’s intense study
of Augustine’s work. They spent four years (1611-1614) examining his
writings at Saint-Cyran’s family estate, focusing on Augustine’s later works on
grace and free will, believing that Augustine deliberately abandoned his
earlier philosophical concerns when he realized the full importance of grace
and free will in Christian life. Their emphasis on free will and grace is seen in
Jansen’s definitive work Augustinus (published posthumously in 1640), where,
Remsberg points out, Jansen makes 7,595 references to Augustine and the
majority are to his works that pertain to grace and free will, which were
written after 410 CE.43 From this, he calculates that “Jansen quotes Augustine’s
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works on grace 4.6 times as much as he quotes the works on knowledge. 260
of the 1120 references to the latter works are to the De libero arbitrio. That
means that except for the De libero arbitrio, Jansen prefers the works on grace
by a ratio of 6 to 1”.44 Believing that grace is at the core of Augustine’s
theology, Jansen and Saint Cyran developed what could be called an
“Augustinianism of grace” that emphasizes the invincible efficacy of God’s
grace and its vital importance in the soul’s salvation.
Jansen and Saint-Cyran’s focus on the necessity of God’s grace is based
on their belief that the soul was severely impaired after the Fall and cannot, on
its own, restore itself to its pre-lapsarian state. Adam’s prideful free act of
turning away from God and focusing on himself and the sensible world
resulted in the soul losing its ability to turn back to God and surrendering its
control over the body and its concupiscent desires. In this state, the soul is
harassed constantly by its concupiscent desires and lacks the internal
resources to combat them. The only way for the soul to conquer these desires
is to counterbalance them with contrary desires, which, in this case, can only
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come from God’s, or more specifically Christ’s, dispensation of efficacious
grace. Jansen argues for, what we would call today, a compatibilist theory of
free will. For him, the will is free only in so far as the action under question is
in its own power, not that it could choose to do otherwise when all of the
conditions for the performance of an action are given.45 Accordingly, even
though free acts are in the power of will, the will is, nonetheless, determined
by pre-deliberative cognitive and appetitive states, making the will act in
accordance with the most dominant state at the time. The will is analogous to
a balance scale where the will is determined by the “heaviest” preceding
states. Unfortunately, after the Fall, the will is not equally balanced, but is
weighted in favor of concupiscent desires and there is no way for the soul to
counterbalance them with contrary desires. Consequently, the will is always
leaning towards sensible pleasures and is primed to act in accordance with
them. For Jansen, Christ’s efficacious grace, which produces contrary desires
in the soul that motivates it to act through God’s love, is the only way for the
soul to counterbalance them. So not only is it impossible for the soul to act
contrary to its dominant desires, it is also impossible for the soul to perform
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good acts on its own.46 The soul, nonetheless, still retains the power to do
good, but given that the will is severely impaired, it does not have the ability
to do good on its own. That is, the ability to act depends upon the soul’s
condition at the time of the action. If the soul has the right amount of
efficacious grace, then it can perform a good act, but if it does not, it cannot
perform the act.47 In both cases, the soul retains the power to act, but in the
latter case it cannot exercise its power as it can in the former case. Jansen
believes that this is sufficient for attributing responsibility to the soul. That is,
the soul may be determined by grace and concupiscence to act well or badly
respectively, nevertheless, it is free in that it retains the power, though not the
ability, to act.
Remsberg suggests that the intense focus on the soul’s moral integrity
and salvation influenced the Jansenists understanding of Augustinian wisdom
and its relation to science; essentially limiting the relation to the sphere of the
soul’s interior state and its actions.48 For them, wisdom is knowledge about the
soul’s interior moral state, its relationship to God, and its potential
improvement. Science, in turn, is the affectatious knowledge that enlightens as
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well as moves the soul towards its particular moral and salvatory activities.
Both kinds of knowledge are more affectatious than abstract, essentially
stirring the soul to good actions.49 In the end, Jansenism identifies wisdom
with God’s illuminating grace, and science with grace’s efficacious power to
repair the soul’s damaged nature and to move the soul closer to its salvation.
By limiting the wisdom-science relation to the soul and its actions,
Jansenism is able to separate theology from natural philosophy, establishing
both as separate realms of knowledge that requires different epistemic
methods, the former derived from God’s revelatory grace and the latter from
the soul’s own intellectual and experiential resources.50 With the realm of
grace effectively quarantined from the realm of nature, the Jansenists were
free to explore different philosophical and scientific methods without
worrying about contaminating the moral condition of their souls by deriving
knowledge from one realm with methods from the other. Some Jansenists,
most notably Arnauld, favored Cartesianism for what they believed to be its
Augustinian underpinnings and Descartes’ perceived separation of theology
from natural philosophy.51 Within this framework, they argued that as God’s
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salvific grace is direct and specific to the moral conditions of each soul, with
its dispensation known only to God, God’s governance of the natural world is
uniform and can be described in terms of general laws, which can be known
through observation and rational inquiry. Jansenism’s “separate realms”
principle is at the heart of Arnauld’s uncompromising objection to
Malebranche’s Treatise on Nature and Grace, where Malebranche argues that
God governs the realm of nature and grace in the same way with analogous
general laws. He believes that Malebranche dangerously confuses God’s
individual care for souls with his general governance of the physical world.52
This division between theology and natural philosophy put Jansenism at odds
with the Augustinianism of the Oratory that uses Augustine’s works on
knowledge, rather than grace, to develop a broader understanding of an
Augustinian wisdom-science relation that encompasses both theology and
natural philosophy.

1.3.2
The

The Augustinianism of the Oratory
Oratory’s

interpretation

of

Augustine’s

wisdom-science

relation

developed out of Bérulle’s theocentrism, which emphasized God’s power and
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influence in the created world. According to Henri Gouhier, Bérulle
introduced into the Oratory a new Christian meditative practice that focused
not on the soul’s moral weakness and salvation, as Jansenism did, but on
God’s power and glory. “La vie intérieure du chrétien prend alors une
direction nouvelle; le problème du salut personnel se trouve subordonné au
désintéressement du’un amour où Dieu est aimé pour lui-même”.53 For
Bérulle, the love for God should be at the center of the Oratorian spiritual life,
not the possible salvific benefits that could be reaped from him. This shift in
focus from personal salvation to the disinterested praise of God and his
attributes puts God’s power and influence on the soul and the created world
at the center of Oratorian thought. Naturally, philosophically inclined
Oratorians attempted to describe and articulate how God’s power manifests
itself in the world. Gouhier suggests that Bérulle’s theocentrism was
supported and propagated by the early Superior Generals, Condren and
Bourgoing, and eventually became entrenched in Oratorian thought,
inevitably influencing Malebranche’s philosophy, particularly in terms of his
occasionalism.54
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As Gouhier discusses Bérulle’s theocentrism in terms of God’s power,
Remsberg focuses on Bérulle’s theocentrism in terms God’s divine
illumination. Again, as Jansenism limited God’s illumination to knowledge of
the soul’s interior state and its potential improvement, Bérulle believes that
God is the epistemological ground for all knowledge, from ethics and politics
to mathematics and natural philosophy.55 Consequently, Bérulle’s conception
of the wisdom-science relation, contra Jansenism, unites the realms of nature
and grace, making God the foundation of all knowledge. Remsberg suggest
that this aspect of Bérulle’s Augustinian theocentrism naturally became the
intellectual foundation of the Oratorian mind.
Another quality of the Oratorian is his determination to make religion
and learning go together. Not only is he interested in being both a
priest and a scholar, but he feels that the two activities interpenetrate so
as to form one homogeneous whole. This brings him into contradiction
with both the Jesuits and Jansenists, for both of them make a separation
of the activity of the scholar and the activity of the religious believer,
although they do not relate these separate activities in the same way.56
The Oratorian mind, in this case, puts God at the center of its religious,
philosophical and scientific life, recognizing that each field is potentially
compatible with each other. Naturally, one of the goals of an intellectually
inclined Oratorian is to uncover the fundamental harmony between disparate
55
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fields of knowledge, given their mutual epistemological source. This partly
explains the Oratory’s interest in education, science, and biblical exegesis. It
also explains the Oratory’s attraction to intellectuals of all stripes, such as the
biblical historian and linguist Richard Simon, and the Cartesian philosophers
Louis Thomassin and Bernard Lamy.
Bérulle’s Augustinianism also had an impact outside the Oratory, most
notably Descartes. If we are to believe Menn’s account of Bérulle’s fateful
meeting with Descartes after the L’Affaire Chandoux, where Bérulle “told
Descartes to construct a new philosophy, he also told him to begin with
metaphysics, and with metaphysics as conceived in Augustinian terms, as a
discipline of reflection on God and the soul”, and also his reasonable
suggestion that Descartes was introduced to Oratorian Augustinianism
through his correspondence with other important Oratorians, such as Charles
de Condren and Guillaume Gibieuf, we can see that Bérulle’s Augustinianism
likely influenced Descartes’ philosophy.57 Descartes uses not only God as the
ultimate epistemological source and justification for his metaphysics, and in
turn, his physics, but also Augustine’s meditative practice to cultivate the
mind’s cognitive disposition so that it can properly access the truth without
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relying on the senses.58 Philosophers such as Louis de la Forge, Arnauld, and
Malebranche instantly identified Descartes as an Augustinian. In fact, De la
Forge, in the preface to his important work Treatise on the Human Mind, which
is entitled “In which the author shows the agreement between Saint
Augustine’s teaching concerning the nature of the soul and the views of Mr.
Descartes,” conducts a systematic textual comparison of Augustine and
Descartes in an attempt to defend Descartes against charges of heterodoxy
(DC 5).59
Bérulle’s influence on Malebranche is unclear. Gouhier points out that
even though Malebranche never cites or mentions Bérulle in his works, “il lui
imposa une forme [la théocentrisme], et l’amour de cette forme lui dictera
désormais tous ses jugements”.60 So, at a minimum, Malebranche felt the
general presence of Bérulle’s Augustinianism and it helped frame his belief
that God’s eternal truths are the epistemological ground that unifies
mathematics, physics, ethics and theology. There were other Oratorians,
however, that seem to have had a direct influence on him. According to
Gouhier,
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Malebranche is the Augustinian-Cartesian philosopher André Martin, who
wrote under the pen name Ambrosius Victor. Martin was a controversial
figure in the Oratory. He entered the Oratory in 1641 and was ordained in
1646. He taught at the major Oratorian schools in Marseille, Saumur, and
Angers, and was the first Oratorian to publically teach Cartesianism. But in
1652, while teaching in Marseille, he was suspended from his duties for
teaching Cartesian theses, and for attempting to synthesize the doctrines of
Descartes with Augustine in his works.61 Martin received the suspension order
on January 19, 1652, which Gouhier quotes in full.
Le P. André Martin se rendra au plus tôt de Marseille en notre maision
d’Arles, et y résidera jusqu’à nouvel ordre, quittant son cours de
Philosophie commencé, lequel sera parachevé par le P. Pierre de
Rhodes, Supérieur, et ce pour les dangers auxquels il met la
Congrégation tant envers Rome que vers Mr. de Marseille.62
Martin’s suspension was a consequence of the much larger political power
struggle between the Jesuits and Oratorians over the control of schools that
spilled over into disputes over the curriculum at the universities, particularly
the public teaching of new philosophies that appear to undermine
Aristotelianism. As early as 1624, the Parlement of Paris issued a decree
mandating that Aristotelianism must be the only philosophical system taught
61
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at the universities. Louis XIV made this the law of the country in 1671.63 Even
though there was support for Cartesianism amongst the lower ranks of
Oratory and the Oratory did not officially forbid its members from studying
Cartesianism, there was, by 1641, an anti-Cartesian block at the top levels of
Oratory, led by conservatives such as Senault and the anti-Cartesian
Bourgoing in 1664, which wanted to placate the Jesuits, and in turn, the king
by banning the public teaching of Cartesianism.64 So Martin’s suspension had
everything to do with the public image of Oratory, rather than with an
inherent prejudice against it in the Oratory as we see with the Jesuits. So
Oratorian Cartesians, such as Martin, Malebranche and Lamy, did not
compromise Oratorian principles by studying and espousing Descartes’
philosophy.
Despite Martin’s professional problems, Gouhier convincingly argues
that Martin’s work, Philosophia Christiana (1671), had an important influence
on Malebranche’s Augustinianism.65 In this work, Martin formalized
Oratorian Augustinianism by collecting and ordering under different
philosophical topics relevant passages from Augustine’s work. In the
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appendix of his work, La Philosophie de Malebranche, Gouhier provides a
complete collation of passages from Augustine in Malebranche’s works and
compares them with those in Philosophia Christiana, suggesting that
Malebranche cited Augustine directly from Martin’s work, a work that was in
his library.66 Furthermore, after comparing Martin’s Augustinianism with
Malebranche’s, particularly in relation their theories of knowledge, Gouhier
concludes that “l’augustinisme que Malebranche a connu, c’est celui de la
Philosophia Christiana ; entre saint Augustin et Malebranche, il y a Ambrosius
Victor”.67
Moreover, Remsberg believes that Martin’s work is representative of
Oratorian Augustinianism in general. He argues that Martin, in line with
Bérulle, but contrary to Jansen and Saint-Cyran, focuses his attention on
Augustine’s work on knowledge rather than on grace. He calculates that
Martin “shows a preference for those works written at a time when Augustine
was interested in the problem of knowledge by a ratio of 2.66 to 1.”68 Since
Martin’s ratio favors Augustine’s work on knowledge, Remsberg concludes
that Martin is not concerned with “the problem of grace and free will, but the
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problem of the relation of all knowledge to God, which is the problem of
science and religion, science and wisdom”.69 So whether or not Martin had a
strong influence on Malebranche, as Gouhier suggests, Malebranche was
obviously aware of Martin’s work and probably recognized it as reflection of
the Oratory’s particular brand of Augustinianism.
For Martin, the mind is intimately united to God’s eternal truths, and it
is through this union that mind can know the intellectual structure of the
physical and moral realms. Consequently, God’s illumination is not limited to
grace and salvation, but to all areas of knowledge. More importantly, Martin
suggests that the mind is not merely a passive recipient of divine illumination,
but has the ability to turn the mind’s eye towards these truths in an attempt to
understand them better and to discover other truths. Of course, the mind,
which is finite and corrupted by the Fall, cannot know these truths perfectly,
but it can, through the Augustinian discipline of cognitive reflection, train the
mind to turn away from the distractions of the world and focus its attention
on God and its relationship to him. By doing this, the mind can prepare its
rational capacities and moral disposition to receive God’s illumination.70 As
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we will see in detail in chapter three, this is important for Malebranche’s
theory of the mind’s perfection.

1.4

Malebranche’s Augustinianism and the Mind’s Perfection

Four years prior to his ordination in 1664, Malebranche entered the Oratory,
under the advice of his maternal uncle de Lauzon, in 1660. He was tonsured
and received the four minor orders on March 28, 1660.71 Gouhier, quoting
Lelong, suggests that Malebranche chose the Oratory over a canonship at
Norte Dame because the Oratory satisfied his physical and spiritual needs.72
Its liberal conditions for membership—he could leave at any time and there
were no fixed set of priestly duties—suited his weak physical condition, and
allowed him the free time to pursue his spiritual and intellectual interests. In
1661, he spent a few months at the Oratorian school Notre Dame des
Ardilliers at Saumar studying theology. The school vigorously competed with
the prestigious Protestant Academy, but the rivalry was friendly, with
students freely attending lectures at both school.73 Around this time, Saumar
was considered a hot spot for Cartesianism, particularly with the influence
and popularity of Louis de la Forge and the earlier lectures of Louis
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Thomassin from 1648 to 1654, but there is no evidence that Malebranche was
taken in by Cartesianism at this time. It was not until his encounter with
Descartes’ Treatise on Man in 1664 that he switched his focus from mainly
theological concerns and biblical exegesis—he worked with the controversial
bible critic Richard Simon—to Cartesianism and mechanical physics.74
We can conclude from this that the intellectual atmosphere that
fundamentally influenced Malebranche’s thought in the first four years at the
Oratory was most likely its Augustinianism, not necessarily its Cartesian
inclinations. Following Gouhier and Remsberg, I argue that the Oratory’s
intellectual tradition, based on Bérulle’s Augustinianism and later articulated
and developed by Oratorians such as Martin, shaped Malebranche’s core
beliefs about the epistemological unity of all knowledge, and the mind’s
ability to access the intellectual structure of the moral and physical realms
through its union with God’s eternal truths. These beliefs, accordingly,
became the filter through which he understood Descartes’ philosophy and
developed his own particular brand of Cartesianism.75 Malebranche’s system
can also be seen as the fulfillment of Bérulle’s goal of developing a new and
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improved Christian philosophy based on Augustinian and Cartesian
principles that could replace Aristotelianism.76 So Malebranche’s ordination
into in the Oratory 1664, I believe, represents not only his commitment to the
Oratory as an institution and its goals, but also to its Augustinian tradition. In
the

end,

understanding

the

place

of

Oratorian

Augustinianism

in

Malebranche’s philosophy is vital for seeing how the major parts of his system
fit together, since it is the linchpin the connects each part. For the rest of this
chapter, however, I want to provide a rough outline of Malebranche’s
Augustinianism, particularly in relation to the basic principles of his
philosophical system.
First of all, Oratorian Augustinianism is at the core of Malebranche’s
philosophical persona, that is, the cognitive and moral dispositions, practices,
and goals by which he conducts and guides his life as a philosopher.77
Malebranche’s philosophical persona should be understood within the context
of what John Cottingham calls the traditional model of philosophy, where
philosophy is seen as a comprehensive enterprise whose twofold goal is to
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provide, through the interior cultivation of the philosopher’s intellectual and
moral character, a complete summary of philosophical knowledge in all areas
(e.g. metaphysics, physics, and morals) and use this knowledge to discover the
best way to live.78 This twofold goal is clearly expressed by the seventeenthcentury Cartesian philosopher Antoine Le Grand in the first passage of the
preface of his encyclopedic work, An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the
Principles of the Famous Renate Des Cartes:
Philosophy, according to its etymology, is the love and study of
wisdom; where by wisdom we understand such a disposition of the
mind, by which Man is firmly inclined to have the right sentiments of
the things that occur to his perception, and to make a just examination
of the actions that belong to his life. For wisdom, doth not only direct
the understanding, and guide the mind in the contemplation of truth;
but also inclines it to honesty, and assists the will in the prosecution of
virtue; So that wisdom is indeed nothing else but a perfect knowledge
of all those things which is possible for man to know, and which may
be both a rule to his life, and help to the inventing of all arts
whatsoever. Whence philosophy may be defined as a habit of the mind,
acquired by study and exercise from inborn ideas and self evident
principles, enlightening the understanding in the knowledge of
necessary things, and perfecting the will by honest and virtuous
actions.79
Philosophical knowledge, for Le Grand, is not the end of philosophical
inquiry, but the means to properly ordering one’s life, and for providing
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universal happiness for all with discoveries in the mechanical arts. More
importantly, he suggests that the philosopher must have the right dispositions
and habits to acquire philosophical knowledge and to use it beneficially for
the individual and common good. His description of the philosopher as one
who exercises the intellect through a careful and methodical study of the
mind’s innate ideas and self-evident principles is clearly Cartesian, but it is
also in line with the traditional philosophical persona that makes the
acquisition and proper use of philosophical knowledge dependent upon the
philosopher’s own intellectual and moral character.80 Even though there was a
new philosophical persona developing alongside the traditional one in the
seventeenth century, where knowledge acquisition, particularly in the field of
natural philosophy, shifted from its dependence on personal character to
scientific methods that anyone could use, whether intellectual scoundrel or
saint, the traditional persona was still very much alive during this period.81
Malebranche, I believe, follows this tradition by advocating the interior
cultivation of one’s character, and arguing that such cultivation is necessary
for the acquisition of philosophical knowledge and in the ability to act
according to it.
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Now Malebranche consistently expresses the traditional philosophical
persona from an Augustinian perspective. The bedrock principle of his
philosophy is the claim that all minds are united to God, and that this union is
the most natural and essential to the mind because God, who can only act for
himself (God is self-sufficient and desires nothing outside of himself), can
create minds only to know and love him (OCM I 10, LO xxxiv).
The mind of man is by its nature situated, as it were, between its
Creator and corporeal creatures, for, according to Augustine, there is
nothing but God above it and nothing but bodies below it…the latter
union [God-mind] raises the mind above all things. Through it, the
mind receives its life, its light, and its entire felicity, and at many points
in his works Saint Augustine speaks of this union as the one most
natural and essential to the mind (OCM I 9, LO xxxiii).
It is through this union that all minds have access to the eternal truths that
structure the physical and moral realms. Without knowledge of this rational
structure, the mind would be unable to gain knowledge of the natural world
and our proper moral obligations to other human beings.
The Reason which enlightens man is the Word or the Wisdom of God
Himself. Though every creature is a particular being, the reason which
enlightens man’s mind is universal (OCM XI 17, CW 45).
In contemplating this Divine substance, I may see some part of that
which God thinks. God sees all truths, and I may see some of them.
Then, I am able to discover something of what God wills; for God wills
only according to Order, and Order is not entirely unknown to me
(OCM XI 18, CW 45).
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For by contemplating the intelligible substance of the Word, which
alone makes me reasonable and all other intelligent beings, I clearly see
the relations of magnitude which exist between the intelligible ideas
contained therein; and these relations are the same eternal truths which
God sees. For God…sees as well as I that 2 and 2 are 4, and that
triangles which have the same base and are between the same parallels
are equal. I may also discover, at least confusedly, the relations of
perfection which exist between these same ideas; and these relations are
the immutable Order which God consults when He acts, the Order
which also must govern the esteem and love of all intelligent beings
(OCM V 19, CW 46).
God’s Order is always present to the mind, but it is up to the mind itself to
recognize it.
These truths cannot be erased from the mind, and they infallibly
discover them when it pleases them to think about them (OCM I 13, LO
xxxv).
The truth does not abandon them, it is they who abandon the truth. Its
light shines in the darkness but does not always dispel it, just as the
sun’s light surrounds those who are blind or who shut their eyes,
although it enlightens neither of them (OCM I 15, LO xxxvi).
The mind’s recognition of God’s order, however, is not as easy at it might
seem. Even though the mind can, in principle, access and follow God’s Order,
its secondary union with the body seriously distracts and hinders the mind by
bombarding it with sensible stimulation, and by constantly occupying it with
things that relate to the body, from mere bodily preservation to material
wealth and worldly reputation (OCM I 12, LO xxxv).
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However, I admit that immutable Order is not easy to reach; it dwells
within us, but we are always spreading ourselves out to the world
around us. Our senses spread our soul out to all parts of the body, and
our imagination and passions spread it out to all the objects around us,
often even to a world having nor more reality than imaginary spaces;
this is incontestable (OCM XI 33, CW 56).
Malebranche sees the body’s dominance over the mind as evidence of the
disordered union between the mind and body that was caused by the Fall,
where Adam, out of pride, turned away from contemplating and following
God’s order to revel in the sensations and passions of his body (OCM I 72, LO
579-580). By doing this, Adam fundamentally switched around the mind-body
power relation that he had before the Fall, where he had complete control over
the movements of his body and the sensations and passions that are connected
to them (OCM V 95, PR 150-151). Humankind inherited this disorder from
Adam, and now all minds are dominated by bodily sensations and passions,
which constantly distract the mind from contemplating God’s order.
Overcoming this predicament, for Malebranche, requires a constant effort on
part of the mind’s attention to focus and concentrate on God’s order (OCM XI
59-69, CW 75-82).
By a general law which He constantly follows and all of whose
consequences He has foreseen, God has linked the presence of ideas to
the mind’s paying attention: when we are masters of our attention and
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make use of it, then without fail light is spread within us, in direct
proportion to our effort (OCM XI 59, CW 75).
Man is free, presuming the necessary aids. Concerning Truth, he is able
to search for it, in spite of his difficulty in meditating. Concerning
Order, he is able to follow it in spite of the forces of concupiscence. He
can sacrifice his peace of mind for the sake of Truth, and his pleasures
for the sake of Order (OCM XI 22, CW 48)
Even though he believes that the mind must be aided in its endeavor by
Christ’s grace, whenever his grace so happens to touch it, the mind must,
nonetheless, do the necessary preparatory work to receive and utilize it (OCM
V 132, PR 182-183).
Given his understanding of the mind’s dual union with God and the
body, Malebranche, in line with the traditional philosophical persona, believes
that one of the main goals of philosophy is to perfect the mind, that is, to
maximize the mind’s ability to successfully access, comprehend, and follow
God’s Order, while reducing the body’s control over the mind. In fact, nothing
is more important to Malebranche than the “science of man” (OCM I 22, LO
xl). He typically describes perfection in terms of strengthening the mind’s
bond with God by submitting to, and following, his divine order. The degree
to which the mind follows God’s order determines the mind’s level of
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perfection, and in turn, its happiness. The more perfection the mind has, the
more it resembles God.
We are rational creatures, therefore our virtue, our perfection is to love
Reason, or rather, to love Order (OCM XI 24, CW 49).
In order to be happy we must be perfect. Virtue, or man’s perfection
consists in submission to the immutable Order, never following the
order of nature (OCM XI 17, CW 45).
Thus anyone who works at his own perfection and makes himself to
resemble God, works for his own happiness, works for his own dignity.
If he does that which in some way depends on him to do, that is, if he
earns merit by making himself perfect, God…will make him happy. For
since God loves beings in proportion as they are lovable, and since the
most perfect are the most lovable, the most perfect will be the most
powerful, and most happy and the most content. Anyone who
constantly consults reason and loves Order, thereby taking part in the
perfection of God, will also take part in His happiness, His glory and
His dignity (OCM XI 23, CW 48).
Without this cognitive ability, Malebranche believes that the mind would be
unable to acquire knowledge in the fields of mathematics, physics, theology
and ethics, since all knowledge is grounded in God’s order.
[I]t is only by the mind’s attention that any truths are discovered or any
sciences acquired, because the mind’s attention is in fact only its
conversion and return to God, who is the sole Master, who alone
teaches us all truth through the manifestation of his substance, as Saint
Augustine says, and without the intervention of any creature (OCM I
17-18, LO xxxviii).
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In his work Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion Malebranche
illustrates, through the characters Theodore and his student Aristes, the
cognitive process by which the mind can perfect itself. In the opening scene,
Theodore suggests that he and Aristes should retreat to Theodore’s study,
away from the distractions of the world, so that they can consult God’s order
about certain metaphysical matters (OCM XII 29, JS 3). Over the next several
days, Theodore helps Aristes, through a rational meditative process, to focus
his mind’s eye on God’s order. He does this by guiding Aristes from simple
truths to more complex ones, and by constantly admonishing Aristes when he
uses his senses and imagination to defend particular claims or explicate
certain concepts. It is through these cognitive exercises that Aristes
strengthens his connection with God’s order, thereby perfecting himself and
giving him a rational starting point to acquire knowledge in other fields. So,
for Malebranche, the mind’s perfection is the first goal of any philosopher, and
must be the necessary starting point for any successful attempt at providing a
comprehensive account of knowledge that, in turn, can be used to better order
our lives, including the material benefit that is gained through advances in the
mechanical arts.
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As we can see, the mind’s union with God’s Order and its perfection
are at the center of Malebranche’s philosophical enterprise. Since God’s order
grounds and unifies all knowledge, the philosopher’s mind must tap into it in
order to know the rational structure of the physical and moral realms. Based
on his theological understanding of the mind’s disordered union with the
body, however, he believes that the mind has a serious epistemological deficit,
and the only way to recover from it is to cultivate and perfect our intellectual
and moral character by turning the mind’s attention away from the senses and
imagination towards God’s order. By participating in God’s order, the mind
also participates in God’s happiness (OCM XI 22, CW 48).
As I mentioned in the introduction, Malebranche’s theory of the mind’s
perfection has not been at the forefront of Anglo-American scholarship. The
focus has been on the mechanics of his divine illumination theory, primarily in
terms of visual perception, and his causal theory of occasionalism. Given the
historical and philosophical evidence presented in this chapter, Malebranche’s
Oratorian Augustinianism is central to his philosophy, and must be given due
consideration if we have any chance of providing a complete account of his
system, and in reconciling the apparent difficulties between its parts,
particularly between his occasionalism and theory of freedom. The rough
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outline provided here can be seen as a roadmap, with its directions and
signposts, by which we can engage in a more detailed and complex discussion
of Malebranche’s Augustinianism and the theory of perfection that it entails.
In order to this, we must first examine Augustine’s own theory of the mind’s
perfection, limiting our discussion to Augustine’s early works on knowledge,
and then, within this context, explicate Malebranche’s theory of perfection,
incorporating elements of his Cartesian metaphysics and physics. These are
the goals of the second and third chapters respectively.

2.

2.1

Augustine and the Mind’s Perfection

Introduction

In chapter one, I argued that Malebranche, as an Oratorian, is fundamentally
an Augustinian, specifically in terms of Augustine’s theory of knowledge and
the soul’s perfection. This brand of Augustinianism is at the core of his
philosophical persona, that is, the belief that philosophers must cultivate their
intellectual and moral character in order to acquire philosophical knowledge.
This, I argue, puts the mind’s perfection at the heart of his philosophical
system and that the other parts of his system must be understood in terms of
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it. In order to understand his theory of perfection, we need to examine
Augustine’s own theory for comparison. Though the two theories differ in
some details, the method and stages of perfection are relatively the same.

2.2

Perfecting the Soul

Augustine’s method for perfecting the soul is closely connected to the ancient
tradition of intellectual eudaemonism, whereby the soul, through the
attainment of wisdom, achieves happiness. As he explains in his Confessions,
Augustine, at the young age of nineteen, was introduced to this tradition by
reading Cicero’s Hortensius, where Cicero exhorts his reader to practice
philosophy, that is, to become a lover of wisdom. After reading this book,
Augustine explains that he was “inflamed by such a great love of philosophy
that I considered devoting myself to it at once” and “by its call I was aroused
and kindled and set on fire to love and seek and capture and hold fast and
strongly cling not to this or that school, but to wisdom itself” (De beata vita 1.4;
Conf. 3.4.7). Augustine believed that his burning search for truth was
essentially the same as his search for God; seeing God as the source of truth.
His desire was to come to an accurate understanding of the nature of God, his
own soul and the relationship between the two (Sol. 1.2.7).
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Thee I invoke, O God, the Truth, in, by and through whom all truths
are true; the Wisdom, in, by and through whom all are wise who are
wise; the True and Perfect Life, in by and through whom live all who
live truly and perfectly…the Intelligible Light, in, by and through
whom all intelligible things are illumined…(Sol. 1.13)
Impassioned with the desire for wisdom—“O Truth, Truth, how the deepest
and innermost marrow of my mind ached for you”—Augustine struggled to
find the content of this wisdom, spending nine years as a devotee of the
aberrant Christian sect Manichaeism, subscribing to its material conceptions of
God, the soul and evil. Finding problems with the Manichees’s understanding
of the physical universe, particularly in relation to their astronomical
calculations, and discovering that their assertions of intellectual certainty were
empty after his unsatisfying encounter with the Manichee leader Faustus of
Milevius, Augustine, despairing that he would never discover the truth,
briefly flirted with Academic skepticism (Conf. 3.6.10, 5.3.3-5.7.13, 5.10.19).
Though skepticism provided consolation for his despair, it also taught him
that the search for wisdom is a difficult journey that must be taken with
intellectual courage, and is not instant and prepackaged as the Manichees
proclaimed.82 It also helped clear the way for Augustine to explore other
philosophical paths that might lead to his goal. When he finally settled in
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Milan, after brief stays in Carthage and Rome, Augustine discovered
Neoplatonism. There, he encountered the intellectual cosmopolitan Ambrose,
the powerful bishop of Milan, who, through his sermons, indirectly
introduced him to Neoplatonism by using Platonist language and concepts to
present a sophisticated and intellectually rigorous understanding of
Catholicism and the scriptures that went far beyond the primitive and
superstitious Catholicism he was taught, and outright rejected, in his native
North Africa. His authority and teachings made Catholic doctrine palatable to
Augustine, moving him from skepticism to belief (Conf. 5.14.24, 6.3.3-6.5.8).
Around the same time, he was directly introduced to Neoplatonism through
Plotinus, whose works were given to him by his friend Manlius Theodorus, a
devotee of Plotinus.83 As Ambrose gave Augustine the justification he needed
to believe in Catholic doctrine without fully understanding it, Neoplatonism
gave Augustine the philosophical framework and intellectual discipline he
needed to develop a new understanding of the Christian universe that was
based on immaterial conceptions of God, the soul and evil. This new vision
helped him overcome the contradictions between the Manichee’s materialistic
understanding of God and evil, and his own axiomatic beliefs about God’s
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immutability, inviolability, goodness, and omnipotence (Conf. 7.2.3-7.5.7).84
Neoplatonism, in this sense, gave Augustine the philosophical support he
needed to move from his belief in Catholic doctrine, instilled by Ambrose, to
rationally understanding and accepting it. In turn, this process helped prepare
him to receive Christ’s redemptive grace and finally to commit himself to God
and Catholicism.
Augustine believed that both philosophy, in his case Neoplatonism,
and Christianity served the same goal of achieving wisdom, that is, actively
contemplating God’s Truth (or Christ understood as the Word), but each
provided a different, yet complementary, way of achieving it. Each served
different therapeutic functions for repairing and strengthening the soul.
Christianity, through faith, hope and charity, fortifies the soul’s moral
character so that it can turn away from concupiscent desires and maintain its
focus on God. Philosophy, by strengthening the soul’s cognitive powers,
provides the soul with a rational method by which it can comprehend, and act
in accordance with, the Truth. Both practices are expressed in Augustine’s
famous formula, succinctly expressed by Anselm, credo ut intelligam: “I believe
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so that I can understand”.85 By coordinating these practices, and with the help
of God’s grace, he believed that the soul could achieve perfection and wisdom,
and therefore a happy life.
Of course it must be mentioned that the compatibility between
Neoplatonism and Christianity was not perfect. Firstly, Neoplatonism did not
speak to some fundamental truths of Christianity, such as the incarnation of
the Word or Truth in the person of Jesus Christ, and the knowledge gained
from scripture and Catholic doctrine (Conf. 7.9,13-15). And secondly, there was
a serious tension between Neoplatonism’s claim of spiritual autonomy,
wherein the soul, under its rational powers alone, can achieve wisdom, and
Christianity’s emphasis on the soul’s dependence on God.86 This tension is
clearly seen, as we saw in chapter one, in Augustine’s own writings,
particularly between the rather optimistic Neoplatonic works of his early
period in which he demonstrates the soul’s rational powers in gaining
knowledge of God and the soul, and his more pessimistic works after 410 CE,
with the start of the Pelegian controversy, where he changes his focus from the
soul’s ability to acquire knowledge to discussing the soul’s severe moral
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weakness and the need for God’s grace.87 Given our discussion in chapter one
of André Martin’s narrow focus on Augustine’s early work on knowledge,
and in turn, Malebranche’s reliance on Martin for his understanding of
Augustine, we will focus most of our attention on these early works to see
how Augustine understands the soul’s rational powers in relation to his
methods for knowledge and the soul’s perfection. While acknowledging the
necessity of God’s grace in this process, we can, justifiably, bracket the thorny
interpretive difficulties of how Augustine, in the end, understood the
relationship between the soul’s autonomy and God’s grace. Nevertheless, we
can say, as we will see in the next section, that Augustine believed that the
soul has the power and ability, given the right training, to prepare itself
effectively to receive and comprehend God’s illumination. In fact, Augustine’s
method for perfecting the soul necessarily presupposes it. With this being
said, we can focus most of our attention on the philosophical, or more
specifically, the modified Neoplatonist therapeutic practices that Augustine
advocated.
So, for Augustine, the natural desire, and ultimate goal, of every
rational soul is happiness, that is, the affective contemplation of God through
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the Word or Truth. “The life of blessedness and repose for man consists in the
harmonious rationality of all his activity” (Markus 381; cf. Conf. 10.23.33; De
lib. arb. 2.8, 2.18). By constantly contemplating the Truth, and consistently
acting in accordance with it, the rational soul comes to imitate God as best it
can, ordering its life in relative harmony with God’s order. As a result, the
soul gains wisdom (sapientia), perfection, and ultimately, happiness (De beata
vita 4.35; De Trin. 12.22 quoted above).
The wise man is so closely united with God in his mind that nothing
can come between to separate them. God is truth, and no one is wise if
he has not truth on his mind. We cannot deny that man’s wisdom is a
kind of intermediary placed between the folly of man and the pure
truth of God. The wise man, so far as it is given to him, imitates God
(De util. cred. 15.33; cf. De Trin. 12.10).
Augustine believes that the soul has a unique position in the middle of God’s
created hierarchy, and can exercise its rational powers in both the material
and intellectual realms, with the ability to direct and focus its attention on
either realm. In order to be happy, the soul must primarily focus its attention
on the intelligible realm, while minimizing the desires, cares, and demands of
its body (De vera relig. 12.24). Pre-lapsarian Adam is an exemplar of this
perfect state, being in full control of his body and undisturbed by its
concupiscent desires while focusing maximum attention on God. As a soul-
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body composite, Adam was in perfect harmony, ordering his thoughts and
actions according to God’s eternal order (De civ. Dei 14.10). Adam’s sin,
however, was the result of a prideful act, whereby Adam freely turned his
attention away from God and towards his body and its desires, which he
wants to possess and govern according to his own self-interested laws (De civ.
Dei 14.13; De vera relig. 15.29; De Trin. 12.14). This greed to satisfy concupiscent
desires acts like a weight that drags the soul down from its intelligible heights
to the material realm below, from which the soul cannot escape on its own
(Conf. 7.17.23). As a result of this downward movement, the soul is “heaved
out of happiness”, losing direct contact with God’s eternal truths, and
therefore, the knowledge to act in accordance with it (De Trin. 12.14).
Ultimately, Adam disrupted the perfect harmony he had with his body and
God, surrendering control over his body, leaving him vulnerable to its
concupiscent desires. Now this disordered state, according to Augustine, has
been hereditarily passed down to all human beings, putting them at the mercy
of bodily passions and pleasures. They overwhelm the soul’s attentive powers,
forcing the soul to turn away from God and towards the material realm (De
civ. Dei 14.10). With its attention divided amongst bodily desires and carnal
habits, the soul has little time to contemplate and act in accordance with God’s
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eternal order, leaving the soul in a constant state of disharmony, qualitatively
far away from the happiness it naturally desires.
The soul’s damaged state and its repair is of the utmost importance to
Augustine. This is portrayed in the Confessions, where he passionately
describes, through his own difficult conversion and the spiritual challenges he
subsequently faced, the soul’s constant struggle to control its concupiscent
desires and to turn its attention back towards God’s eternal order. But all is
not lost for Augustine. He believes that the soul, though seriously damaged,
has the power, with the help of God’s grace, to repair itself and partly regain
the harmony and order experienced by pre-lapsarian Adam (De vera relig.
15.29). Augustine believes, as I mentioned above, that the soul could achieve
this with a prescription of Christian faith and authority on the one hand, and
the regular practice of intellectual and moral exercises to refocus the mind’s
attention on God on the other. Both, used in conjunction, prepare and develop
the soul’s intellectual and moral character so that it can receive God’s wisdom.
Before we get into the specifics of this prescription, we need to see how
Augustine conceives of the soul and its powers in terms of its relationships to
both the body and God.
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2.2.1

The Augustinian Soul

The best place to start is Augustine’s account of the relationship between the
soul and body. For Augustine, the soul in the most general and fundamental
sense is the life-principle of all living things. In the case of human beings, the
rational soul is the dynamic active force that controls the vegetative and
sensitive operations of the body, and the rational operations of the mind (De
quant. anim. 70ff.). Augustine describes the union of soul and body as a
mixture in which the soul is temporally present throughout the entire body
and is aware of the changes in the body through what he calls vital “attention”
or “concentration” (intentio).
The soul is not of a bodily nature, nor does it fill the body as its local
space, like water filling a bottle or a sponge, but in wonderful ways it is
mixed into the body it animates, and with its incorporeal nod, so to say,
it powers or steers the body with a kind of concentration, not with any
material engine (quadam intentione, non mole) (De Gen. ad litt. 8.21.42).
The soul’s vital attention also controls the inner workings of the body, and
actively uses the sense organs to make contact with the material world. Since
the body is inferior to the soul and cannot act on it, the sense organs are
merely an instrument for the soul activities (De Musica 6.5.9-10). “It is not the
body, you see, that senses, but the soul through the body, using it as a kind of
messenger in order to form in itself the message being brought in from
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outside” (De Gen. ad litt. 12.24.51). Augustine speaks of the sense organs as
windows through which the soul senses the external world.88 In the end, he
compares the soul’s relationship to body as that of master ruling his servant
(De Musica 6.9).
Augustine explains the soul’s interactions with the sense organs in the
following way. He believes that the brain has three ventricles that are located
in the front, middle and back of the brain (De Gen. ad litt. 7.13.20-18.24). The
front ventricle controls the sensations, the middle houses the memory, and the
back ventricle controls the movements of the body. From the center of the
brain, tiny tubes are distributed throughout the body and are connected to the
sense organs. These tiny tubes, which contain a fiery corporeal medium,
transmit stimuli to the brain. But, the fiery corporeal medium manifests itself
differently according to the nature of each sense organ and their
corresponding objects (De Gen. ad litt. 3.4.6, 7.13.20). Light is the medium for
eyes, air for the ears, mist for the nose, dampness for the mouth, earth or mud
for the skin (i.e. touch) (De Musica 6.10). Now the soul controls the sense
organs by activating the various mediums of each organ. Augustine suggests
that since light is closest in nature to the incorporeal nature of the soul, the
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soul uses light to interact, by mixing, with the grosser elemental mediums of
the sense organs (De Gen. ad litt. 7.20.26, 12.16.32; De Musica 6.8.24). In this
context, he describes sensation as the product of the motion and countermotion of the medium by external stimuli and the soul (De Musica 6.15). This
motion and counter-motion attracts the attention or concentration of the soul.
Thus, sensation, for Augustine, is the result of physiological processes and the
soul’s attentive or concentrated activities (De Musica 6.10). Augustine’s most
detailed explanation of the soul’s activities in sense perception is found in his
account of visual perception or what he calls corporeal vision.
Visual perception consists of both physical and psychological
processes. In terms of the physical process, Augustine argues for a ray theory
of vision where the soul animates the visual organs in such a way that a
sheath of rays project from the eyes and touch the object within its visual field
(De quant. anim. 23.43; De Gen. ad litt. 7.13.20; De Trin. 11.2). The rays, in this
case, become a sentient medium between the object and the visual organ.
When the rays touch the object, the object disturbs the sentient medium in
such a way as to stimulate the visual organ. The visual organ, in turn, forms a
corresponding sensible (corporeal) image of the object. At this point, the
psychological process takes over. Once the visual organ is stimulated and put
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into motion, the soul, through sensory counter-motion, becomes aware of this
motion, and simultaneously produces a corresponding non-corporeal image
(phantasia) that is stored in the memory. Once the image is produced, the soul
“sees” the external object. Note that the body does not cause the soul to
produce an image, it merely provides the occasion for the soul to produce it.
It must also be noted that the memory, in this process, is not merely a
recipient of the spiritual image, but plays an active role in the production of it.
Since sense perception is a temporal process, it requires the memory to collect
and organize the spatio-temporal parts of the image in such a way that it
forms a complete image (De Gen. ad litt. 12.16.33). In De Musica, Augustine
uses the sensation of hearing to illustrate this point.
For any syllable, no matter how short, since it begins and stops, has its
beginning at one time and its ending at another. Then it is stretched
over some little interval of time and stretches from its beginning
through its middle to an end. So reason finds that spatial as well as
temporal intervals have an infinite division and so no syllable’s end is
heard with its beginning. And so, even in hearing the shortest syllable,
unless memory help us have in the soul that motion made when the
beginning sounded, at the very moment when no longer the beginning
but the end of the syllable is sounding, then we cannot say we have
heard anything (De Musica 5.8.21).
Since time intervals are infinitely divisible, the beginning of a syllable does not
temporally coincide with its end; therefore, memory is needed to retain each
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temporal part in order for the soul to hear the entire syllable. Similarly, since
space is infinitely divisible, the soul cannot perceive an extended body
simultaneously in its entirety without the aid of the memory. So, memory is
not only used to store the perceptual image, it is necessary for the production
of the image itself. As we will see, memory plays a vital role in the higher
cognitive and rational activities of the soul.
For Augustine, corporeal vision is considered a low-grade activity that
human beings have in common with the animals. A higher-grade activity is
the imaginative activity or what Augustine calls spiritual vision. Spiritual
vision is a purely psychological activity that consists in the rational soul
turning its attention away from the body and towards the memory where it
can consciously recall images (phantasms), strengthens associations with other
images, and stitches together new images from the parts of other images. In
the simple case of recalling images from memory, the soul actually produces
an exact copy of the image stored in the memory. The stored image is a
template from which the soul can print-off, as it were, a copy of the image.
When the soul directs its attention to other thoughts, the copy is automatically
erased and replaced by other images, but the original image is still retained in
the memory for later use (De Trin. 11.6). The rational soul also has the power
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to collect, combine and manipulate images in such a way as to produce
entirely new images (De Trin. 11.13). These new images can also be retained in
memory for recall later. Augustine describes this power of cogitatio—to push
together, collect—in the following way.
Enormous wonder wells up within me when I think of this [power of
the memory], and I am dumbfounded. People go to admire lofty
mountains, and huge breakers at sea, and crashing waterfalls, and vast
stretches of ocean, and the dance of the stars, but they leave themselves
behind out of sight. It does not strike them as wonderful that I could
enumerate those things without seeing them with my eyes, and that I
could not ever have spoken of them unless I could within my mind
contemplate mountains and waves and rivers and stars (which I have
seen), and the ocean (which I only take on trust), and contemplate them
there in space just as vast as though I were seeing them outside myself
(Conf. 10.15).
Expanding this beyond sensible images, Augustine believes that the memory
also stores other things such as past experiences, emotions and learned crafts
that the soul can recall, combine, and manipulate at will. This higher
cogitative power is restricted to human beings (De Trin. 12.2; Conf. 10.11.18).
Animals, on the other hand, are limited to retaining and recalling sensible
images and cannot consciously combine and manipulate images into new
ones. Augustine believes that these activities are good enough for animals to
survive in their environment and procreate (De quant. anim. 33.71; De Trin.
12.2).
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So far we can see that Augustine believes that the soul has a variety of
powers that are responsible for a human being’s basic life functions, sensitive
capacities, and imaginative activities. In his account of corporeal vision, the
soul is not only responsible for animating the visual organ and directing it
towards particular objects, but also for the production of non-corporeal
images that correspond to the material objects. In the case of spiritual vision,
the rational soul can actively recall, combine, and produce new images at will.
The evidence presented so far clearly indicates that the Augustinian soul is by
its very nature active. As we will see, this is also the case for the highest
activities of the rational soul, namely, reason and knowledge acquisition.

2.2.2

Augustine’s Theory of Divine Illumination

For Augustine, following his own interpretation of Neoplatonism, reality and
knowledge are two parallel hierarchical structures that are intimately related
to each other with God at the top. God, in terms of reality, created a perfect
world that consists in a hierarchy of diverse beings that is patterned according
to his divine order (rationes aeternae) (De nat. boni c. Man. ii). At the top of this
created hierarchy, are incorporeal rational souls (humans and angels) and at
the very bottom are material objects. In the middle, participating in both
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realms, are human beings, which, as we have seen, are soul-body
composites.89 Given the unique position of human beings in this hierarchy,
they are confronted with two objects of knowledge that correspond to
different degrees of the reality: the mutable, temporal objects of the material
world and the immutable, eternal truths or forms in God’s mind. The rational
soul has access to both areas of knowledge through two rational processes: the
ratio inferior (or lower reason), which is concerned with sensible knowledge
(scientia), and the ratio superior (or higher reason), which is concerned with the
intellectual knowledge (sapientia) achieved through the mind alone (De Trin.
12.22). The end of the former is practical action in the material world and the
end of the latter is ultimately the contemplation of God and the happiness
derived thereof (De vera relig. 29.72; De quant. anim. 76; Conf. 10.23.33). So, for
Augustine, not only is intellectual knowledge or wisdom (sapientia) superior to
practical knowledge (scientia) in the sense that intellectual objects have a
higher degree of reality than material objects, but also in the fact that in the act
of contemplating eternal truths the soul turns its attention away from the
sensible world and towards God.
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The rational soul’s acquisition of practical knowledge and wisdom
consists in its innate rational powers and God’s divine illumination.
Unfortunately, the relationship between the soul’s rational powers and God’s
illumination is difficult to assess. Ronald Nash bluntly acknowledges that “no
other important aspect of Augustine’s philosophy has proved as difficult to
understand and to explain as this notion that God in some way illumines the
mind of man”.90 There are two main difficulties. The first difficulty is figuring
out how the rational soul accesses or acquires God’s eternal truths (rationes
aeternae). The second difficulty is trying to demarcate the contributions of God
and the rational soul in the acquisition of knowledge. After working out these
difficulties, we will see that Augustine’s theory of illumination is not a
supernatural invasion of the rational mind, but a natural activity of the mind
that is made possible by God.
Concerning the first difficulty, Augustine suggests that the immutable
truths are both in God and rational souls (mens). In De libero arbitrio, Augustine
provides an argument for the claim that immutable truths must be in God. He
argues that truth, by its nature, is eternal, immutable and common amongst all
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minds. It is the standard by which the rational soul judges material objects,
right actions, and the moral quality of other souls.
We make these judgments in accordance with the inner rules of truth,
which we perceive in common; but no one makes judgments about
those rules. When someone says that eternal things are better than
temporal things, or that seven plus three equals ten, no one says that it
ought to be so. We simply recognize that it is so; we are like explorers
who rejoice in what they have discovered, not like inspectors who have
to put things right (De lib. arb. 2.12).
Since truth is the measure rather than that which is measured, truth must be
superior to those things that it measures, including the rational activities of
souls. Moreover, given that something superior cannot originate from
something inferior, Augustine concludes that immutable truths must originate
from something that is equal or superior in nature, namely God. Moreover, if
they are not distinct from the mind, then they will suffer the same temporality
and mutability as the soul, which is contrary to their nature.
Yet, Augustine does not believe that the mind accesses immutable
truths by “seeing” them in God, but suggests that God somehow impresses
these truths on the mind (De Trin. 12.2).91 Again, in De libero arbitrio, Augustine
speaks of how the eternal moral law (justice), number, wisdom and happiness
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are stamped on the mind (De lib. arb. 2.6.15; cf. De ord. 2.8.25, 2.8.20, 2.9.26).
Specifically, they are stamped on the memory.
Then where are these standards written down, where can even the
unjust man recognize what being just is, where can he see what he
ought to have what he does have himself? Where indeed are they
written but in the book of that light which is called truth, from which
every just law is copied, and transferred into the heart of the man who
does justice, not by locomotion but by a kind of impression, rather like
the seal which both passes into the wax and does not leave the signet
ring? (De Trin. 14.21).
The memory also stores countless truths and laws of mathematics and
mensuration, no single one of which was impressed upon it by bodily
sense, for they have no color, sound or smell, nor have they been tasted
or handled (Conf. 10.12.19).
The memory, according to Augustine, does not start out as an empty
storehouse that is gradually filled up with sensory images, past experiences,
and personal actions, but is stocked full of immutable truths from the very
beginning. From this, it follows that these truths are not derived or abstracted
from material objects; rather, they are in the mind prior to experience (De civ.
Dei 8.16).
For Augustine, these truths constitute the mind’s rational structure.
God, making the mind in his own image, patterned the mind’s rational
structure after his divine order. God’s divine order is reflected in the material
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world as well. Augustine explains the parallel patterns of God’s divine order
in the mind and in material world with the following analogy.
Light and heat are both perceived consubstantially, as it were, in the
same fire; they cannot be separated from each other. Yet the heat affects
only the things that are nearby, while the light is radiated far and wide.
In the same way, the power of understanding that inheres in wisdom
warms the things that are closest to it, such as rational souls; whereas
things that are further off, such as material objects, are not touched by
the heat of wisdom, but they are flooded with the light of numbers (De
lib. arb. 2.11).
The fire, in this case, is God’s divine order. God’s divine order “heats” or
endows the mind with a rational structure that is of a higher reality than the
order the material world reflects from the “light” of God’s divine order (cf. De
vera relig. 36). The mind’s position between the parallel patterns of order in
God and the material world gives it the ability not only to contemplate the
intelligible world of God’s divine order, but also to acquire knowledge of the
material world.
Augustine describes the mind’s perception of these truths in terms of
intellectual vision. As corporeal and spiritual vision refers to the mind’s
perception of sensible objects, intellectual vision refers to the mind’s
perception of impressed truths that are stored in memory (De Gen. ad litt.
12.31.59). This activity involves the mind turning its attention away from
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sensible images and focusing on the intellectual objects that God impressed on
it. This is not an easy task. Augustine believes that these truths are latent in
the mind, buried deep in the hidden depths of the memory. The mind can
elicit these truths from the memory by its own volition or through skillful
questioning and learning (Conf. 10.10.17; De Trin. 12.22). He considers this an
activity of higher reason or ratio superior. The end result, for Augustine, is
wisdom or sapientia.
The mind’s knowledge of the material world is an activity of lower
reason or ratio inferior. At one level, this activity involves the mind using truth
as a criterion for judging material objects, such as judging whether an object
should be sought or avoided. At another level, the mind uses it to act
appropriately in the world, for example, applying the ideas of virtue in order
to act courageously in a dangerous situation or act justly towards a friend.
Augustine argues that, “without knowledge (scientia) one cannot have the
virtues which make for right living and by which this woeful life is so
conducted that one may finally reach the truly happy life which is eternal” (De
Trin. 12.22). For him, the end result of these activities is practical knowledge.
From this discussion, we can see that the mind is actively involved in
the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom. The second difficulty is

78
Augustine’s insistence that God’s illumination is necessary for the mind’s
rational activities. I believe, however, that God’s illumination is necessary only
insofar as it makes knowledge possible, but not sufficient for the mind to
acquire knowledge. Augustine explains this in terms of visual perception. Just
as sunlight is necessary for the eyes to see material objects, God’s illumination
is necessary for the mind’s inner eyes to see intellectual objects.
The mind has, as it were, eyes of its own, analogous to the soul’s senses.
The certain truths of the sciences are analogous to the objects which the
sun’s rays make visible, such as the earth and earthly things. And it is
God himself who illumines all (Sol. 1.12).
But the light itself is something else, the light by which the soul is
enlightened in order truly to understand and observe all things either
in itself or in this light. For this light is now God himself, while the soul
is a creature, even though a rational and intelligent one made in his
own image. So when it strives to gaze upon that light it blinks and
shivers in its weakness, and quite simply lacks the power to do so. Yet
that light is what enables it to understand whatever is within the range
of its power (De Gen. ad litt. 12.31.59).
In these two passages, Augustine clearly distinguishes the mind’s activities
from God’s illumination and acknowledges that both are necessary for
knowledge. God’s illumination is necessary for the mind to see truth, but the
mind must also have the cognitive and rational capacities to “see” truth. Just
as the rational soul is active in corporeal vision and spiritual vision, it is
similarly active in intellectual vision.
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Augustine’s theory of divine illumination does not deprive the mind of
its cognitive abilities. Knowledge does not involve God supernaturally
invading the mind, like a divine agent intellect, but consists in the mind
actively acquiring knowledge through its own powers.92 It is true that the
mind is passive insofar as God impresses truths on the mind, but the mind is
active in eliciting these truths from the hidden recesses of the memory and
applying them to the material world. God made the mind in his own image
not only by endowing the mind with a rational structure that is patterned after
his divine ideas, but also by giving it the power to acquire knowledge and
wisdom.

2.3

Three Stages of Perfection

Even though Augustine believes that the soul has the requisite cognitive
ability or power to receive God’s illumination, this ability is severely damaged
by the soul’s disordered relationship with its body that was inherited from
Adam. The soul’s cognitive attention is fragmented and divided among the
body’s needs, desires and habits, effectively clouding the mind’s “eye” and,
thereby, blocking God’s illumination. In this state, the soul’s intellectual and
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moral character is in desperate need of repair. Without it, the soul will never
have the right dispositions and habits to “see” God’s truths and become wise.
Augustine’s therapeutic method for repairing the soul is partly based, just as
his metaphysics and epistemology, on Neoplatonism. Augustine’s method is
obviously different in substantial ways given its Christian inflection, but it
appears to have the same general procedural method as Neoplatonism,
beginning with purification, moving to illumination, and ending, at least
fleetingly in Augustine’s case, in unity (Conf. 7.17.23). To fully understand
Augustine’s therapeutic regime for the soul, we need to examine the
Neoplatonic method that most likely influenced him, namely, the method of
Plotinus, and see how he customized this method to suit the particular needs
of Christianity.93

2.3.1

Plotinus

Plotinus’s method is a program of ascent, one that attempts to turn the soul
inwards, away from its bodily life, and upwards towards a higher intellectual
(contemplative) life, and higher still, towards a unified existence in the One.
The One, for Plotinus, is the transcendent source out which all things come to
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be and where the soul naturally desires to return (E IV.8,6,6). All things flow
from the One through a necessary, yet free, eternal process of successive
emanations whereby higher levels of reality produce lower levels. In this case,
the One, without diminishing itself, begets the Intellect, which in turn, begets
the Soul, and from the Soul emanates the Body (or material realm). So the
soul, according to this model, is situated in an intermediate position between
the lower material reality of bodies and the higher intelligible reality
populated with Platonic forms, which reside (exist) in, and are eternally
contemplated by, Intellect or Nous, which in turn, emanates from the One.
Specifically, the soul itself exists in the intelligible realm, which Plotinus calls
the higher soul, and merely participates in the material realm, called the lower
soul (E IV.8,6,4; E IV.8,6,8). The soul, contrary to Plato’s account in Phaedo, is
not metaphysically entombed in its body, but is “projected” onto the body and
is only attentively imprisoned to the degree that it is concerned with the body
and its needs (E IV.8,6,4). In fact, Plotinus describes the soul’s relationship
with its body as one where the soul is not in the body, but the body is in the
soul (E IV.3,27,9). The soul’s participatory descent into the body comes from
the soul’s natural desire to live a life different from one it lives in the Intellect,
where it eternally contemplates the Forms, to one that orders and governs the
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material realm below it (E IV.8,6,4-5).94 Given this, there is a natural tension
within the soul between its desire for contemplative unity with the Intellect
and its wish for individuality and independence through the governance of
bodies.
Plotinus believes that the soul’s descent is not necessarily good for the
soul. The soul, in concern for its body, can become so immersed in its wants
and needs that it comes to identify itself with it, forgetting its true nature and
higher self. In this case, the soul’s attention becomes fragmented and
dispersed amongst the body’s many desires, eventually losing contact with
the Intellect. In this situation, the soul becomes ugly and identifies itself with
this ugliness.
If someone is immersed in mire or daubed with mud, his native
comeliness disappears; all one sees is the mire and mud with which he
is covered. Ugliness is due to the alien matter that encrusts him. If he
would be attractive once more, he has to wash himself, get clean again,
make himself what he was before. Thus we would be right in saying
that ugliness of soul comes from its mingling with, fusion with,
collapse into the bodily and material: the soul is ugly when it is not
purely itself (E I.6,1,5).
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For Plotinus, however, it is not the body per se and its governance that
is bad, rather it is the mind’s obsessive concern for it that is evil.95 The body, in
this case, is a self-imposed prison.
Thus comes about what is called “loss of wings” or the “chaining” of
the soul. Its no longer the ways of innocence in which, with the Soul, it
presided over the higher realms. Life above was better by far than this.
A thing fallen, chained, at first barred off from intelligence and living
only in sensation, the soul is, as they say, in tomb or cavern pent. Yet its
higher part remains. Let the soul, taking its lead from memory, merely
“think on essential being” and its shackles are loosed and its soars (E
IV.8,6,4).
At the end of this passage, Plotinus intimates that the soul, through its own
powers and abilities, can repair itself by returning to the Intellect and
reuniting with its higher self. For him, this requires a fundamental
reorientation of the soul’s attention by turning it away from the body,
focusing it inward on the soul, and finally upward towards the Intellect.
Plotinus’s program of the soul’s recovery and ascent can be divided
into three progressive stages: purification, illumination, and unification.
Plotinus provides an outline of these stages in his early work On Beauty. Here
he shows how the soul can move from recognizing beauty in material objects
to higher levels of beauty, culminating in the direct contemplation of Beauty
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itself, and if lucky, uniting with the One. In order to reach Beauty itself, the
soul must go through a transformative process whereby it sheds its sensual
desires and gains the intellectual and moral virtues that will enable it to
contemplate Beauty and reunite with the higher soul.
The first step in the purificatory stage is the soul’s recognition of its
own internal beauty through the contemplation of visible or material beauty.
This begins by the soul’s sudden pleasure when it sees a beautiful object,
recognizing and finding kinship with the object’s beauty (E I.6,1,2). Not only
does the beautiful object trigger the soul’s memory of its higher self, but it also
makes it confront the ugliness of its lower, sensual self. Once the soul can
acknowledge the ugliness of its lower self it can begin the purificatory process
of beatifying and strengthening the soul. “When the soul begins to hate its
shame and puts away evil and makes its return, it finds its peace” (E VI.9,9,9).
The soul’s pleasurable kinship moves it to consider the source of the object’s
beauty. The soul, at first, strips away material particularities of the beautiful
object and sees that beauty cannot be reduced to material symmetry or
harmony, but that the material object must participate in something higher
and immaterial (E I.6,1,1-3). The soul’s kinship with the object’s beauty also
makes the soul turn inwards in search of the cause of this kinship, which is its
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own beauty. Even though the soul may see a hint of its own beauty at first
glance, it, nonetheless, has to cultivate this beauty. Plotinus compares the
soul’s beautification (or perfection) to sculpting a statue.
“How can one see the beauty of a good soul?” Withdraw into yourself
and look. If you do not as yet see beauty within you, do as does a
sculptor of a statue that is to be beautified: he cuts away here, he
smoothes it there, he makes this line lighter, this other one purer, until
he disengages beautiful lineaments in the marble. Do you this, too. Cut
away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all
that is overcast, labor to make all one radiance of beauty. Never cease
“working at the statue” until there shines out upon you from it the
divine sheen of virtue, until you see perfect “goodness firmly
established in a stainless shrine (E I.6,1,9)
Sculpting or perfecting one’s soul concerns the cultivation of intellectual and
moral virtues. Without it, the soul will have no chance of contemplating the
Intellect and reuniting with the higher self. In fact, it’s a necessary condition
for the soul’s return. As A.H. Armstrong points out, “Plotinus, like most
Greek philosophers, thought that a philosopher ought to be extremely good as
well as extremely intelligent man, and did not believe that true intelligence
was possible without virtue, or virtue without intelligence”.96 So, for Plotinus,
the soul must have proper moral and intellectual dispositions to contemplate
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the Intellect. As we will see, this attitude is preserved in Augustine and deeply
informs Malebranche’s philosophy.
The soul’s cultivation of these dispositions or virtues is the second step
in the purifying process. The first thing the soul must do is to imitate the
behavior of those who are virtuous. Eventually the imitation of virtue will
turn into genuine virtue.
Like anyone just awakened, the soul cannot look at bright objects. It
must be persuaded to look first at beautiful habits, then the works of
beauty produced not be a craftsman’s skill but by the virtue of men
known for their goodness, then the souls of those who achieve beautiful
deeds (E I.6,1,9).
Practicing virtue helps the soul to separate itself from the concerns of the
body.
In what sense does virtue purify our being, our desires, and all our
other affections, our griefs, and the like? To ask this is to ask how far
the soul can separate itself for the body. In separating itself it
withdraws into itself, into—as it were—its own place above the passion
and affection, the unavoidable pleasures of sense mere medication and
assuagement lest it be disturbed (E I.2,19,5).
To begin the process of the soul’s separation, it must start with the social
virtues, such as prudence, temperance, justice and courage, which help the
soul restrain and control its sensual desires and bodily satisfactions. If the soul
can regularly practice these virtues, it can withstand the necessary hardships
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of life by not letting the pains and sorrow of life get the upper hand, and by
promoting friendly and nurturing relationships between other human beings
(E I.2,19,5). Additionally, the soul uses these virtues to help collect the soul’s
fragmented attention, and to refocus it on the soul’s own interior nature.
Social virtues, however, make up the lowest set of virtues for Plotinus
because they still concern the soul’s relationship with its body and other
people. The higher, purificatory, virtues, which are the ultimate source of the
social virtues, help the soul to separate itself from the body. These virtues
cultivate the soul’s rational powers by fostering the soul’s natural desire to
contemplate the Intellect, unifying the mind’s attention so that it can focus
exclusively on the Intellect without distraction from the body, and more
importantly, instilling intellectual habits, such as mathematical study and
philosophical discourse.97 By practicing the purificatory virtues, the social
virtues are sublimated and, therefore, exercised at a higher level. Temperance,
for instance, is no longer considered the control or restraint of bodily desires,
but the soul’s complete isolation from the body and complete focus on the
Intellect (E I.2,19,7). Courage is no longer understood as bravery in the face of
death, but as steadfast concentration in contemplating the Intellect. As the
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social virtues are directed towards the body and the material world, the
higher virtues are directed inwards, towards the soul’s interior, and upwards,
towards the Intellect.
He who possesses the higher virtues…arrives a higher principles and
measures, and will act in accordance with these. For example, he does
not postulate temperance as moderation; rather he detaches himself
completely, insofar as this is possible. He does not live the life of a man,
even a good man, as the latter is defined by civic virtue. He leaves this
kind of life being, and chooses another: the life of the gods (E I.2,7, 2228).
At this higher level, the soul is no longer modeling itself on the good man and
his actions in this world, but on the source that makes these actions virtuous,
the virtues as Forms (E I.2,19,7).
At this step in the purificatory stage, the soul, by “sculpting” and
perfecting itself, comes to recognize a higher, and more refined, beauty in its
own nature than it perceived in the material realm. This beauty not only
manifests itself in the exercise of the social and purificatory virtues, but also in
the higher cognitive activities of the mind. By constantly exercising its
intellective powers, either through its lower power of discursive reasoning, or
its higher power of contemplation, the soul “polishes” the best part of itself.
The more it does this, the more beautiful it becomes and the closer it comes to
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merging with the Intellect. By exercising the intellect, it becomes like the
Intellect, which eternally contemplates the Forms.
Purified, the soul is wholly Idea and reason. It becomes wholly free of
the body, intellective, entirely of that intelligible realm whence comes
beauty and all things beautiful. The more intellective it is, the more
beautiful it is. Intellection, and all that comes from intellection, is for the
soul a beauty that is its own and not another’s because then it is that the
soul is truly soul (E I.6,1,6).
At this juncture, the soul moves from the purificatory stage to the illuminative
stage, whereby, the soul comes to understand its own divine nature (E
VI.9,9,9). It no longer identifies itself with the body, but with its higher,
rational self. The soul also discovers that the source of its own beauty is
Beauty itself, that simple, eternal, and immutable Form that exists in the
Intellect, and that pours forth beauty to the lower realms (E I.6,1,6).
Up to this point, the soul, as an autonomous being, has been
responsible for its own perfection. It has done everything it can do
intellectually and morally to enable it to be like the Intellect and merge itself
with the One.
The One is absent from nothing and from everything. It is present only
to those who are prepared for it and are able to receive it, to enter into
harmony with it, to grasp and to touch it by virtue of their likeness to it,
by virtue of that inner power similar to and stemming from The One
when it is in that state in which it was when it originated from The One
(E VI.9,9,4).
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The soul, however, has to wait patiently, like a lover waiting for his beloved,
for its final passage to the One, the source and principle of all things,
including Beauty itself (I.6,1,9).98 The One, as the source and cause of the soul’s
desire to return, must raise the soul up to itself, and even then, the soul may
only catch a fleeting glimpse of the One. This fleeting glimpse is not one of
perceiver and perceived, but the merging of the two, or in the words of
Plotinus, “he [the soul] did not “see” it but rather was “oned” with it” (E
VI.9,9,10). Or again,
The man who obtains the vision becomes, as it were, another being. He
ceases to be himself, retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the beyond
he is one with it, like a center coincident with another center. While the
centers coincide, they are one (E VI.9,9,10).
For Plotinus, the vision described here cannot be rationally comprehended,
but only experienced.99 As Pierre Hadot eloquently states, “In mystical ecstasy,
the soul leaves behind all forms, including her own, and becomes this
formless reality, this pure presence which is the center of the soul, as it is of
everything else”.100 But, the soul’s individuality is not utterly extinguished in
the One. It still retains its “center” and is ineffably “coincident” with another
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center, that is, the One.101 After this brief mystical encounter with the One, the
soul, unable to maintain its identity with the higher self, loses its focus and
falls back down to its lower self. The soul, still involved in the body’s
governance, cannot completely isolate itself from the body for very long (E
VI.9,9,10). Only through prolonged and difficult preparation, can the soul
hope to achieve complete identity with its higher self, and if lucky, experience
again the mystical union with the One.

2.3.2

Augustine

Augustine, in his therapeutic regime for the soul’s repair and perfection,
follows the basic Plotinian program of turning the soul inwards, away from
the body and its desires, and upwards towards God’s eternal truths by
moving through the stages of purification, illumination and unity. Although
Augustine rejects some of Plotinus’s metaphysical beliefs such as the soul’s
divinity, its complete autonomy, and that it can potentially merge, in unity,
with the One (or as he understands it, God), his program provides similar
moral and intellectual strategies and tools to prepare the soul to receive God’s
illumination as best it can. While following Plotinus’s basic method, however,
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Augustine modifies it by incorporating practices that are particular to
Christianity. As I mentioned earlier, the two pillars of Augustine’s method of
perfection are Christianity, specifically faith and authority, and the virtues,
that is, the ancient cardinal virtues that fortify the soul’s moral character so
that it can turn away from the sins of bodily desires and maintain its focus on
God, and the intellectual virtues, which strengthen the soul’s cognitive powers
by providing a rational method by which it can comprehend and act in
accordance with God’s eternal truths. Each pillar is designed to cultivate what
Augustine believes to be the two faculties that pertain to the soul’s perfection:
the will and intellect. As we will see, both faculties must work in conjunction
in order for the soul to perfect itself.
Augustine’s program of perfection remains relatively the same
throughout his works, although it is expressed in very different ways
according to the length of the discussion and the context in which it presented
(cf. Sol. 1.6.12ff; De quant. anim. 33.70-76; Conf. 7.17.23, 9.10.24; De Musica 6.1353; De civ. Dei 2.7.9-11; De Trin. 14.1-5). The most detailed presentations of his
method are in chapter 33 of De quanitate animae (387/388 CE), sections 26.8ff in
De vera religione (389/391 CE), and Book II of De libero arbitrio (388-395 CE).
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Taken together, with some supporting materials from other texts, they should
provide us with a comprehensive account of his program.
In De vera religione, Augustine suggests that the soul potentially lives
two lives, which he calls the “outer” (exterior, earthly, old) and “inner”
(interior, heavenly, new) man. Each life corresponds to the soul’s various
powers, with the lower, bodily powers, referring to the outer man, and the
higher, cognitive powers pertaining to the inner man. Which life the soul leads
at any given time depends upon the level of attention and care it gives to each
set of powers (De vera relig. 26.48-49). Augustine recognizes, however, that the
soul naturally begins its life with the body, in infancy, using its nutritive and
organizational powers to maintain, promote, and protect its body. As the
soul’s relationship with the body develops, the soul exercises the higher
sensitive powers as it navigates its environment, shunning that which harms
the body and pursuing those things that help it. When the soul moves from
adolescence to adulthood, the soul uses the higher powers of language,
memory, and practical reason (ratio inferior) to build and maintain the material
and institutional structures of society. It uses the practical arts to cultivate land
and construct cities; the theoretical arts are used to develop civil and
ecclesiastical administrations and to make progress in the fields of
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mathematics, astronomy, rhetoric and history, and, finally, the classical arts to
produce painting, sculpture, and poetry. As we can see, the soul, at this stage,
is exercising distinctively human powers, although they are still directed to
the body and the external world. Hence, the soul, from infancy to adulthood,
is predisposed to focus its attention on its outer, bodily life, which is
concerned with the pleasures, pains, desires of the body, and also with praise
and glory that it can receive from society. The soul’s predisposition towards
its body is also exacerbated by the Fall, putting the soul in a dangerously
dependent relationship with its body. As a result, only society, through its
laws and social duties, regulates the soul’s concupiscent desires and shape its
moral character.102 This means that the soul is governed externally, according
the laws and customs of society, not internally by its own rational powers,
through which it has access to God’s eternal laws. Most souls live such an
outer life throughout their terrestrial existence.
Augustine admits that some souls that are fortunate enough to live a
well-ordered outer life can achieve a modicum of happiness, but he believes
that true happiness is found in the inner life, where the soul turns its attention
inwards, away from the body, to its own higher rational powers, and then
102

In De vera religione, Augustine calls this the “outer man” and it corresponds to the first three stages
in De quantitate animae.

95
upwards to God and his illumination. Though the soul is necessarily born into
an outer life, it can, nonetheless, take the necessary steps to be reborn into an
inner life.
Some live thus [the outer life] from the beginning to the end of their
days. But some begin in that way, as they necessarily must, but they are
reborn inwardly, and with their spiritual strength and increase of
wisdom they overcome “the old man” and put him to death, and bring
him into subjection to the celestial laws…this is called “the new man”,
“the inward and heavenly man,” whose spiritual ages are marked, not
according to years, but according to his spiritual advance (De vera relig.
26.49).
Augustine, agreeing with Plotinus, believes that the path to wisdom, through
the inward life, must first be paved with the soul’s purification and moral
edification, and only after this can the soul advance towards wisdom. He
outright rejects the counter claim that reverses the order, making truth
necessary for purification and virtue.
To wish to see the truth in order that you may purge your soul is a
perverse and preposterous idea, because it is precisely in order that you
may see, that it has to be purged (De util. cred. 16.34).
Augustine believes that in order for the mind to “see” the truth, the mind’s
eye must be healthy and correctly used. In his Soliloquia, where he has a
dialogue between himself and Reason, Augustine discusses what it takes to
have a healthy mind’s eye and what the soul needs to use it properly.
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I, Reason, am in minds as the power of looking is in the eyes. Having
eyes is not the same thing as looking, and looking is the same as seeing.
The soul therefore needs three things: eyes which it can use aright,
looking and seeing. The eye of the mind is healthy when it is pure from
every taint of the body, that is, when it is remote and purged from
desire of mortal things. And this, faith alone can give in the first place
(Sol. 5.12).
Reason is the power of the soul to look, but it does not follow that every
one who looks, sees. Right and perfect looking which leads to vision is
called virtue. For virtue is right and perfect reason (Sol. 5.13).
Augustine, however, recognizes an obvious problem with his method.
If the soul must first purify itself of its concupiscent desires and acquire virtue
before it can see the truth and become wise, rather than the other way around,
it must have some way of knowing how to proceed that is not based on first
perceiving the truth. But how can an impure soul become pure and virtuous if
it cannot perceive the truth about how to be virtuous? How does the soul
know it is on the right path? Augustine’s solution is based on his famous
principle credo ut intelligam, which is based on the Christian virtues of faith
and authority.
For Augustine, faith is not merely blind adherence to doctrine, but is
belief based on reason and evidence. Belief, in this case, is the intermediate
epistemological state between opinion and knowledge, the former being mere
presumption (the acceptance of a claim without evidence) and the latter being
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the direct knowledge of a claim, where the acceptance of a claim is based on
reliable or authoritative sources. Beliefs make up the majority of our
judgments, and they provide a legitimate source of justification for our
actions.
…how innumerable were the things I believed and held to be true,
though I had neither seen them nor been present when they happened.
How many truths were of this kind, such as events of world history, or
facts about places and cities I had never seen; how many were the
statements I believed on the testimony of friends, or physicians, or
various other people; and indeed, unless we did believe them we
should be unable to do anything in this life (Conf. 6.5.7).

Understanding the nature of belief was an important turning point in
Augustine’s own struggle for wisdom. For example, before encountering
Ambrose’s authoritative exegesis of scripture, Augustine could not accept the
truth of the scriptures given their apparent inconsistencies. In fact, he thought
he needed certain knowledge before he could accept them.
I longed to become as certain of those things I could not see as I was
that seven and three make ten. I was not so demented as to think that
even this simple truth was beyond comprehension; but I wanted to
have the same grasp of other things, both material entities not
immediately present to my senses and spiritual realities of which I did
not know how to think in any but a materialistic way. The possibility of
healing, was ironically, within my reach if only I had been willing to
believe, because then I could with a more purified mind have focused my gaze
on your truth… (Conf. 6.4.6) [my italics].
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It was only after accepting Ambrose’s authority concerning the scriptures that
Augustine was able to intellectually engage them and attempt to understand
them. His belief was not based on blind faith, but on his reasoned assessment
of Ambrose’s exegetical abilities. Without Ambrose’s framework, Augustine
would have struggled to find the right interpretative strategy. Belief, in this
case, was the necessary link between Augustine’s ignorance and refusal, and
understanding. By providing guideposts and directions for the soul, beliefs
become, for Augustine, the means by which the soul can move towards
understanding, and eventually, wisdom.
Augustine makes clear in the passage above and the one below that
belief is necessary for the soul’s moral and intellectual purification.
For my part I judge that believing before reasoning, if you are not able
to follow reasoning, and cultivating the mind by faith in order to be
ready for the seeds of truth, is not only wholesome, but is indeed the
only way by which health can return to sick minds (De util. cred. 14.31).
Since the soul’s path to wisdom is the contemplation and application of God’s
eternal truths, the first thing the soul must believe is that there is a God, and
that he is the source of eternal truths (De lib. arb. 2.2). Secondly, the soul must
believe that in order to contemplate the eternal truths it must purify itself
through moral edification. The soul, accordingly, must have the Christian
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virtues of faith to believe that the mind must be healed in order to see God,
hope that the mind can be purged, and love to desire God and his illumination
(Sol. 30-31). The soul’s purification also includes accepting the teachings of
Christ and the authority of Catholic Church through the overwhelming
evidence provided by the history of the former’s life and the spread of latter’s
influence.
Christ, therefore, bringing a medicine to heal corrupt morals, by his
miracles gained authority, by his authority deserved faith, by faith drew
together a multitude, thereby secured permanence of the tradition, which
in time corroborate religion (De util. cred. 14.32)
With these basic beliefs in hand the soul can now actively foster the cardinal
virtues, particularly temperance and fortitude, by following the example of
those who possess them. By practicing temperance and fortitude, the soul can
begin to restrain and control the desires, drives and passions of its body, and
then through prudence understands its place in the hierarchy of being, with
material objects below and God above, which also helps it to move inwards
and upwards to God. Next the soul can begin to cultivate the virtue of justice
by attempting to order its life according to God’s order and treating things
according to their metaphysical and moral worth. At this stage, the soul does
not understand these virtues, but believes that following the examples of
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morally upright persons in the past and present can lead it in the right
direction. Only after direct cognitive contact with, and understanding of, the
eternal moral truths can it be said that the soul possesses virtue. This, as we
will see, ultimately requires the practice of the intellectual virtues.103
Moral virtue is not only preventative insofar as it controls and blocks
the alluring power of concupiscent desires, but it also strengthens the soul’s
will. The will, in relation to the soul’s perfection, is the soul’s inner force that
is responsible for directing the mind’s eye and maintaining its focus or
attention on the objects under its purview. Augustine calls the driving force of
the will love or the desire for the good. Now what the soul loves is dependent
on what the soul perceives as good. So the attentive will of the outward man is
directed towards material, or lower goods, as the inward man’s is focused on
intelligible or higher goods. Whether the soul’s love is good or bad is
determined by how it loves the objects of its desire. So neither the soul’s
desires nor the objects themselves are essentially good or bad, it is only the
relations between the desires and the objects that are considered good or bad
(De lib. arb. 1.15). For instance, a soul could use God’s eternal truths for its own
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selfish advantage or love material objects rightly according to their
metaphysical and moral worth.
The challenge for the unpurified soul is to unify and channel the will’s
attentive love towards the inner, higher goods of the soul, and even higher
still to the eternal truths. This is not so easy. The will is easily divided.
Augustine, during the struggle of his conversion, describes his own inner
difficulties to unify his will and commit himself to the Christian life.
My body was more ready to obey the slightest whim of my soul in the
matter of moving my limbs, than the soul was to obey its own
command in carrying out this major volition [conversion], which was to
be accomplished within the will alone…Evidently, then, it [the will]
does not want this thing with the whole of itself, and therefore the
command does not proceed from an undivided mind. Inasmuch as it
issues the command, it does will it, but inasmuch as the command is
not carried out, it does not will it…hence it cannot be identical with that
thing which it is commanding to come into existence, for if it were
whole and entire it would not command itself to be, since it would be
already. This partial willing and partial non-willing is thus not so
bizarre, but a sickness of the mind, which cannot arise with its whole
self on the wings of truth because it is heavily burdened by habit. There
are two wills, then, and neither is the whole: what one has the other
lacks (Conf. 8.8.20-8.9.21).
Here, Augustine identifies the common problem faced by all souls, that is, the
disconnection between wanting to do something and willing to do it, what the
Greeks call akrasia. The soul may want to do the right thing, but cannot bring
itself to do it. The moral virtues are needed to rectify this internal conflict
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through reconnecting, unifying, and directing the will towards the higher
goods. So, for the soul to “arise with its whole self on the wings of truth” it
must practice, and eventually rationally acquire, the moral virtues. In the end,
a perfectly virtuous soul is one that transforms the will’s brute love into the
highest virtue: charity, a virtue that, in the words of Etienne Gilson,
“consummates all virtues” by rightly loving the highest good: God.104
With its concupiscence under control and its will strengthened and
unified the soul can now move to next stage of perfection, that of illumination.
Since the mind’s eye is healthy and strong at the end of the purification stage,
the soul can now begin its transition from belief to understanding by honing
its intellectual capacities through rational means. This will help the soul use its
cognitive eye with precision, direct it towards God’s eternal truths, and
accurately understand them.
For, it is one thing to have the eye of the soul so clear that it does not
look about idly or incautiously and see what is unseemly, and another
thing to protect and strengthen the health of the eye; and it is another
thing, again, to direct a calm and steady gaze upon that which is to be
seen. The soul must be pure to do this, if not, then the soul will
misinterpret what it sees (De quant. anim. 33.75).
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Given his intellectual eudaemonism, Augustine believes that the royal road
up through the inward life and to wisdom is paved with rational arguments
and traversed by reason. “Indeed, it is not by faith alone, but by trustworthy
reason, that the soul leads itself little by little to the most virtuous habits and
the perfect life” (De ord. 19.49). With this process the inward or new man “is
no longer kept in the bosom of human authority, but step by step by the use of
reason he strives to reach the highest unchangeable law” (De vera relig. 26.49).
As we learned in section 2.1.2 above, these “unchangeable laws” or immutable
truths are stamped, as it were, on the soul and constitute its rational structure.
Consequently, the soul, whether purified or not, already uses these immutable
truths as standards for making judgments about such things as the number
and beauty of material objects, the morality and justice of human actions, and
the very rationality of these judgments (De lib. arb. 2.10; De Trin. 14.21). At the
illumination stage, the goal of the inward man is to have unfiltered, direct
access to this rational structure, understand its nature, and the role it plays in
the soul’s quest for wisdom.
The soul’s rational movement inwards begins by discovering its own
nature and, consequently, recognizing its place in the hierarchy of being. By
doing this, the soul will see that the intelligible realm, and its participation in
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it, is of higher value in comparison with its activities in the temporal, material
realm. “The yearning to understand what things are true and best, is the soul’s
highest vision. Beyond this it has nothing more perfect, more noble, and more
true” (De quant. anim. 33.74). Now the first step is for the soul to see that there
are three basic created perfections: being, life, and reason. All created things
have being, but only a small subset of beings have life (i.e. souls), such as
plants and animals, and only a very small subset of living things, namely
rational souls, have reason. Obviously, the creature that possesses all three is
clearly superior to those that only possess one or two of these perfections (De
lib. arb. 2.3; De vera relig. 29.52). In fact, one soul is greater than all material
things, including the stars, sun and moon (De lib. arb. 35.77). Next, the soul,
using the self-evident principle that that which judges is superior to that
which is judged, examines its own powers and comes to understand that
reason, an immaterial faculty, is its highest power. Accordingly, reason is not
only superior to material objects, but also its own sensitive powers (De lib. arb.
2.4).
So in the human mind the most excellent part is not that which
perceives sensible objects but that which judges of sensible objects.
Many animals see more sharply and have a keener sense of corporeal
objects than men have. But to judge of bodies belongs not to life that is
merely sentient, but to life that has also the power of reasoning…it is
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easy to see that which judges is superior to that which is judged. For
living reason judges not only of sensible things but also of the senses
themselves. It knows why the oar dipped in water must appear
crooked though it is really straight, and why the eyes must see it in that
way. Ocular vision can only tell us that it is so but cannot judge.
Wherefore it is manifest that as the life of sense excels the body, the life
of reason excels both (De lib. arb. 19.53; cf. Conf. 7.17.3).
The soul, through a detailed examination, sees that an act of visual perception
is a complex activity that involves, at every level, some form of judgment, or
at least something analogous to it. The senses judge, so to speak, whether
objects are beneficial or harmful by communicating pleasant or unpleasant
feelings to the soul. The inner sense, which can be considered the “control
center” that receives information from the five senses and combines them in
such a way as to make single object, judges whether or not the senses are
properly performing their operations (De lib. arb. 2.5). Reason, as Augustine
mentions in the passage above, knows why an object must appear as it does.
So as the senses judge that something is so, reason judges that it ought to be so.
Reason, accordingly, judges the inner sense and its objects, making reason the
highest power of the soul.
The third, and final step is for the soul to examine reason and its
operations. First, it comes to understand that even though its rational power is
mutable, the standard by which it judges is immutable. Such an immutable
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standard cannot come from a mutable source, but from an immutable one; one
that is superior to material objects and the soul, that is, God. Next, it discovers
that this standard judges reason itself and, moreover, constitutes the soul’s
rational structure. It follows that truth is the measure rather than that which is
measured, so it must be superior to those things that it measures, in this case,
the soul’s rational activities. The soul realizes that it had, as an outward man,
intuitively judged things according to these truths and experienced regret and
remorse when it violated them (De Trin. 14.21). The soul, now purified, can
contemplate and understand these truths without distraction. It comes to
realize the superior value of truth and virtue over temporal knowledge and
idle pleasures, and sees that the universe is but a temporal manifestation of
these truths. As a result, the soul, through reason’s participation in God’s
eternal truth, can discover the mathematical and moral structure of the
universe. Moreover, if it orders its life according to these truths, it will be in
harmony with God’s eternal order.
At this point, the soul moves to the highest stage: unity.105 Augustine
describes this stage as “not really a step, but a dwelling place to which the
previous steps have brought us” (De quant. anim. 33.76). The soul, at this stage,
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first recognizes that truth is incomparably more valuable than material things
(De quant. anim. 34.77). Truth is common to all rational souls and is
inexhaustible. One can keep going back to the well of truth and always find it
overflowing. Furthermore, truth is intransient and cannot be taken away like
temporal objects and the pleasures derived from them. A wise soul can,
therefore, feel secure with this most valuable possession, unlike outward
looking souls who are in perpetual fear of losing their material possessions.
With such security, the wise soul can achieve true happiness (De beata vita
4.33; T 13.8).
Breaking with Plotinus, Augustine does not believe that the soul is
metaphysically identified with the Intellect, and can momentarily merge with
the One. Rather, he believes that soul becomes unified with God only insofar
as it can imitate God as best it can, by ordering its life according to God’s
order. If it can do this, it will achieve wisdom.
Let it [i.e. the soul] then remember its God to whose image it was made,
and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it worship the
uncreated God, by whom it was created with a capacity for him and
able to share in him. In this way it will be wise not with its own light
but by sharing in that supreme light, and it will reign in happiness
where it reigns eternal. For this is called man’s wisdom in such a way
that it is also God’s (De Trin. 14.4.15).
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To conducts its life according to God’s Order, the soul must not only act in
accordance with God’s Order, but also understand why it must act in this way.
Since the wise soul understand its place in the hierarchy of being in
comparison with other beings, it can treat them appropriately according to
their metaphysical worth. It will no longer give more value to material objects
than to other living things, and in turn, will value truth and God over all
things. Accordingly, the wise soul loves things as they ought to be loved,
using them appropriately and understanding why it must do so. Since it
values truth above all, the wise soul will not easily submit to concupiscent
desires and temporal pleasures. By doing this, the soul acts harmoniously
with God’s creation, fulfilling its designed role within it. This is perfect virtue.
The wise soul will also fulfill the promise of Christian faith and “realize how
full of truth are the things we are commanded to believe, how excellently and
healthfully we were nourished by Mother Church” (De quant. anim. 13.34). As
a result, the wise soul will have repaired some of the damage caused by
Adam’s sin.
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3.

3.1

Malebranche and the Mind’s Perfection

Introduction

In chapter one, I argued that Malebranche, like other Oratorians, is
fundamentally an Augustinian, specifically in terms of Augustine’s theory of
knowledge and the soul’s perfection. This brand of Augustinianism is at the
core of Malebranche’s philosophical persona, that is, the belief that
philosophers must cultivate their intellectual and moral character in order to
acquire philosophical knowledge in both the intellectual and moral realms,
and in turn, act according to it. Given this, I argued that the mind’s perfection
is at the heart of his philosophical system and that the other parts of his
system, particularly his vision in God and occasionalism, must be understood
in terms of it, rather than the other way around. In chapter two, we studied
Augustine’s philosophy in relation to his own theory of perfection where we
discovered an Augustinian soul that is cognitively and volitionally active,
whose goal is to imitate God as best it can by moving up the stages of
perfection: purification, illumination, and unity. With this study in hand, we
can now use it as a philosophical guide to our discussion of Malebranche’s
own theory of perfection, which, though different in some important ways, is
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very similar in its general structure in terms of its goal and the process for
achieving it.
The methodology of the next three chapters diverges from the previous
two. As chapters one and two took the shape of a historical and philosophical
narrative, the next three chapters will be more philosophically argumentative.
The main goal of this chapter is to provide a detailed and philosophically
plausible account of Malebranche’s theory of perfection. In order for it to be
plausible, however, it must satisfy three conditions. The first condition is that
the Malebranchean mind must be cognitively and volitionally active. Without
these two activities, his theory would be empty because any such theory
necessarily implies self-perfection. This, in turn, entails a second condition that
the mind is responsible, and thus metaphysically free, in some way for its own
perfection. The third, and most challenging, condition is that first two
conditions must be compatible with his vision in God and occasionalism. As I
mentioned in the introduction, it has been generally accepted amongst
commentators that Malebranche cannot satisfy these conditions.106 I believe,
however, that he can. In this chapter I show how, through his theory of
perfection, Malebranche satisfies the first condition, and part of the third, by
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explicitly attributing cognitive and volitional resources to the mind, and
arguing that his divine illumination theory does not exclude this possibility. In
chapters four and five, I attempt to satisfy the second condition, and the
second part of the third, by arguing for a particular interpretation of his
occasionalism that makes metaphysical room for the mind’s perfection. So for
the next three chapters, I argue for, and defend, a particular interpretation of
Malebranche’s system that successfully integrates his theory of perfection with
his divine illumination and occasionalism.

3.2

Malebranche’s Theory of Perfection

Surprisingly, relatively little has been written about Malebranche’s theory of
perfection in Anglo-American scholarship compared to other aspects of his
system.107 One reason could be that commentators just don’t see it. As I argued
in the introduction, this may not be a problem of neglect, but simply one of
perspective. Given their predilection for examining Malebranche’s system in
terms of its Cartesianism, commentators can only see his system, and its
problems, from this perspective. In order to see his theory of perfection, they
must undergo something akin to a Gestalt shift, changing their focus from
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particular aspects of Malebranche’s Cartesianism to his Augustinianism. By
doing this, they will see that it is in plain sight. In fact, Malebranche devotes
an entire work to the mind’s perfection, namely his Treatise on Ethics. With this
work, coupled with support from his other works, we can develop a
comprehensive interpretation of his theory. We will see

that the

Malebranchean mind follows the same basic stages of perfection as the
Plotinian and Augustinian soul, that is, the stages of purification, illumination
and unity.108
In the avertissement to the 1707 edition to the Treatise, Malebranche states
that the subject matter of his treatise concerns the mind’s acquisition and
preservation of virtue, specifically the virtue on which all the other virtues
rest. This virtue, he argues, “consists precisely in the habitual and dominant
love of immutable Order” (OCM XI 4). From this love, Malebranche believes,
comes happiness. As we saw in chapter one, Malebranche, following
Augustine, believes that both the possession and exercise of this virtue are
necessary for the mind’s perfection. In fact, he divides this works along these
lines. In the first part, titled “Virtue”, he attempts to prove that following
108
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volitional capacities, explaining bodily functions in purely mechanistic terms.
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God’s immutable order is the principal virtue, and then explains how the
mind can acquire and preserve it, with the ultimate goal of perfecting itself.
The mind can do this, he argues, by first coming to understand its dual
relationship with God and its body, and how the body’s concupiscent desires
negatively affect the mind. With this knowledge, the mind can then start to
learn how to control these desires and train itself to perceive God’s Order. The
mind can do this, in conjunction with God’s grace, through the effective use of
its own powers, or what he calls “la force and la liberté de l’esprit” (OCM XI 4).
These two powers give the mind the ability to focus and maintain its attention
on God’s Order. They also help the mind develop the right disposition so that
it can receive two aspects of God’s grace: enlightenment (la lumière) and
feeling (la grâce de sentiment) (OCM V 100, PR 153). As the former illuminates
(or reveals) God’s Order to the mind, the latter offsets the influence of
concupiscent desires that naturally distract the mind from this order. In part
two, titled “Duties”, he shows how the mind can act according to Order by
carrying out its proper duties to God, family, society, sovereigns, and itself (as
mind-body composite). What is telling about part two is that Malebranche
saves the last chapter for his discussion of the duty to oneself, thereby giving
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it a preferred place in the treatise. In fact, he claims that all the other duties can
be reduced to this one.
The duties everyone owes to himself, as well as those we owe to our
neighbor, may be reduced in general to working for our happiness and
perfection: for our perfection, which consists principally in a perfect
conformity of our will with Order; for our happiness, which consists only
in the enjoyment of pleasures, I mean pleasures solid and capable of
satisfying a mind made to possess the sovereign good (OCM XI 269, CW
220).
He ends this chapter, thus the treatise, with a summary of what the mind
can do to perfect itself. From this brief avertissement, we can see that this work
addresses the two conditions that Augustine deems necessary for the mind’s
perfection, that is, the moral and intellectual cultivation of the mind so that it
can access God’s order, and the mind’s ability to apply this order in the
conduct of its terrestrial life. More importantly, by devoting a separate treatise
to his theory of perfection, Malebranche is clearly indicating that it is a very
important part of his philosophy. In fact, one could argue, without hyperbole,
that it is the most important. He does this for no other part of his philosophy.
The outline Malebranche presents in the avertissement is a good guide for
our own discussion, and we will be following it closely throughout the
chapter. As we saw in chapter one, Malebranche believes that the mind is
united to both God and its body. As the mind’s union with the body
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“infinitely debases man and is today the main cause of all his errors and
miseries”, its union with God is the source of “its life, its light, and its entire
felicity” (OCM I 9, LO xxxiii). As the mind’s union with the body entices and
distracts the mind away from God with its own needs and desires, its union
with God gives it access to Order and the means to act according to it.109 Given
this dual union, however, the mind’s attention is divided, as it were, between
God and its body.
The mind has two capacities, the understanding and will, and they
participate in both realms. The mind’s understanding is a passive capacity that
perceives God’s order and, through its body, the material objects that populate
the world. The understanding perceives things in three ways. One way is
through pure understanding, whereby it perceives intellectual objects, which
do not rely on corporeal images, such as God’s eternal truths. A second way is
through sensations, by which it can perceive, via the sense organs, sensible
objects and feel such things as tickles and pains. The third way is through the
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mind is made in the image of God, it, nonetheless, has to fulfill the promise of it by properly exercising
what God has given it.
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imagination by which the mind perceives corporeal images that it represents
to itself (OCM I 65-68, LO 16-17). The first way is made possible by the mind’s
union with God, as the last two are possible by its union with the body.
The will, for Malebranche, is the natural and invincible (or necessary)
movement of the mind towards the good in general, that is, towards God. The
will, however, is not an innate power of the mind, but is God’s continuous
movement of the mind towards himself. This movement is none other than
God’s love for himself. Just as the mind’s essential union with God’s Order
makes the mind capable of rational thought, its union with God’s self-love
makes the mind capable of loving particular goods, since God contains in
himself all goods, thereby making him the measure of all goods (OCM V 117118, PR 169-170; OCM I 47, LO 5; OCM II 314, LO 449). Unlike the mind’s
invincible movement towards the good in general, the mind’s movement
towards particular goods is not invincible, because God wants the mind only
to love him, not the particular goods the mind encounters in the world. So,
even though the mind has a natural tendency towards, and desire for,
particular goods, it is never satisfied by them. The mind, in this case, does not
have freedom of indifference in terms of willing or not willing the good in
general, but it does have the ability to stop its search for particular goods and

117
move beyond them. It is this non-invincible movement towards particular
goods that Malebranche calls the “liberty” or free will of the soul (OCM V 118119, PR 170-172). This dual union between God and the body divides the mind
insofar as God continuously pushes the mind towards the good in general,
and the body, through the sense organs or through the mind’s own
imagination, drives it towards particular goods.
Given this dual union, the mind is receptive to God’s immutable Order
and love along as well as the desires, pleasures, and passion of the body.
Given the mind’s finite and therefore limited capacity for thought, it must
properly manage the objects it attends to. Its proper management is
determined by God’s purposes for establishing the dual union, which is for
the mind to perfect itself through the free love of God and his Order, and for it
to control and preserve its body. God designed the mind’s dual union so that
it could achieve these goals without being overwhelmed. Malebranche
discusses God’s design and its proper management by examining Adam
before the Fall. For him, prelapsarian Adam represents the ideal model of
perfection for all minds. This examination will give us a rough sense of how
he understands the mind’s perfection.

118
3.2.1

Adam’s Prelapsarian Perfection

The dual union of prelapsarian Adam was in perfect order. His union with
God enabled him to devote his full attention and love to God, and act
according to his Order. With respect to mind-body union, Adam had perfect
control over his body and could essentially stop the bodily movements of his
sense organs and their corresponding sense impressions (OCM I 75, LO 22).
Adam could “eat without pleasure, look without seeing, sleep without
dreaming those useless phantoms which unsettle the mind and disturb our
rest” (OCM XII 103, JS 65). To make sure that Adam could devote his full
attention to God, God designed the mind-body union in such a way that the
mind could quickly and easily detect what was good and bad for its body,
without having to have exact knowledge of the objects.
The goods of the body do not deserve the attention of a mind, which
God made only for Him. The mind, then, must recognize this sort of
good without examination, and by the quick and indubitable proof of
sensation…I grant, then, that pleasure and pain are the natural and
indubitable characteristics of good and evil [of the body] (OCM I 73, LO
21).
By correlating objects that are good for the body to pleasures, and those that
are bad for the body to pains, God provided a heuristic or short-cut, as it were,
for the mind to detect those objects that could preserve or harm the body. “He
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[God] leads us to these things [e.g. bodies] by instinct, i.e., by pleasant or
unpleasant sensations” (OCM I 73, LO 21). In his perfect state, Adam used, as
God intended, the knowledge gained through mind-body union only for the
preservation of his body. This afforded him the opportunity to devote his full
attention to God and act according to God’s Order.
More importantly, God designed Adam’s union with himself in such a
way that Adam could love him by a free choice, not by a prevenient pleasure
given to him by God. To do the latter would necessarily limit Adam’s freedom
and merit.
Adam cannot be said to have been brought to love of God and to his
duty by a prevenient pleasure, because his knowledge of God, like that
of his good, and the joy he unceasingly felt as a necessary result of the
perception of his happiness in being united to God could have sufficed
to attract him to his duty and to make him act more meritoriously than
if he had been determined, as it were, by some prevenient pleasure.
Thus he was fully free (OCM I 73-74, LO 21).
Adam’s was able to make his free choice by attending to God’s Order. By
devoting his full attention to God, Adam, through a pure perception of the
understanding, clearly perceived that God was the true cause of his
happiness. This clear perception, unlike the pleasurable and painful sensations
occasionally caused by bodies, did not determine Adam to love God, but
merely made him aware of God’s wisdom and goodness, and provided him

120
with reasons to love God. So the act of loving God and his Order came from
Adam alone. As a necessary consequence of loving God, Adam received
intellectual joy (OCM III 45-46, LO 563). So Adam’s joy is the consequence of
his love, not the cause of it; thus, Adam was not sustained in his love of God
by prevenient pleasures, but by a free choice and the experience of joy that
followed. Malebranche believes that this is a necessary condition for the
mind’s perfection (OCM XI 47, CW 65).
As we can see, the mind can either love by reason (illumination) or by
instinct (pleasure). The difference between the two is that the former is free
and the latter is not.
For if we begin to love an object, we do so either because we know
through reason that it is good or because we experience through
sensation that it is pleasant. Now there is quite a difference between
illumination and pleasure. Illumination enlightens our mind and makes
us aware of the good without actually or efficaciously leading us to
love it. Pleasure, on the contrary, both moves us and efficaciously
determines us to love the object seeming to cause it. Illumination does
no lead us by itself; it merely permits us to lead ourselves, freely and by
ourselves, to the good it presents to us when we already love
it…Pleasure, on the contrary, precedes our reason; it prevents us from
consulting it and makes us love by instinct; it does not leave us entirely
to ourselves and weakens our freedom (OCM III 45, LO 563).
Given God’s design, the mind can freely love only through reason while
instinct determines the mind to love an object before it can reason about it
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(OCM III 73, LO 580). Illumination, guided by the mind’s attention, provides
the mind with reasons so that it can freely make determinations or judgments
about objects. In fact, the amount of illumination or knowledge that the mind
receives from God is based on the degree to which it attends to God’s universal
reason (OCM XI 60, CW 75). In the case of instinct, however, the mind, as a
result of the correlations between objects and sensations, naturally loves or
avoids an object before it can attend to the object. But, after the initial
determination, the mind, given will’s non-invincibility towards particular
goods, is not forced to continue to love or avoid an object, rather, it can attend
to the object and discover through God’s illumination (via reasons) whether or
not it is a true good (OCM I 50-51, LO 8; OCM XII 289-290, JS 227). So instinct,
if not tempered by illumination, weakens our freedom insofar as it determines
the mind’s love without its attention and free consent. Note that in case of
Adam, however, he was able to control the motions of the sense organs and
their corresponding sensible pleasures. Thus, prelapsarian Adam had control
over his body and could suppress or ignore the pleasures of the body and
attend to God’s Order.
Recall from chapter one that even though Adam’s mind was in perfect
harmony with God and his body, he was, nevertheless, able to sin. If Adam

122
could freely love God, then he could also freely decide not to love him.
Adam’s sin was ultimately the result of him turning his mind away (aversio)
from God. Malebranche argues that there are three reasons for Adams’s sin.
Happy would he, and we, have been…had he not voluntarily turned
himself away from the presence of his God by allowing his mind’s
capacity to be exhausted by the beauty and anticipated sweetness of the
forbidden fruit, or perhaps by the rash joy excited in his soul by the
contemplation of his natural perfections, or finally by his natural
fondness for his wife and the inordinate fear of displeasing her, all of
which apparently contributed to his disobedience (OCM I 75, LO 22).
Malebranche, however, believes that the main cause of sin was Adam’s
decision to turn away from God and his Order, and attend to his own natural
perfections. Adam knew that God was the true cause of his happiness, but
sensed that his own perfections were the cause. But Adam, by a free choice,
turned away from God and focused his attention on his body in order to relish
in the pleasures of admiring his own perfections. By doing this, he succumbed
to sensible pleasures and allowed them to overwhelm his mind and distract
him from God, which violated God’s Order (OCM III 45-48, LO 563-65). This
resulted in Adam forever losing control over the movements and sensations of
his body, upsetting God’s design and causing a permanent disorder in his
relation to God and his body. It is this disorder that is inherited by all human
beings.
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So given Adam’s fall, the mind finds itself in a state of disorder. The
mind, though superior in being to the body, is now dependent on the body
and cannot control the movements of its sense organs and their corresponding
sensations. As a result, the mind is constantly under siege by the sensations
and passions of the body, which, at times, overwhelms the mind’s capacity for
thought, and distracts it from God (OCM V 95, PR 150). Since sensible
pleasures and their objects are loved instinctively, according to God’s design,
the mind’s dependence on the body makes it that much more difficult for the
mind to reason about them. This constant barrage of uncontrollable sensations
weakens the mind’s ability to judge whether particular goods are true goods
or not. “The more the reason is weakened, the more the soul becomes sensegoverned, and judges promptly and falsely concerning sensible goods and
evils” (OCM V 126, PR 177). Consequently, the mind, given its corrupted and
disordered state, is led to believe that the material world is the source of truth
and the cause of its happiness (OCM I 15, LO xxxvii). This belief is the source
of the mind’s errors in judgment, concupiscence, and moral failure.
Malebranche’s intellectual and moral plan for the perfection of the
mind is designed within the context of the mind’s disordered state. Even
though the mind is forcibly turned towards the body and its sensations,
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Malebranche believes it can, with effort, turn back (converso) to God and
regain some semblance of perfection it had before the Fall. In doing so, the
mind can once again attend to God, and follow, through its own free will, his
immutable order. Unfortunately, the mind’s corrupted state makes it that
much more difficult for the will to act freely, that is, rationally. For instance,
God’s “short-cut” design by which the mind can detect material objects that
are good for the body without having to reason about the objects, now works
against free will, since the mind, given its dependence on the body, cannot
easily stop the natural love it has for objects so that it can reason about them
and freely decide whether to love them or not. The mind’s dependence on the
body is so strong that, as we will see later, the mind alone cannot overcome its
corrupted state, but needs God’s grace to counterbalance concupiscence so
that it can act freely according to God’s immutable order. We must keep these
things in mind as we examine Malebranche’s prescription for moral
perfection.

3.2.2

Liberty and Concupiscence

Malebranche believes that the first stage to perfection is for the mind to purge
itself of its concupiscent desires so that it can unify its attention and then turn
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back (conversio) to God and focus its full attention on his Order. The most
virtuous mind is the one that can do this most effectively. “[W]hoever goes
back into himself most deeply, and who listens to the inner truth in the
greatest silence of the senses, imagination and passions, is the most solidly
virtuous” (OCM XI 35, CW 57). Following Augustine, he believes that faith,
understood as Augustinian belief, is a precondition for perfection, but the
mind’s rational effort is the key to its perfection.110
Evidence, or understanding is preferable to faith. For faith will pass
away, but understanding will live eternally. Faith is truly a good, but
this is because it leads us to an understanding of certain necessary and
essential truths, without which we can acquire neither solid virtue nor
eternal felicity. However, faith without understanding (I am not
speaking of the mysteries here, for we cannot have a clear idea of
them)—faith, I say, without any light (if that is possible) cannot make
us solidly virtuous. It is light that perfects the mind and governs the
heart (OCM XI 34, CW 57).
Given his emphasis on reason, Malebranche believes that the first step of the
purification stage is to understand the mind’s relationship to its body and
recognize the ways in which concupiscence can weaken the mind’s liberty,
and how God’s grace of feeling can increase it. In order to be perfect, “we
must study man; we must know ourselves, our dignity and weaknesses, and
our perfections and inclinations…” (OCM XI 84, CW 93). With this
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knowledge, the mind can then attempt to increase its liberty while reducing its
concupiscence. By strengthening its liberty, the mind can better focus its full
attention on God and receive his illumination. With God’s illumination, the
mind will see that God is the true cause of its happiness, thereby enabling it to
freely choose to love him and his Order, just like prelapsarian Adam. By freely
choosing to love God and act according to his Order, the mind naturally
strengthens its union with God (OCM XI 22, CW 48). But before we explicate
the latter stages of illumination and unity, we need to examine the purification
stage.
For Malebranche, the counterweight to liberty is concupiscence. As
liberty gives the mind the ability to move beyond particular goods,
concupiscence, on the other hand, moves the will towards particular goods.
Since concupiscence makes the mind falsely believe that particular goods are
the true causes of its happiness, it naturally works against liberty.
Malebranche describes perfect and imperfect liberty within this context.
Thus the most perfect liberty is that of minds which can at every
moment surmount the greatest pleasures; it is that of minds in respect
to which no movement towards particular goods is ever invincible; it is
that of man before sin, before concupiscence troubled his spirit and
corrupted his heart. And the most imperfect liberty is that of a mind
with respect to which every movement towards a particular good,
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however small it seems, is invincible in all kinds of circumstances
(OCM V 123-124, PR 175).
In the end, the forces of liberty and concupiscence are in constant conflict,
both struggling for the supremacy of the mind. In fact, the mind’s degree of
concupiscence is inversely related to its degree of liberty. The more it has of
one, the less it has of the other.
The struggle between concupiscence and liberty is not the same for
every mind. Even though each mind starts out with an equal share of liberty
and concupiscence, the particular characteristics of each mind-body
composite, natural and acquired, determines a mind’s degree of liberty and
concupiscence. This means that the mind’s degree of concupiscence and
liberty differs over time, and is different from one mind to another.
Concupiscence and liberty, Malebranche believes, is determined by three
factors: (1) the natural structures, dispositions and motions of the body, (2) the
habits formed by the mind-body composite through its interactions with
external objects, and (3) the mind’s degree of grace in terms of both
illumination and feeling (OCM V 123-126, PR 175-177). As the first two will
either increase or diminish liberty depending on the particular characteristics
of the mind-body composite, the third will naturally increase liberty if the
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mind is receptive. In order to understand the ways in which these factors
affect the mind’s freedom, a brief account Malebranche’s Cartesian physiology
is needed.

3.2.3

Cartesian Physiology

Malebranche believes the sense-organs are composed of numerous fibers or
filaments (which are bundled into nerves) that originate in the principal part
of the brain and spread out, without interruption, into all the members of
body and extends to the exterior portions of the body (i.e. skin).111 These fibers
are hollow and filled with the most refined and agitated parts of the blood: the
animal spirits. The animal spirits are generated by the heart through a
complex process of fermentation in which the blood entering the heart is
refined and agitated by the heart’s heat and movements. The newly generated
animal spirits exit the heart, along with the rest of the blood, and travel
through the arteries to the principal part of the brain, where they are, in turn,
distributed to every part of the body through a complex system of fibers. This
system of fibers, along with the animal spirits that flow through them, is
responsible for the material aspects of sensations.
111
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Sensing, in its material aspect, begins with an external object, such as
light in visual perception, striking the sense organs with enough force to
displace the impacted fibers or vibrate the corresponding animal spirits in
such a way that they communicate the impact, by forming traces in the brain
fibers, to the principal part of the brain. The principal part of the brain
responds to the impact by distributing a determined amount of animal spirits
to the affected area so that the body can adjust itself in the appropriate way.
The animal spirits accomplish this by inflating the fibers in the affected area in
such a way that the muscles, to which the fibers are joined, will either contract
or expand.
The mental side of sensing is the actual “felt” sensation that is
experienced by the mind when the material side of sensing is satisfied. This
means that every sensation corresponds to a pattern of brain traces. These
correlations not only link sensations with brain traces, but also connect the
qualitative and quantitative character of sensations with the agitation or
motion of the animal spirits. The intensity of a sensation, such as the
sharpness of a pain or the perceptive vividness of a tree, is determined by the
amount of animal spirits flowing through the brain fibers and their degree of
agitation and motion. The more agitated the animal spirits are the more
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intense the corresponding sensation is, and vice-versa. This also accounts for
some of the differences between sensing and imagining, the former
corresponding to a higher degree of animal spirit agitation than the latter
(OCM I 192, LO 88).
Now, sensations and images produce corresponding passions.
Passions, in general, reinforce sensations and images and sustain the body’s
natural response to the sensed or imagined object. As a consequence, they
maintain and fortify the mind’s attention on the sensed object. Malebranche
describes this process as “nothing but a continual circulation of feelings and
movements which sustain and produce themselves” (OCM XI 146, CW 135).
Just as in the case of sensations, the degree of animal spirit agitation will
determine the intensity of the passion.
God establishes these basic correlations between sensations and brain
traces in order to unite the mind and body, and to help the mind preserve the
body (OCM I 216-217, LO 102-3). The mind is not united to the body by being
“immaterially” spread out, so to speak, to every part of the body, but by being
aware of the changes that go on in the principal part of the brain. Since all the
sense organ fibers originate in this area of the brain, the mind can be aware of
the activities of each sense organ. Thus, the principle part of the brain is, as it
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were, a control center that manages the activities of the sense organs and other
parts of the body, and is the central point of mind-body interaction.
Regarding the body’s preservation, these basic correlations connect
sensations to particular brain traces so that the mind and body can easily
navigate, and interact with, the external world. As noted above, pleasures and
pains accompany these sensible perceptions so that the mind can quickly
judge whether an object is helpful or harmful to the body. These natural
judgments are instinctive and usually concern the preservation of the body, as
the free judgments that usually follow them have to do with the true welfare
and happiness of the mind, that is, with whether the objects are true goods or
not. If a needle, for instance, pricked the hand, the mind would naturally
judge that the “pain” is in the hand. But after consulting its knowledge of
Cartesian physiology the mind would judge that “pain” is really a
modification of the mind and that it corresponds to a particular set of brain
traces. In both cases, the mind judges that the pain is bad for the body, but the
free judgment is mostly concerned with finding out the true cause of the pain,
which was not really the needle, but the occasional union that God set up
between the mind and body. These judgments are based on free acts of the
mind, and have nothing to do with the body. Mistakenly, the mind often
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believes that what is good for the body is also good for the mind because it
conflates natural judgments with free ones (OCM I 130, LO 52-3).
With his Cartesian physiology, Malebranche explains the inverse
relation between concupiscence and liberty. He argues that even though
human bodies are physically similar to each other and have the same core set
of mind-body relations, they also differ in many ways according to their
individual physical composition and environment, and the habits they form
through their interactions with the world. In the case of physical composition,
Malebranche believes that the mind’s character is determined by the animal
spirits’ degree of agitation and the malleability of brain fibers and their
susceptibility to brain traces.
For it is easy enough to explain all the different characters encountered
among the minds of men, on the one hand by the abundance and
scarcity, by the rapidity or slowness of agitation, and by the density
and lightness of the animal spirits, and on the other hand by the
delicacy or coarseness, the moistness and dryness, and the malleability
of the brain fibers; and finally, by the relation the animal spirits might
have to these fibers (OCM I 194-195, LO 89).
Here he suggests that the body’s physical composition determines, to
some degree, the mind’s character or disposition. For instance, if someone is
born with an unusually hot heart and very delicate and malleable brain fibers,
his body will naturally produce an abnormal amount of very refined and
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lively animal spirits that can easily create deep and permanent brain traces in
the delicate brain fibers. This will result, given the correlations between mind
and body, in more intense sensations, images and passions that can potentially
overwhelm the mind’s finite capacities and distract it from its true good.
Consequently, a mind with this type of body is much more susceptible to
concupiscence than a mind that is joined to a body that is more moderately
constructed and disposed (OCM I 196-197, LO 91).
Even with a moderately constructed body, the body still faces
environmental factors that can severely alter its composition and lead to an
increase or decrease in concupiscence. Consider the air that the body breathes.
The heart needs air to ferment the blood and produce animal spirits. So the
quality of the air, just as the heart’s degree of heat, determines the character
and amount of animals spirits produced. The more refined the air, the more
lively the animal spirits are, and obviously, the coarser the air is, the less lively
they are.
Other notable examples are food and wine. The amount and quality of
the food ingested by the body is directly related to the amount and quality of
chyle that is produced in the intestines by the actions of the bile and pancreatic
juices (the digestive enzymes) on the chyme (the semi-fluid mass of partly
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digested food that the stomach expels into the first part (duodenum) of the
small intestines). The chyle, Malebranche contends, mixes with the blood that
enters the heart and affects the quality of the animal spirits that are produced.
Thus, if the chyle thickens the blood, the animal spirits will be coarse and less
lively. This will naturally reduce the amount of animal spirits entering the
brain, which will in turn, decrease the production of brain traces and their
corresponding sensations and imaginings. So, after a heavy meal, the mind’s
imagination becomes less active and the body typically succumbs to lethargy.
Wine, like animal spirits, is very spirituous in nature. But unlike animal
spirits, wine spirits are not easily controlled by the will. So after much
drinking, the mind usually loses control of its body’s movements and their
corresponding sensations and passions. The mind’s attention, in this case, is at
the mercy of its sensations.
Malebranche uses these environmental factors to explain the different
temperaments of people living in different regions and countries.
Thus, it is certain that the most refined air particles we breathe enter
our hearts; that together with the blood and the chyle there, they
maintain the heat that gives and movement to our body, and that,
according to their varying qualities, they cause great changes in the
fermentation of the blood and in the animal spirits.
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We recognize these facts every day through the various humors and
mental characteristics of persons in different countries. The Gascons
[Gascony is a former province in south-western France], for example,
have a much more lively imagination than the Normans…But if we
consider the people of more remote lands, we shall encounter even the
stranger differences, as between an Italian and a Fleming or a
Dutchman (OCM I 202-203, LO 95).
Air, food and wine are just some examples of how the environment can affect
the mind’s ratio of freedom and concupiscence. A highly agitated body, along
with a poor diet, can make a powerful concupiscent cocktail that can
overcome the mind’s attention, and force it to turn away from its true good,
and hurt its chances at perfection.
Another

factor

determining

the

mind’s

ratio

of

liberty

and

concupiscence are voluntary and involuntary habits formed by the
interactions of the mind and body with the environment. Habits, described in
mechanistic terms, are formed and fortified by repeated acts of the same kind
that produce deep and lasting traces on the brain and occasion their
corresponding sensations in the mind. These traces allow the animal spirits to
pass easily through the fibers of the body to the principal part of the brain
where they can be distributed swiftly to other parts of the body. This explains,
according to Malebranche, skills acquired by training such as learning a
language, playing an instrument, and more importantly, acquiring and
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conserving virtue (OCM I 227-228, LO 108; OCM XI 51-52, CW 69). The more
one speaks a language or plays an instrument, the deeper the imprint on one’s
brain fibers and the easier the animal spirits flow. By the same reasoning,
habits can be effaced through inactivity. If brain traces are not fortified and
maintained by repeated acts, the brain traces will heal and revert back to their
normal state. So unlike natural brain traces, which are natural and permanent,
acquired brain traces can, in principle, be formed, fortified and effaced. As
Malebranche uses natural traces as a physical explanation for natural instincts
and behavior, such as self-preservation, he uses acquired traces to explain
social behaviors, such as language, customs, and duties (OCM I 250-251, LO
121). Malebranche encapsulates this nicely in the phrase: “acts produce habits,
and habits produce acts” (OCM XI 51, CW 69).
Now the formation of habits begins, for Malebranche, during a fetus’s
gestation in its mother’s womb. The fetus, given its dependent condition, is
intimately connected or united with its mother. In fact, the connection is so
intimate that the fetus, given its very malleable brain fibers, actually shares in
its mother’s sensations and passions.
And although their soul [fetus] be separated from their mother’s, their
body is not at all detached from hers, and we should therefore conclude
that they have the same sensations and passions, i.e., that exactly the
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same thoughts are excited in their souls upon the occasion of the
motions produced in her body. Thus, children see what their mothers
see, hear the same cries, receive the same impressions from objects, and
are aroused by the same passions (OCM I 234, LO 112-113).
From this, Malebranche concludes that a mother’s acquired habits can be
imprinted on the fetus’s brain fibers, and could affect the child into adulthood
unless it is effaced. This explains how a child inherits its mother’s peculiar
dispositions, such as a weak or strong imagination, a fear for dogs or a desire
for particular foods (OCM I 241-242, 245, LO 117, 119). More importantly, it
shows that the child will inherit a similar degree of concupiscence from its
mother. So if a child has a mother with a high degree of concupiscence, then it
will have a higher degree of concupiscence than a child whose mother was
moderately disposed during pregnancy.
It must follow from this that since all the traces of the mothers are
engraved and imprinted in the brains of the children, they must be
born with the same habits and other qualities as their mothers, and
even normally retain them throughout their lives, since the habits one
has from the earliest youth are the one preserved the longest, which
nevertheless is contrary to experience (OCM I 249, LO 121).
Thus, a newborn, when it first comes into the world, has already acquired
habits that could potentially alter its ratio of concupiscence and liberty.
Interestingly, Malebranche also uses this to give a physiological
explanation for the soul’s inheritance of Original Sin (OCM I 247-248, 71-118,
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LO 120-1, 579-606). The mind-body disorder caused by Adam and Eve’s sin,
which turned the mind away from God and made it dependent on the body, is
passed down to the child through the mother. Essentially, the concupiscent
habits, acquired by Eve after sin, were passed down to her offspring, and then
in turn, passed down to her descendents through the woman. Thus, every
child is born into sin and, as a result, has a concupiscent disposition. So the
question is not whether an infant has concupiscence, but to what degree it has
it, and this depends on the mother and her concupiscent habits. However,
unlike other acquired habits, Original Sin cannot be effaced because,
according to Malebranche, the habits are reinforced by the mind’s constant
interaction with the world through its body. In the end, Malebranche uses this
account to release God from responsibility, making the mother solely
responsible for the sinful disorder of her child.
The acquisition of habits does not stop at birth, but continues
throughout the child’s life. The particular habits that a child acquires are
determined by the environment and the people that care for the child, and
later, the people with which it interacts. So, the way a child is raised and
interacts with the world affects its degree of liberty and concupiscence. If the
child acquired concupiscent habits in the womb, then they could efface those
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habits with a proper education and moderate lifestyle. Yet, as the child grows
older, it becomes more difficult to acquire and efface habits because the brain
fibers harden and become less flexible and malleable over time (OCM I 227228, 230, LO 108, 110). The reason for this, according to Malebranche, is that
the animal spirits, through their continuous agitation, gradually dry up the
brain fibers, just as the wind dries the earth it blows over (OCM I 231, LO 111).
So if concupiscent habits are not effaced by late adulthood, they can become
permanent dispositions. This not only affects the acquisition of habits and the
vigor (vivacity) of the imagination, but also the mind’s ability to acquire
knowledge and attend to particular truths (OCM I 270, LO 132).
With its inherited concupiscence and the many physical and habitual
factors that affect it, the mind is not in a good position to exercise its liberty;
especially if it has a strong predisposition for concupiscence. But all is not lost.
Malebranche believes that the mind can combat concupiscence with the help
of God’s external aid and from its own internal resources. A detailed account
of each resource is necessary for a proper understanding of the mind’s
freedom and perfection.
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3.2.4

Jesus Christ and the Grace of Feeling

God’s aid consists in gifts of grace that are given to the mind. For
Malebranche, there are two species of grace that pertain to the mind’s freedom
and perfection: grace of enlightenment and grace of feeling.112 Each has plays a
unique role and has a different occasional cause. As I mentioned earlier, the
first pertains to the mind’s intimate union with God’s immutable order, the
second directly combats and counterbalances concupiscence. Saving grace of
enlightenment for our discussion of the mind’s ability to perfect itself, let’s
turn to grace of feeling and the role it plays in counterbalancing
concupiscence.
As we have seen, the mind’s will is constantly being moved by
prevenient concupiscent desires towards particular goods (OCM V 98-99, PR
151). Given its fallen disordered state, the mind cannot control these
concupiscent desires and is easily distracted and overwhelmed by them,
resulting in a severe loss of liberty. Without any control over these prevenient
desires, the mind needs something, similar in kind, to counterbalance them.
Malebranche believes that this counterbalance comes from the grace of Jesus
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There is also habitual grace, or what he sometimes calls grace of charity, but this does not directly
relate to our discussion
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Christ as the redeemer of humankind. Accordingly, Christ redeems the mind
by helping it overcome its dependence on the body and its concupiscent
desires so that it can turn towards God. In order to counterbalance the mind’s
disordered state caused by the first Adam (sinful and terrestrial Adam), it was
necessary for the second Adam, Jesus Christ (innocent and celestial Adam) to
dispense desires in the mind that are contrary to concupiscence, such as
prevenient pleasures that support and augment the mind’s love for God and
his immutable order, or distaste for the objects that give rise to concupiscent
desires. He can also diminish the mind’s attraction towards particular goods
by directly weakening concupiscent desires (OCM V 95, PR 150).
Now, Christ dispenses grace of feeling to particular individuals not as a
productive or efficacious cause, but as an occasional cause that delimits the
application of God’s general laws of grace. Specifically, he occasions the
dispensation of grace of feeling to individual minds through his own thoughts
and desires.
At the present he (Jesus Christ) is the sovereign priest of future goods,
and by his different desires he prays ceaselessly to his Father on behalf
of men. And since his desires are occasional causes, his prayers are
always granted; his Father refuses him nothing, as Scripture teaches us.
However, it is necessary that he pray and that he desire in order to
obtain: because occasional, natural, physical causes (these three signify
the same thing) do not have, by themselves, the power to do anything,

142
and because all creatures, and Jesus Christ himself considered as a man,
are by themselves nothing but weakness and impotence (OCM V 72, PR
142-3; cf. OCM XII 320, JS 253).
Christ, limited by his finite and impotent human nature, cannot dispense
grace simultaneously or uniformly to all minds at all times, but must dispense
it according to his successive thoughts and desires, which are limited to
particular individuals or groups of people that share the same dispositions
(OCM V 73, PR 144). Since Christ is limited in the number of persons or
dispositions he can think about at any given time, he must constantly change
his thoughts and desires in order to dispense grace of feeling to all the minds
that he desires. Furthermore, the amount of grace of feeling a mind receives is
determined by the intensity of Christ’s desires at any given time. So not only
does Christ’s thoughts and desires change, but also their intensity. This is no
different from the way the mind acts on its body.
The different desires of the soul of Jesus diffusing grace, one sees
clearly how it is that it is not diffused equally in all men, and that it falls
on the same persons more abundantly at one time than at another. For
the soul of Jesus Christ not thinking at the same time of all men, it does
not have at one time all the desires of which it is capable. Such that
Jesus Christ does not act on his members in a particular way except by
successive influences. In the same way our soul does not move, at one
single time, all the muscles of our body: for the animal spirits are
diffused unequally and successively in our members, according to the
different impressions of objects, the different movements of our
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passions, and the different desires which we freely form within
ourselves (OCM V 74-75, PR 145).
Now, Christ dispenses grace of feeling according to two kinds of
desires: those that are passing and particular, and those that are stable and
permanent. Passing and particular desires are usually reserved for minds that
are unprepared to receive grace of feeling, as stable and permanent ones
concern those who regularly receive the sacraments, and love God and his
immutable order. Hence, Christ regularly dispenses grace of feeling, with
different degrees of intensity, to devout hearts, but he also, at times, gives
grace of feeling to those who may not be receptive to Christ’s grace.
The feelings of charity which he has for the faithful are more frequent
and more durable than those which he has for libertines and for the
impious; and since all the faithful are not equally disposed to enter the
Church of the predestined, the desires of the soul of Jesus are not, with
respect to all of them, equally lively, frequent, and lasting (OCM V 92,
PR 147).
At first glance, it seems that Christ, at least when in comes to passing
desires, dispenses grace irregularly, merely dispensing grace of feeling
according the particular dispositions of a person or group without following
any sense of order. But in fact, Christ dispenses grace of feeling according to
God’s plan for the construction of his eternal Church (OCM V 74, PR 144).
Consequently, Christ does not dispense grace according to individual needs or
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merit, by only in terms of his need to construct his Church. Wanting to
provide the most diverse Church possible, Christ dispenses grace of feeling
not only to those that have received the sacraments, but also to those who do
not, such as misers or those with hardened hearts. So Christ’s dispensation of
grace of feeling, though determined by his particular thoughts and desires,
follow God’s immutable Order.
Now, turning back to the mind, Malebranche describes the effects of
grace of feeling on finite minds in terms of a scale with two bowls on each side
with a sliding fulcrum. The scale represents the will, the two bowls grace of
feeling and concupiscence, and the sliding fulcrum the mind’s dispositions
(OCM V 132-133, PR 182). According to this scheme, the “weight” of grace of
feeling and concupiscence in each bowl will determine the balance of the
mind’s will, either in favor of God or particular goods. However, the “weight”
of grace of feeling and concupiscence is determined by the three physical and
environmental factors mentioned above that structure the mind’s disposition.
Given that no two minds have the same dispositions, the same quantity of
grace of feeling and concupiscence will affect minds differently.
Thus the grace of feeling is always efficacious by itself: it always
diminishes the effect of concupiscence because pleasure naturally
brings about love for the cause which produces it, or which seems to
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produce it. But although this grace is always efficacious by itself, it
depends, or rather the effect depends, on the actual dispositions of him
to whom it is given (OCM V 132-133, PR 182).
The effects of pleasure and of all the feelings of the soul depend in a
thousand ways on the actual dispositions of the mind. The same weight
does not always produce the same effects: it depends, in its action, on
the construction of the machine by which it is applied to the contrary
weight. If a balance is unequally suspended, the force of the weights
being unequally applied, the lighter ones may outweigh the heavier
(OCM V 144, PR 192).
So if one mind were more susceptible to material wealth than another mind,
and they were both presented with the same pot of gold, the concupiscent
“weight” of the gold would be relatively heavier in the former and lighter in
the latter. In this case, the mind’s dispositions determine the position of the
fulcrum on the scale, which in turn, affects the influence on concupiscence and
grace of feeling.113 Consequently, a mind that has suitably disposed itself to
receive grace of feeling will be in a better position to utilize it than a mind that
has not done the proper preparatory work. Just as a farmer needs to prepare
his fields so that he can utilize rain to grow his crops, the mind needs to
prepare itself to receive grace of feeling, if and when it comes.
Why do they [sinners] not prepare themselves to receive the rain from
heaven? They cannot merit it, but they can augment its efficacy with
respect to themselves. Can they not…avoid occasions for sin, deprive
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themselves of pleasures (at least those they have not already tasted) by
which they will not be enslaved in consequence? Thus they can remove
some impediments to the efficacy of grace, and prepare the ground of
their heart, such that it becomes fruitful when God pours rain
according to the general laws that he has prescribed to himself (OCM V
54, PR 132).
However, Malebranche’s scale analogy seems to suggest that the mind
is determined to act according to which bowl on the scale is heavier, thereby
stripping the mind of its responsibility. But this is not the case. Even though
the scale is tip one way or another, the mind can still freely decide what to do,
although the dominant influence of grace of feeling or concupiscence will
make it more or less difficult for the mind to decide. However, if the scale is
extremely imbalanced in favor of either pleasure, it may be practically
impossible to avoid its influence.
Since concupiscence has not entirely destroyed liberty in man, the grace
of Jesus Christ, however efficacious it may be, is not absolutely
invincible. One can defeat sensible pleasure if it is weak; on can
suspend the judgment of one’s love, when one is not carried along by
some passion that is too violent; and when one succumbs to the allure
of this false pleasure, one is guilty because of the bad use of one’s
liberty. In the same way the delectation of grace is not ordinarily
invincible. One can fail to follow the good feelings which it
inspires…This grace does not fill up the soul in such a way that it
carries it towards the true good without choice, without discernment,
without consent (OCM V 134, PR 183-184).
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In the end, Malebranche believes grace of feeling is an aid but not a
cure for concupiscence. If grace of feeling were a cure for concupiscence, then
the mind would be determined to love true goods by prevenient pleasures (or
instinct) and not by its own free rational choice (OCM V 133-134, PR 183-184).
This would make Christ solely responsible for the mind’s perfection;
essentially stripping the mind of its responsibility to love God and act
according to his immutable order. Accordingly, grace of feeling is necessary
for combating concupiscence, but it can never be the ultimate source of the
mind’s freedom and perfection. Perfection can only come from the mind’s
own internal resources.

3.2.5

Interlude: Jolley and Efficacious Ideas

Knowing the mechanics behind mind-body union, along with the effects of
liberty and grace of feeling on the mind, puts the mind in the position to
purify itself by developing the right habits and dispositions to resist
concupiscent desires so that it can turn inwards and then upwards to God.
Malebranche’s account, presented thus far, seems to imply that the mind, in
order to perfect itself, must have its own internal resources. That is, it must be
cognitively and volitionally active in some way. Yet this contradicts the
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generally accepted opinion that the Malebranchean mind does not have these
resources, and even if it did, they would be inconsistent with his vision in
God.114 The best representative example of this is Nicolas Jolley’s argument
that Malebranche, in his mature writings, rejects the idea that the mind has its
own cognitive and volitional resources to apprehend God’s Order and makes
God solely responsible for the mind’s intellectual or pure perceptions.115 If the
mind does not have the internal resources to perceive God’s Order, then it is
clear that the mind cannot perfect itself. Given the evidence presented below,
however, it should become obvious that Jolley’s interpretative argument
misses the mark because he fails to take into account key parts of
Malebranche’s theory of perfection where Malebranche explicitly attributes
native resources to the mind. Jolley’s interpretation, though inaccurate, is
nonetheless informative because it provides us with the context we need to
understand how the mind can perfect itself through God’s illumination, and
how the mind’s cognitive and volitional resources are compatible with
Malebranche’s vision in God.
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Jolley argues that Malebranche presents two very different accounts of
divine illumination in his writings. In his early writings, Malebranche gives an
account that retains the mind’s cognitive faculties to acquire knowledge and
merely transfers ideas (immutable truths) from the mind to God. This means
that the mind’s cognitions, or what Malebranche calls pure perceptions, are
intentionally related to God’s ideas in such a way that the mind actively “sees”
them, as it were, in God. God’s job is merely to “reveal” ideas to the mind. In
his later and more mature writings, Malebranche gives another account that
does not just transfer ideas from the mind to God, but also strips the mind of
its cognitive capacities, leaving the mind utterly passive. In this case, the
mind’s pure perceptions are more than just intentionally related to God’s
ideas, they are causally related to his ideas insofar as the ideas themselves cause
the perceptions, that is, the mind’s perceptual (or cognitive) acts.116 In this case,
the mind does not actively “perceive” ideas in God, but passively perceives
ideas in that the idea causes the mind’s entire cognitive act, without any active
cognitive contribution on the mind’s part.117 So as the earlier account retains
the mind’s cognitive role in acquiring knowledge, insofar as the mind actively
116
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contributes, in some way, to the perceptual act of seeing God’s ideas, the later
account replaces the mind’s cognitive faculties with causally efficacious ideas,
essentially reducing the mind to a mere passive recipient of knowledge. In the
end, Jolley argues, Malebranche rejects the first account in favor of the second.
By doing this, Malebranche abandons the fundamental Cartesian doctrine of
the pure intellect, whereby the mind acquires knowledge through its own
internal resources.
Jolley believes that Malebranche’s dramatic anti-Cartesian shift reflects
a strict interpretation of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination that is
based on the tenet that the mind is a lumen illuminatum (illuminated light), not
a lumen illuminans (illuminating light).118 Malebranche, according to Jolley,
thinks that Augustine’s theory implies that the mind is not only completely
dependent on God for all of its knowledge, but also that it is devoid of all
cognitive activity.119 This puts Augustine’s theory of divine illumination in
direct conflict with the Cartesian doctrine of the pure intellect. It is this
conflict, with Malebranche siding in the end with Augustine, that is at the
heart of Malebranche’s account of the mind and its intimate relationship with
God. To suggest that the mind has such resources is tantamount to rejecting
118
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this principle. Jolley provides ample textual evidence to support his
interpretation. Here are two representative passages.
Created reason, our soul, the human mind, the purest and most
sublime intellects, can indeed see the light; but they cannot produce it
or draw it from their own resources, nor can they engender it from their
substance. They can discover eternal, immutable, necessary truths in
the divine Word, in eternal, immutable, necessary Wisdom; but in
themselves they find only sensations which are often very lively, yet
always obscure and confused, i.e. modalities full of darkness (OCM XII
64-64, JS 32-33).
I cannot reiterate too often that we must consult not the senses and
their respective modalities, which are sheer darkness, but Reason which
enlightens us by its divine Ideas, by ideas that are immutable,
necessary, eternal (OCM XII 72, JS 47).
For Jolley, these passages suggest that Malebranche has moved away from a
Cartesian pure intellect and towards a more radical theory of divine
illumination in which the mind is totally dependent on God for all of its
knowledge.
The second reason is more philosophical in nature. Jolley suggests that
Malebranche’s new theory may have been motivated by his deep distrust of
ascribing powers or faculties to the mind. He pays particular attention to a
passage in Elucidation 10 of The Search after Truth where Malebranche
compares those Cartesians who ascribe productive faculties to the mind to the
scholastics who talk of powers, forces and natures.
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I am astonished that these Cartesian gentlemen, who rightly have such
aversion to the general terms nature and faculty, so willingly use them
on this occasion. They dislike it if one says that fire burns by its nature
or that it changes certain bodies into glass by a natural faculty; and
some of them are not afraid to say that the mind of man produce in
itself the ideas of all things by its nature, because it has the faculty of
thinking. But, whether they like it or not, these terms are not more
meaningful in their mouths, than in those of the Peripatetics. It is true
that our soul is such by its nature that it necessarily perceives that
which affects it: but God alone can act in it… Just as it is false that
matter although capable of figure and motion, has in itself a force, a
faculty, a nature, by which it can move itself or give itself now a round
figure, now a square, thus, though the soul is naturally and essentially
capable of knowledge and volition, it is false that it has any faculty by
which it can produce in itself its ideas or its impulse toward the good,
because it invincibly wants to be happy (OCM III 144-145, LO 622).
Jolley acknowledges that, in this passage, Malebranche is explicitly attacking
the Cartesian claim that the mind can produce its own ideas. But, Malebranche
also makes the claim that the terms “nature” and “faculty” are meaningless.
Jolley believes that this claim, coupled with the thesis that the mind is not a
light to itself, shows that Malebranche is actually making the stronger claim
that the mind is utterly devoid of cognitive abilities.
In order to fill the gap left by the mind’s cognitive impotence, Jolley
suggest that Malebranche argues for a theory that makes God’s idea causally
responsible for mind’s cognitive states. Again, according to this interpretation,
the mind does not actively perceive ideas in God rather the mind’s pure
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perceptions are caused by God’s ideas. Jolley takes this to mean that divine
ideas must “act directly on the mind; [so that] they thereby cause cognitive
states to arise in a substance which is devoid of all genuine cognitive
capacities on its own”.120 In this case, the mind participates in the acquisition
of knowledge only in the sense that it passively receives it. For Jolley, the
mind “has no active, native faculty for attending to such objects of thought”.121
Hence, divine ideas are responsible not only for the content of the mind’s pure
perceptions, but also the perceptual acts themselves.
Admittedly, Jolley’s strong interpretation of efficacious ideas fits in
nicely with other important aspects of Malebranche’s system, especially his
theory occasionalism. Recall that, according to occasionalism, God alone is
causally efficacious, and the regularities of nature are grounded in God’s
divine and lawful decrees. Created substances and their modalities, are
causally inefficacious and merely provide the occasion for God to dispense his
power in particular ways. In this case, the mind cannot act on its body, and
more importantly, it cannot produce its own modifications, in this case, its
own cognitive states. The mind is causally impotent and must totally rely on
God. For Malebranche the mind’s union with God is the cause of “its life, its
120
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light, and its entire felicity” (OCM I 9, LO xxxiii). That is, the mind needs
God’s continual presence in order to stay in existence, receive knowledge, and
desire God.
In comparison with Augustine, Malebranche’s conception of the soul is
rather bleak. As we saw in chapter two, Augustine believes that the rational
soul is actively involved in the vegetative, sensitive processes of the body, and
is responsible for its own imaginative and rational activities. Though God
must constantly be present to the mind in order to keep it in existence, the
Augustinian mind has its own rational structure or impressed ideas from
which it can acquire knowledge. In fact, Augustine is much closer to a
Cartesian conception of mind than Jolley account implies, making
Malebranche not only anti-Cartesian, but anti-Augustinian as well. In contrast,
the Malebranchean mind does not causally interact with the body or have its
own rational structure or storehouse of ideas from which it can acquire
knowledge. As we have seen, the mind, through its intimate union with God,
has direct access to God’s Order, that is, the numerically same Order that God
uses to govern the intellectual and moral realms. “In contemplating this
Divine substance, I may see some part of that which God thinks. God sees all
truths, and I may see some of them” (OCM XI 18, CW 45). Understood within
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the context of Jolley’s theory of efficacious ideas, the mind can do nothing but
wait for God to give it pure perceptions. There is nothing the mind can do on
its own to elicit knowledge from God or even attend to the knowledge that
God gives it. The mind is nothing but an empty receptacle that God
cognitively activates when he sees fit.
The problem with this picture is that it ignores Malebranche’s claim
that the mind is, in fact, cognitively and volitionally active. This claim is not
limited to Malebranche’s earlier writings, it can also be found throughout his
mature work, particularly in Treatise on Ethics (1684) and Dialogues on
Metaphysics and on Religion (1688). In the latter work, where Jolley finds
evidence for the mind’s cognitive inactivity, Malebranche explicitly states the
opposite.
The human mind is also united to God, to eternal Wisdom, to the
universal Reason which enlightens all intellects. And it is also united to
Him through the general laws of which our attention is the occasional
cause which determines their efficacy. The disturbances excited in my
brain are the occasional or natural cause of my sensations. But the
occasional cause of the presence of ideas to my mind is my attention. I
think about what I will. (OCM XII 288-289, JS 226; cf. OCM XII 289, 319,
JS 227, 252; OCM XI 169-170, CW 153).
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In his discussion of how God governs his creation by general laws,
Malebranche lists the general laws that govern the mind’s union with God’s
Order among the five key categories of laws.
The laws of the union of the soul with God, with the intelligible
substance of universal Reason, for the laws of which govern our
attention is the occasional cause. It is establishment of these laws that
the mind has the power to think what it wills, and to discover the truth
(OCM XII 319, JS 252-253).
Malebranche could not be clearer about the importance of the mind’s attention
in knowledge acquisition in this passage from the Treatise on Ethics:
Only God spreads light in minds…But we need search nowhere except
in ourselves for the occasional cause which determines Him to
communicate it to us. By a general law which He constantly follows
and all of whose consequences He has foreseen, God has linked the
presence of ideas to the mind’s paying attention: when we are masters
of our attention and make use of it, then without fail light is spread
within us, in direct proportion to our effort (OCM XI 59-60, CW 75; cf.
OCM V 102, PR 155).
In these three passages, Malebranche argues that the mind’s attention, as an
occasional cause, determines the efficacy of God’s illumination. Given the laws
of God-mind union, God reveals, on the occasion of the mind’s attentive
desire, a part of his Order. An attentive desire is a product of both the mind’s
will and understanding insofar as the will’s desire for knowledge elicits God
to reveal the requisite ideas so that the understanding can perceive or attend
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to them. For instance, by concentrating its attention on an apparent good, the
mind triggers, as it were, God to reveal more information about that apparent
good so that the mind can properly examine it and decide whether it is a true
good that should be pursued or a false good that must be avoided. And if the
mind decides to pursue it, it can attend to God’s Order to see how the good
should be regarded and what duties follow from it. Of course, the mind’s
attention also plays a crucial role in self-perfection. Without it, the mind could
not actively attend to God’s Order and then conform its actions to it.
In contemplating this Divine substance, I may see some part of that
which God thinks. God sees all truths, and I may see some of them.
Then, I am able to discover something of what God wills; for God wills
only according to Order, and Order is not entirely unknown to me. It is
certain that God loves things in proportion as they are lovable, and I
may discover that there are some things more perfect, more estimable,
more movable than others” (OCM XI 18, CW 45).
Note that the mind does not produce its own ideas and it does not have an
innate power to cause God to reveal ideas to it. Rather the mind is merely
controlling its attention and, as it were, petitioning God to reveal his Order.
Malebranche speaks of this activity in terms of a natural prayer that God
grants to minds (OCM XI 60, CW 76). For God to “reveal” an idea to the mind
is to place the idea in an intentional relation to the understanding, thereby
“causing” the mind to perceive it. According to this interpretation, God does
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not give the understanding a perceptual packet that consists in a
representation and the cognitive power to perceive it. Both God and the mind
contribute to the perception insofar as the mind is responsible for eliciting and
perceiving the idea, as God is responsible for the content by intentionally
relating the mind to the corresponding idea. Clearly, Jolley’s claim that the
mind “has no active, native faculty for attending to such objects of thought”,
does not hold up to the textual evidence.122

3.2.6

The Mind’s Internal Resources: Strength and Freedom of Mind

Malebranche provides more details about how the mind actively contributes
to its perfection in his Treatise on Ethics. Here, he identifies two mental
activities, namely strength and freedom of mind (la force and la liberté de l’esprit).
Each plays a distinct, yet collaborative, role in the mind’s perfection. Let’s
examine each in turn. Strength of mind has to do with the mind’s level of
control over its own attentive desires. The strength and intensity of these
desires determines the amount of knowledge God gives to the mind at any
one time, and helps it think about other objects. The mind’s control over its
attention is made possible by the will’s invincible movement towards the
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Jolley (2000), p. 37.
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good in general. This movement provides the mind with the natural desire to
examine whether an object is good or not, and if it’s not, then to move beyond
it by thinking of other goods (OCM III 22, LO 550). Accordingly, strength of
mind helps the mind to examine an object by eliciting God to reveal more
information about it. It also fortifies the mind against false goods, along with
the concupiscent desires they invoke, by allowing it to freely pursue other
goods in its constant search for the good in general. Malebranche believes that
the will, in relation to particular goods, is a “blind power” that can be put
under the mind’s directive control.
But it must be carefully noted that insofar as a mind is thrust toward
the good in general, it cannot direct its impulse toward a particular
good unless that same mind, insofar as it is capable of ideas, has
knowledge of that particular good. In plain language, I meant that the
will is a blind power, which can proceed only toward things the
understanding represents to it. As a result, the will can direct both the
impression it has for good, and all its natural inclinations in various
ways, only be ordering the understanding to represent to it some
particular object. The power our soul has of directing its inclinations
therefore necessarily contains the power of being able to convey the
understanding toward the objects that pleases it (OCM I 47, LO 5).
This is not to say that the mind can freely control what objects are presented to
it at any given time, since the mind is constantly bombarded by, and naturally
led to, particular objects through its union with the body. But it can direct the
“blind power” of the will by petitioning God to present new intellectual,
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imaginative or sensible objects to the understanding, thereby moving the will
towards new objects.123
So for Malebranche, the mastery of the attention, by maximizing its
strength, is one of the mind’s most important virtues (OCM XI 61, CW 76).
Such mastery helps the mind to purify itself by avoiding false goods and the
concupiscent desires they invoke, helping it advance to the illumination stage
of the perfection process.
Now, God had to establish us as the occasional cause of our knowledge,
for several reasons, the chief of which is that otherwise we would not
be able to be masters of our wills. For since our wills must be
enlightened in order to be excited, if it were not in our power to think,
then it would not be in our power to will. Thus, we would not be free
with a perfect freedom nor, for the same reason, would we be in any
condition to merit the true goods for which we are made (OCM XI 60,
CW 75).
Sin, however, has made it much more difficult for the mind to use its
attention to gain knowledge because now the attention is dominated and
controlled by concupiscent desires. This divides the minds attention and
leaves it with little opportunity to focus its attention on God’s Order. And
when it actually does, the attention is easily distracted and overwhelmed by
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Some commentators argue that this is not Malebranche’s mature view and thus reject the idea that
the mind has directive control over the will. I believe that Malebranche held to this position throughout
his works. I will defend this interpretation in chapter four.
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sensible pleasures. Accordingly, the mind’s attention varies according to the
mind’s ratio of concupiscence and liberty. Thus, it is not equal in all minds.
And if our prayer were not interrupted, if our attention was not
troubled, if we had some idea of what we ask, we would never fail to
receive, in so far as we are capable of receiving. But our prayers are
ceaselessly interrupted…our senses and imagination throw all our
heads into trouble and confusion; and although the truth which we
consult responds to our requests, the confused sound of our passion
keeps us from hearing its answers, or makes us speedily forget (OCM V
102, PR 155).
This is why grace of feeling is so important for the mind’s freedom. Grace of
feeling dissipates or reduces concupiscent desires, giving the mind the
opportunity to focus its attention on God’s Order and come to love it through
reason, not instinct. But, even with the help of Christ’s grace, the mind is still
responsible for the direction, focus, and strength of its attention. But
strengthening the mind is not so easy.
The mind’s attention is thus a natural prayer by which we obtain
Reason, which enlightens us. But because of sin, the mind often finds
itself in frightfully barren spells; it cannot pray, i.e., the effort of
attention fatigues and discourages it. In fact, this effort is at first very
great, and the reward quite mediocre. Furthermore, we continually feel
the attraction, the pressure and the agitation of the imagination and
passions, whose inspiration and movement would be so easy to follow.
However, attention is a necessity; we must call upon it in order to be
enlightened. There is no other way to obtain light and understanding
than by the effort of attention. Faith is a gift of God, which we do not
merit. But ordinarily understanding is given only to those who merit it.
Faith is pure grace, in every sense; but understanding of Truth is a sort
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of grace which must be merited by effort, by cooperation with grace
(OCM XI 60, CW 76).
But through its knowledge of Cartesian physiology, God’s dispensation of
grace, and the inner experience of its own levels of concupiscence and liberty,
the mind can, with difficulty, purify itself and strengthen its attention so that
it can advance to the illumination stage of perfection, and eventually unify
itself with God by rationally loving his Order and by imitating him as best it
can by acting in accordance with it.
The mind gains strength by forming habits through constant mental
exercises. These exercises mainly consist of meditative exercises wherein the
mind attempts to calm its concupiscent desires, by avoiding those objects,
foods, environment, and activities that stoke the flames of desire for such
things as wealth, power and fame, while spending time each day
contemplating God’s Order until the mind can sustain its attention on it for
ever longer periods of time (OCM XI 64-65, 81-82, CW 77-78, 91). Through
these mental exercises, the mind will receive the knowledge it needs to love
Order through reason. In addition, it will also realize that its momentary
desires and passions pale in comparison to the true happiness it can receive
from following Order. By consistently avoiding objects that give rise to
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concupiscence, the deep traces in the brain formed by such objects will
eventually heal since there are no animal spirits to sustain them. In fact, this is
the only way to heal brain traces. Not even God’s enlightenment or grace of
feeling can do this.
They [minds] obtain from God those aids needed for battle, but do not
deliver us from our misery unless by strength of combat and resisting
we should naturally make the spirits take another route so that our
wounds would be healed and closed. In order to heal the wounds of the
brain, just as we those of other parts of our bodies, it is sufficient that
nothing prevent the separated fibers from being rejoined (OCM XI 8889, CW 96).
Thus, the mind, through its own effort, must contribute to the eradication its
old concupiscent habits and form new virtuous habits that conform to God’s
order.
In order for the mind to use its attention to apprehend God’s Order, it
needs freedom of mind so that it can stop and withhold consent when
confronted with apparent goods and examine them according to Order, seeing
if they are true goods (OCM XI 70, CW 83). Without it, concupiscent desires
would take over the mind’s judgment and determine its consent.
But no matter how much strength of mind we acquire, we cannot make
that effort without pause, constantly. Thus, in order for man not to fall
into error, it is not enough that he have a mind strong enough to
support the effort required. In addition we must have another
virtue…Freedom of the mind, by which man always withholds his
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consent until he is invincibly carried to the giving of it (OCM XI 70, CW
83).
Therefore nothing is more necessary than freedom of the mind, if we
are to love only true goods, live according to order, obey reason
inviolably, and acquire true and solid virtue (OCM XI 79, CW 89).
Freedom of mind originates from the same source as liberty, namely the
mind’s non-invincibility towards particular goods. Since the mind is not
compelled to love any particular good, it can give or withhold consent when
confronted by these goods. Thus, the power to give or withhold consent is a
consequence of the indeterminate impression God gives the mind towards the
good in general.
God does not lead us either necessarily or invincibly to the love of this
[particular] good. We feel that we are free to halt this love, that we have
an impulse to go farther—in short, that the impression we have for the
universal good (or to speak as others do, our will) is neither constrained
nor necessitated to halt at this particular good (OCM III 18-19, LO 548).
Recall that the will’s degree of non-invincibility is directly related to the
mind’s liberty, which is, in turn, determined by the mind’s level of
concupiscence. So the mind’s freedom is not a faculty that all minds equally
possess, but a virtue that must be acquired. In the end, strength and freedom
of mind are not given, but earned.
But it is up to man, or has been up to man, to conserve his strength and
freedom of mind and not let his imagination be corrupted such that
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even if grace were given to him, it would be fruitless. For if his
imagination is corrupted, then spiritual delight in true goods will just
barely be felt because of the abundance, vivacity and strength of the
sensible pleasures which disturb and captivate it (OCM XI 83, CW 92).
The most important way, according to Malebranche, to augment the
mind’s freedom is to constantly use it. “To make us of freedom AS MUCH AS
WE CAN, that is essential and indispensable precept of Logic and of Ethics”
(OCM XI 71, CW 83). Since acts produce habits, the mind’s constant use of its
freedom will produce a strong habit in the mind, making it routine to stop and
examine all objects that confront it. The mind, by doing this, will favorably
dispose itself to the graces of Christ and God, which in turn, can be used to
combat concupiscence and discover true goods, respectively. Without forming
such habits, the mind is less likely to overcome its concupiscent desires and
rationally consent to true goods. Moreover, the mind will not be able to
perfect itself by consistently following God’s Order.
As we can see, strength and freedom of mind work in conjunction to
produce rational judgments. First the mind, when confronted by an apparent
good, must stop and withhold its consent. Next it must use its attention to
petition God to reveal more information about the object or action in question.
After it receives enough evidence about the object, it can then rationally
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consent to it or not. Malebranche clearly states this earlier on in The Search after
Truth.
Now its [the mind’s] freedom consists in the fact that not being fully
convinced that this honor [particular good] contains all the good it is
capable of loving, it can suspend it judgment and love, and then…by its
union with the universal being…it can think about the other things and
consequently love other goods. Finally, it can compare all goods, love
them according to order to the extent to which they ought to be loved,
and relate them all to that which contains all goods and which, being
alone capable of fulfilling our total capacity of loving, is alone worthy
of limiting our love OCM I 48, LO 5-6).
In this case, a perfectly free mind will rationally consent to, or love, an object
only if there is enough evidence in support of it or no remorse in loving it
(OCM XI 71-72, CW 84; cf. OCM I 54-55, LO 10). Thus, the mind is using its
illumination to put itself in accord with God’s order; thus, harmonizing its
actions with God’s will.
Unlike the mind’s attention, however, freedom of mind does not
produce, or occasion God to produce, anything in the mind, even though
giving or withholding consent is an activity of the mind. This activity, in terms
of withholding consent, merely gives the mind’s attention the opportunity to
examine any particular good or turn towards other goods. It is the attention
that occasions new modifications in the mind, not the mind’s act of
withholding consent. When we resist temptation, Malebranche contends,
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We can be said to give ourselves a new modification in this sense, that
we actually and freely will to think of things other than the false goods
that tempt us, and we will not rest in their enjoyment (OCM III 25, LO
551).
The new modification, in this case, is not occasioned by withholding consent,
but by the mind’s attention to “freely will to think of things other than the
false goods that tempt us.” So, withholding consent does not produce or
occasion any new modifications in the mind.
Freedom of mind, in terms of giving consent to an apparent good, is the
mind’s ability to end its examination of a particular good and settle its
attention on it. This can happen in a couple of ways. The mind could exhaust
its examination of an apparent good and see indubitably that it is a true good,
or it could succumbs to the demands of its concupiscent desires and settle on
the good without comparing it to other goods; thereby failing to love the good
as it ought to loved, that is, according to God’s Order (OCM III 20, 25, LO 549,
551). Malebranche describes this as an act of stopping or resting. In relation to
sin he argues,
We love a false good that God does not make us love through and
invincible impression. We give up seeking the true good and frustrate
the impulse God impresses in us. All we do is stop and rest. This is
certainly done by an act, but by an immanent act that produces nothing
material [real] in our substance—by an act that in this case does not
even require of the true cause [God] some material effect in us, neither
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new ideas nor sensations, in short, that is, by an act that does nothing
and makes the general cause do nothing insofar as it is general,
disregarding His justice, for the soul’s inactivity, like the body’s, has no
force or material efficacy. Now when we love a particular good by itself
or contrary to order, we receive from God as great an impression of
love as if we did not pause over this good (OCM III 24, LO 551).
The mind’s “immanent act”, in this case, is ultimately the mind’s failure to use
its attention to examine the false good, by occasioning God to reveal his
Order, or use its liberty to move beyond a false good. So, in this case, the mind
is not producing or occasioning anything new, it is simply not using what God
has given it. In relation to merit, the mind is using what God has given it, and
consents to the good only after it has conducted an exhaustive examination, or
if time is short, a limited examination that yields a reasonable degree of
probability about the good (OCM XI 76-77, CW 87; OCM I 57, LO 11). Hence,
the mind rests in the sense that it stops using, or does not use, its attention to
examine the good in question. The difference between merit and sin, in this
context, is simply the difference between the mind using or not using its
freedom and strength of mind before giving consent. Note that Malebranche is
willing to admit that if the act of consent does in fact “materially” modify the
mind, then the mind has real power.
[I]f our consent, which I view as inactivity or voluntary suspension of
seeking and examining, is taken to be a material reality, then I agree
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that in this sense the mind can modify itself in different ways through
the action or desire to be happy that God places in it, and that in this
sense it has a real power (OCM III 25-26, LO 551).
Even though Malebranche believes that the mind’s immanent act has
no physical or real aspect, he does believe that it has a moral aspect. This
pertains to the relation between the consenting act and God’s order.
But it seems to me that there is no more reality in the consent we give to
good than in that we give to evil, that that which is a consequence of a
true judgment is right and that which depends on a false judgment is
disordered, and that the morality of our consent is derived solely from
objects. The soul’s repose in God is just, for He is the true good, the true
cause of happiness. The same repose in some created thing is unjust,
because no creature is a true cause of happiness. But I do not see that
our inactivity, whether ordered or disordered, which makes us either
just or criminal, of itself materially changes the substance of our soul
(OCM III 26, LO 551).
The moral quality of the mind’s consent is determined by its conformity to
God’s moral Order. For instance, if the mind consents to a false good, then the
act does not conform to God’s Order and is therefore considered disordered
and sinful. So the act of consent does not change the mind’s modifications, it
only changes the mind’s external relation to the moral Order. Such an external
relation, for Malebranche, does not have real being; thus, it cannot result in
any real change in the mind. This claim is similar to Malebranche’s discussion
of non-real relations between ideas.
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Thus, we do not claim, as does Saint Augustine, that we see God in
seeing truths, but in seeing the ideas of these truths—for the ideas are
real, whereas the equality between ideas, which is the truth is nothing
real. When we say, for example that the cloth we are measuring is three
ells long, the cloth and the ells are real. But the equality between them
is not a real being—it is only a relation found between the three ells and
the cloth. When we say that twice two is four, the ideas of the numbers
are real, but the equality between them is only a relation (OCM I 44, LO
234).
In this passage, Malebranche seems to distinguish that which is true from that
which is real. It is true that the length of cloth is equal to the three ells, but this
truth is a mere relation that changes nothing about the ells or the cloth.
Similarly, it could be argued, that the mind’s act of consent and God’s Order
are real, but the moral relation between the two is not; thus, nothing changes
in the mind or God’s order.124 So, for Malebranche, some external relations,
such as the mind’s external relation to God’s Order, change nothing about the
internal modifications of a substance. Therefore, the moral aspect of consent
does not produce, or occasion God to produce, any new modifications either
in the mind or any other thing.
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Such an external non-real relation seems analogous to Malebranche’s contention that a body’s
relative position to other bodies changes nothings about its size, shape or quantity of motion. See Tad
Schmaltz’s (1994) argument for this interpretation, p. 43 fn.100. See Elmar Kremer (2000) for an
objection to this position, pp. 213-214. Kremer argues that Malebranche violates the basic principle that
a change must mean a change in something, in this case God or the mind’s consent. If God changes, it
would violate his immutability, if the mind changes, then it violates Malebranche’s full-blown
occasionalism. One way to get around this objection is to reject the assumption that Malebranche is a
full-blown occasionalist. I present my case in chapters four and five.
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Bring the pieces of our discussion together, the mind must use its
strength and freedom together in order to make free rational choices about
particular goods, and combat concupiscent desires. When the mind, aided by
Christ’s grace, is confronted by an apparent good, it must first withhold its
consent, and then use its attention to examine the good by occasioning God to
enlighten the mind. The mind should consent only if the examination has
established that it is a true good and reveals the proper relations it has to other
goods. By doing this, the mind can love the good according to reason and
God’s Order (OCM XI 155, CW 144). In order to augment the mind’s strength
and freedom, Malebranche believes that the mind must mortify the senses by
avoiding objects that excite it and by controlling its imaginations and passions
by subordinating and subjecting them to reason and Order. This will help the
mind to acknowledge that these things pale in comparison to God and his
Order. Moreover, it must use its strength and freedom of mind as much as it
can so that it can form the proper habit of consulting Order in all things (OCM
XI 150-152, CW 138-139). This forces the mind to stop and think before it
instinctively consents to false goods.
If the mind, in cooperation with Christ’s grace, uses its strength and
freedom in this way, it will gain merit. If the mind is determined to give
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consent by concupiscent desires or Christ’s grace of feeling alone, it will not
gain merit even if it correctly consents to a true good. This follows from
Malebranche’s contention that the mind must love true goods according to
reason, not instinct (OCM V 134, PR 184).
One must conclude from weighing everything I have just said, that one
always merits when one loves the true good through reason; and that
one merits not at all when one only loves it through instinct. One
always merits when on loves the true good through reason, because
order will have it that the true good be loved in that way, and that
enlightenment all alone does not transport us at all, when one only
loves the true good through instinct, or in so far as pleasure transport
or invincibly determines the mind—because order will have it that the
true good, or the good of the mind, be loved by reason, be loved by a
free love, by a love of choice and of discernment, and that the love
which pleasure alone produces is a blind love which is natural and
necessary (OCM V 138, PR 187).
In the end, a mind that loves by reason, not instinct, is one that uses its reason
to advance beyond prevenient delectations, whether concupiscence or Christ’s
grace, and freely loves the good according to God’s order, not according to
mind’s own needs and desires. As a result, the mind recovers some of the
order that was lost by Adam’s sin, and increases its perfection, thereby,
fulfilling the duty it has to itself. Moreover, the mind fulfills its duties to God
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by properly using the power, reason, and will that God has given it (OCM XI
153-192, CW 143-162). 125
Thus, contrary to Jolley’s claim that the mind is cognitively impotent,
this account clearly shows a Malebranchean mind that has its own cognitive
and volitional resources by which it can actively apprehend God’s order and
conform its judgments according to it. Obviously, God did not endow it with
its own rational structure or a corresponding cognitive capacity to produce
pure perceptions on its own, but it is responsible, through its attentive desires,
for petitioning (or occasioning) God to reveal his order. What Jolley sees as
Malebranche’s later theory of efficacious ideas, as opposed to an earlier one
that grants cognitive abilities to the mind, I see as one theory. Malebranche is
not expounding two theories, but two aspects of the same theory, emphasizing
one aspect over another depending on the context of his discussion. If he is
discussing the causally productive side of cognition he will emphasize God’s
power and the efficacy of ideas. For instance, he uses the causal efficacy of
ideas to argue that all ideas must be in God (OCM I 442, LO 232). Yet, if he is
discussing the mind’s own cognitive resources, he speaks of the mind’s
125

Malebranche, believing that the mind is made in the image of God (Trinity), states that the mind’s
free rational love of an object (Holy Spirit) is the consummation of the mind’s proper use of its power
(Father) and reason (Son or Wisdom) (OCM XI 157, CW 145). Rational love, in this case, is the mind’s
fulfillment of this image. In this way, the mind unites itself with God insofar as it imitates God as best it
can.
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strength and freedom of mind, as we saw above. Jolley presents us with an
either/or situation, where either God or the mind is cognitively responsible,
when in fact Malebranche believes that both play important roles in
knowledge acquisition. Thus, Jolley’s account, as a representative example of
the supposed incompatibility of the Malebranche’s divine illumination theory
and mind’s internal resources, is unlikely given the textual evidence and the
alternative interpretation presented above.

3.3

Conclusion: Summary of Malebranche’s Theory of Perfection

With the habitual use of meditative exercises, and the subsequent increase of
its strength and freedom, the mind can effectively purify and inoculate itself
from concupiscence. When it does this, the mind can unify its attention and
focus it on God’s Order, receiving his illumination. With God’s illumination
the mind can now act according to Order, properly fulfilling its duties to
society as well as to itself. As with Augustine, the mind’s final stage of
perfection is to unify itself with God by recognizing him as the true cause of
happiness, and then following his Order as best it can. This recognition
culminates in the mind’s rational love for God, which can be sustained by
constantly pledging to obey God’s order (OCM XI 83, CW 91). At this stage,
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the mind has acquired the highest virtue what Malebranche calls “the habitual
and dominant love of immutable Order” (OCM XI 4). In the end, even though
the mind depends on God for its happiness, the mind, nevertheless, is
responsible for its own happiness. It can do this only by perfecting itself and
meriting God’s love.
Thus anyone who works at his own perfection and makes himself to
resemble God, works for his own happiness, works for his dignity. If he
does that which in some way depends on him to do, that is, if he earns
merit by making himself perfect, God will do that in him which in no
way depends on him—He will make him happy (OCM XI 23, CW 48).
With Malebranche’s theory of perfection in hand, and dispelling the
general consensus amongst commentators that the Malebranchean mind has
no cognitive and volitional resources, we can now turn to the more difficult
question of how these resources are compatible with his brand of
occasionalism. If we can successfully answer this question, we will be able to
unify Malebranche’s philosophical system. The next two chapters will be
devoted to completing this task.
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4.

4.1

Divine Causation and Malebranche’s Occasionalism

Introduction

In chapter three, I presented Malebranche’s theory of perfection and argued
that, contra Jolley, the Malebranchean mind has the cognitive and volitional
resources to perfect itself, and that these resources are integral to his divine
illumination theory. Malebranche describes these resources as the mind’s
strength and freedom, both of which are grounded in the mind’s liberty, that
is, the will’s non-invincibility towards particular goods. Freedom is the mind’s
ability to withhold consent when confronted by a particular object, and the
mind’s strength is its level attentive power to focus on that object and elicit
from God more information about it so that the mind can properly assess its
relationship to the object and respond appropriately, that is, in accordance
with God’s Order. Strength and freedom of mind, however, are not equally
distributed to all minds. In fact, a mind’s degree of strength and freedom
depends on its ratio of liberty and concupiscence, which is determined by the
mind’s own natural dispositions, environment, and acquired habits, along
with the amount of grace of feeling that it receives from Jesus Christ. The
mind, on its own, can offset its concupiscence, and thereby increase its liberty,
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by habitually performing mental exercises that can help reduce its
concupiscent desires, augment its strength and freedom, and prepare itself to
receive and utilize Christ’s grace of feeling. By increasing its strength and
freedom, the mind can more easily elicit, and focus on, God’s illumination.
With God’s illumination, the mind can now order its life according to reason,
not instinct. This enables the mind to perfect itself by unify itself with God by
rationally following the same Order that he does.
At first glance, his account of the mind’s perfection appears
diametrically opposed to another central principle of his philosophical system,
that is, his occasionalism. As I mentioned in the introduction, occasionalism is
the idea that God alone is causally efficacious, and that the regularities of
nature are grounded in God’s divine and lawful decrees. Created substances
and their modalities are causally inefficacious and merely provide the occasion
for God to dispense his power in particular ways. If God alone is causally
efficacious, then the mind’s cognitive and volitional resources appear to be
excluded, essentially ruling out the mind’s ability to perfect itself. That is, if
the mind cannot causally contribute to its own perfection, then the mind
cannot be genuinely responsible because responsibility seems to demand
some kind of causal contribution on its part. So given Malebranche’s
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occasionalism, is there any meaningful way to attribute responsibility to the
mind without ascribing genuine causal powers to it? Or, turning it around,
can Malebranche consistently ascribe self-perfecting powers to the mind while
also being an occasionalist? If the answer to both questions is no, then
Malebranche’s philosophical system is clearly undermined.
Typically, most commentators analyze this problem strictly in terms of
the first question. That is, they examine the mind’s freedom and responsibility
from the perspective of occasionalism, assuming that occasionalism is the
immovable point of his system and that all other aspects of his system must
conform to it. From this, they try to figure out how Malebranche could
attribute responsibility to the mind without ascribing causal powers to it. Such
examinations, though insightful and resourceful, fail to do this. A better way
to deal with the problem is to examine it in terms of the second question. That
is, we need to change our perspective from occasionalism to perfection and try
to reconcile the former with the latter rather than the other way around. This
makes better sense given that his theory of perfection, not his occasionalism, is
at the center of his system, and that his occasionalism is more moveable than
we might think. It is clear that Malebranche, throughout his writings,
consistently argued that the mind has self-perfecting powers, but it is not clear
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that he was a full-blown occasionalist in terms of the mind’s modifications. In
fact, I believe that Malebranche’s brand of occasionalism leaves metaphysical
room for the mind’s self-perfecting powers.126 As we saw in chapter three,
these powers are not independent powers, but derivative ones that naturally
result from the will. The mind, in this case, merely harnesses God’s invincible
movement of the mind to the good in general so that it can stop and examine
particular goods, and potentially move beyond them by thinking about other
goods. The mind, then, is responsible for two things: suspending or giving
consent, and the directive control over its attention. Even though the mind’s
consenting and attentive control are derivative powers, there is still a question
of how the mind can harness these powers and makes them its own without
violating his occasionalism. For example, at one level, the mind’s attentive
control over the “blind power” of the will in relation to particular goods
means that the mind petitions God to present new intellectual, imaginative or
sensible objects to the understanding, which in turn, attracts the will and
moves it towards new objects (OCM I 47, LO 5). The mind’s attention, in this
case, is not the true cause of the will’s change of direction, as it were, but it
126
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nevertheless occasions God to cause the directional change. Yet, at a deeper
level, the causal origin of the mind’s petitions or attentive desires appears to
be the mind itself, just like the mind’s ability to suspend or give consent. In
this case, the mind causes its own attentive and consenting acts, but they, in
turn, do not cause any new modifications; they merely occasion God to produce
new modifications in the mind, such as new perceptions or sensations.
Interestingly, Malebranche never unequivocally denies that the mind is
causally responsible for its attentive and consenting acts, and his arguments
for, and explications of occasionalism do not necessarily exclude this
possibility. Of course, he adamantly denies that the acts themselves cause new
modifications in the mind, but he does not deny that the mind is causally
responsible for these acts. Malebranche circumscribes a very narrow set of
activities for the mind, leaving the rest to God. In the end, attributing causal
powers to the mind is the only meaningful way to give responsibility to mind
for its own perfection. So my answers to the two questions posed above are
“no” and “yes” respectively.
Given the inherent difficulties of the problem, and the rather
controversial nature of my solution, the best way to proceed is to first provide
the necessary context in which to examine his arguments for occasionalism
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and then determine their scope. But unlike his theory of perfection, which is
Augustinian in origins, Malebranche’s occasionalism has scholastic and
Cartesian roots. So in order to understand his brand of occasionalism we need
to study the ways in which scholastic and Cartesian philosophers incorporate
divine causation into their causal theories of the world. We will use the
scholastics to help us understand the assumptions and arguments behind the
need for God’s causal intervention in the created world and demarcate
possible divine causal models according to the level of God’s intervention, and
then use the Cartesians to study the assumed need for occasionalism within
their metaphysics and mechanistic physics. Within this context, we can then
properly examine Malebranche’s own arguments for occasionalism and
delimit their scope. Next, in chapter five, I defend a particular interpretation of
Malebranche’s occasionalism that accommodates the mind’s self-perfection,
while also entertaining objections to this interpretation and the potential
problems that follow from it.

4.2

Scholastic Accounts of Divine Causation

To be clear, Malebranche’s use of divine causation in his causal theory of the
world is not unique. In fact, divine causation figures centrally in seventeenth-
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century theories of causation. It is used to account for such things as the
motion of bodies, the causal interactions between immaterial minds and
material bodies, and grounding the laws of nature. The reasons for this were
not only theological, but philosophical as well. With the slow erosion of
Aristotelian scholastic philosophy, and the growing acceptance of Descartes’
mechanical philosophy, came new philosophical challenges, especially in the
area of natural causation. Descartes’ desire to construct a more parsimonious
ontology without the various ‘occult’ powers of scholastic metaphysics, left
him and his fellow Cartesians with difficult problems concerning causation.
They attempted to solve these problems by incorporating, in some way, God’s
divine power into their causal theories. Their rejection of scholastic
metaphysics, however, did not bar them from utilizing many assumptions
that were deeply rooted in scholastic tradition, such as God’s creation and
conservation of the world, and his immediate cooperation with the actions of
his creatures. So, a proper understanding of scholastic theories of divine
causation is vital for interpreting seventeenth-century theories of divine
causation, particularly Malebranche’s occasionalism.
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4.2.1

Scholastic Metaphysics and Efficient Causation

Before we begin this section, a few preliminary remarks are in order. The
scholastic account I present here is general in nature and does not attempt to
tackle the many philosophical differences amongst the scholastic schools, such
as the Thomists and Jesuits, or between individual philosophers. It merely
provides an outline of key metaphysical principles, and presents the majority
opinion on certain philosophical issues, ignoring the disagreements over the
details. It also uses the demonstrations of Thomas Aquinas and Francisco
Suarez to illustrate the general lines of argument for certain philosophical
positions. In the end, the main purpose of this account is to provide the
necessary philosophical background for our examination of Malebranche’s
occasionalism.127
The natural world, for scholastics, is a dynamic system of causally
interacting substances (animate and inanimate), each with its own individual
nature or essence that makes it a member of a natural kind, and determines
the active and passive powers it has. This brute fact of nature, experienced
through observation, is not in need of argument. Francisco Suarez contends
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that nothing is more evident than natural change. “For what is better known
to the senses than that the sun gives light, fire produces heat, water cools?”
(DM 18.1.6). To deny this fact, according to Luis de Molina, is downright
“stupid”.128 This conviction is the empirical basis for the Aristotelian account
of natural substances and the changes they undergo.
A natural (or material) substance is a unified entity that has three layers
of composition, each referring to a particular metaphysical layer of substance.
The most basic layer is that of substantial form and primary matter. A
substantial form is an active principle of a substance that determines what that
substance is (a “this-such”), whereas matter is the subject of substantial form
or the “that out of which” a substance comes to be. Matter, at this level, can be
seen as primary or proximate; the former being pure potentiality or
possibility, the latter being elemental or lower order structures of matter that
can fall under different physical descriptions (e.g. earth, air, fire, water or
chemical compounds). In both cases, substantial form gives structure and
unifies matter, and in the case of proximate matter, it subsumes lower order
entities or substances into a higher order of substantial unity that has its own
substantial being and distinctive properties, which are irreducible to the
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properties of its lower order components. Simply put, substantial form is that
which structures and unifies, as matter is that which is unified and structured.
This composition constitutes a substance’s nature or essence, which in turn,
makes the substance a member of natural kind and determines its active and
passive powers (De ente 30-31; DM 15.5.1). The active powers of a given
substance are the possible effects that it can produce, and its passive powers
are the possible effects that can be produced in it. So for the Aristotelian
scholastics, substances are the basic ontological entities of change (rather than
events).
The next layer composition is that of substance and accident. Accidents
are formal perfections or modifications of substance, which are either
inseparable or separable. Inseparable accidents, such as a substance’s active
and passive powers, are necessary to a substance in such a way that it cannot
exist without them. For example, fire is no longer fire if it loses it active power
to burn. Separable accidents are contingent to a substance such as color and
local motion, or a fire’s quantity of heat. In addition, accidents have their own
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accidental being or esse compared to the substantial being or esse of substance.
Aquinas explains this distinction in the following way.129
Properly and truly, therefore, esse is attributed only to whatever
subsists in itself. To this thing a twofold esse is attributed. One esse
comes from those factors from which the unity of being arises, and this
is the person’s proper, substantial esse. The other esse is attributed to the
person in addition to the factors comprising it, and this is an added or
accidental esse, as we attribute “to be white” to Socrates when we say
“Socrates is white” (Qq. disp. IX, q.2, a.2, c and ad. 2).
With these two layers of composition in hand, the third layer, esse and
essentia, can now be explained. The concept of essentia can be construed in
either a narrow or broad sense. In the narrow sense, it is the essentia derived
from substantial matter and form, but in the wide sense, it includes the
accidental forms of substance as well. Being or esse, for scholastics, has two
levels of meaning. At one level it denotes existence in general or esse commune.
It is that in virtue of which a substance is something rather than nothing. At
the other level, esse is understood as an act-of-existing that admits of degrees
or levels. A substance’s degree of existence is in proportion to its essentia. So
such things as humans, dogs, plants, and carbon molecules all have different
acts-of-existing. Aquinas calls this such-esse (ST I, q.44, a.2.c). Such-esse is
usually described in terms of participation. A created substance is said to
129
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“participate in” esse in proportion to what kind of thing it is, with God being
Pure or Unparticipated Esse. This entails that a substance’s act-of-existing is
dependent on God’s pure being. According to Suarez, “only the First Cause is
esse-itself-through-its-essence; but every other esse is a participation in that esse
and so by its intrinsic necessity, they require that cause in order to exist” (DM
21.1.9). So act-of-existing expresses not only the delimited esse of substances,
but also their dependence on God for esse at both levels. As we will see, this
dependence on God is essential for scholastic accounts of creation ex nihilo and
the continuous conservation of substances.
The scholastics use these three compositions to account for genuine
change and divine creation. Let’s consider each in turn. Genuine change has
three basic principles: matter, form, and privation. Matter is the subject that
perdures through, and is modified by, a change, whereas the form is the result
of a change. Privation is the state of the subject before change, and denotes not
just the absence of the form that is gained as the result of change, but the
contrary form. The scholastics explain this process in terms of actuality and
potentiality. Matter signifies the potential modifications that a subject can
undergo, whereas the form denotes the actualization of a potential
modification. So in an unqualified or substantial change, the substantial form
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actualizes or structures primary matter in a specific way (or actualizes a set of
potentialities in primary matter), and in a qualified or accidental change, the
accidental form actualizes a potentiality of a substance. Note that in the former
case, primary matter is the ‘matter’ or subject of change, but in the latter, it is
substance.
These two kinds of genuine change are types of productive efficient
causation. Efficient causation, in general, is a causal process in which an agent,
by means of its own active powers, produces or conserves an effect. Suarez
defines this process as one in which an agent directly (per se) communicates
being or esse to an effect by means of an action (DM 17.1.6). This basic
definition can be used to cover different types of per se efficient causality, only
one of which is the focus of our discussion, namely transeunt causation, i.e.
causes that produce effects outside of the agents themselves.130 So in the case
of genuine change via transeunt action, the process involves an agent acting on
a patient (prime matter or substance) in such a way as to communicate being
or esse (substantial or accidental being) to a patient, which results in an effect,
130
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a substantial or accidental form, in the patient. Now, the communication of
esse from agent to patient does not consist in the agent transferring a
substantial or accidental form to a patient, rather it is the agent actualizing
some corresponding potentiality or passive power in the patient. Using
Aquinas’ example, a hot body, in virtue of its heat, actualizes the potentiality
for heat that exists in the other body. Hence the hot body does not transfer its
own heat (accidental form) to the other body. He explains the proper causal
interaction between agent and patient in the following way. “For a natural
agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces the
passive subject from potency to act” (SCG 3.69.28). This is also described as an
agent educing an effect out the patient by means of an action. Furthermore,
the esse communicated involves the two aspects of esse distinguished above.
That is, it makes the effect something rather than nothing (esse commune), and
it makes the effect one particular kind of thing rather than another (such-esse).
Note that the determinate effect that results from a transeunt action
depends on the active powers of the agent and the corresponding passive
powers of the patient. Recall that a substance’s active and passive powers are
inseparable or necessary accidents, which are determined by what kind of
thing it is (essentia), and delimit the possible effects it can produce and receive.
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Simply put, there is a natural restriction on what a substance can do and how
it can be affected given its nature. So in a transeunt action, the relevant active
powers of the agent must correspond to the relevant passive powers or
potentiality of the patient. In Aquinas’ fire example, the fire’s power of heat
can produce an effect in a patient only if the patient has the passive power or
potential to be heated. From this, we can see that the laws of nature are
grounded in, and determined by, the active and passive powers of substances.
Powers also provide the basis of scientific investigation for the natural
philosopher, since a substance’s powers reveal the nature of that substance.
Now the nature of transeunt causation is, admittedly, difficult to grasp.
The explanation is couched in terms of actuality and potentiality, and it denies
that a form is transferred from agent to patient. So what does causal
interaction consist in? According to the scholastics it consists in the
communication of esse from agent to patient by means of an action, the result
of which is the actualization of some form in the patient. Now, the esse
communicated is the substantial or accidental form that is the result of an
action (terminus ad quem); therefore, the locution “communicates esse” refers to
the result of an action not what is transferred in an action. The agent
communicates esse in the sense that its active powers influence the patient’s
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corresponding potentialities in such a way that they are brought to actuality.
For instance, a body’s disposition for heat is realized when it is in contact with
fire. Similarly, the solubility of salt is realized when it is put in water. Hence,
causal interaction between agent and patient consists in an agent activating
certain dispositions or capacities in a patient, not in the agent transferring
something to the patient. So, in the end, transeunt action consists in influence,
not transfer. Certainly, this account will not satisfy everyone; nevertheless, the
scholastics believe transeunt causation is a brute fact of nature that is based on
observation.
As we can see, the scholastic account of transeunt efficient causation is
based on the strong experiential evidence that nature is a dynamic system of
causally interacting substances, each with its own determinate behavior
according to its nature. They argue that a substance is a unified entity
composed of form and matter, which together, constitute its essentia or nature.
The nature of a substance determines what kind of thing it is, and the active
and passive powers it has. It is through its powers that a substance causally
interacts with other substances that have corresponding powers. For them,
causal interaction consists in an agent, through its own active powers,
actualizing a corresponding potentiality in the patient by means of an action.

192
By attributing powers to creatures, the scholastics are able to ground the laws
of nature in nature. This means that laws of nature are not mere nomological
correlations among events, but are reflections of real causal connections
among substances. In the end, the scholastics have a robust realist account of
causation that gives substances an important causal role in the world.

4.2.2

Scholastic Accounts of Divine Causation

The scholastic account of efficient causation, described above, gives us the
philosophical materials for building a clear account of divine causation. The
scholastics believe that divine causation is compatible with the actions of
substances. But before we can understand this, we must first examine how
God creates the world ex nihilo.
For the scholastics, creation ex nihilo falls under the rubric of direct (per
se) efficient causation. As the definition above states, an efficient cause is a
process in which an agent directly (per se) communicates being or esse to an
effect by means of an action (DM 17.1.6). Now the definition does not require
that an agent act on a patient, it just requires that an agent produces an effect
by means of an action. According to Suarez “it pertains to the nature of an
active power not that it be able to act on something, but that it be able to effect
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something” (DM 20.1.11). So the relation between active and passive powers,
described above, is not an essential one. For Suarez, active powers contain
actions and their effects; thus, active powers are not dependent on passive
powers. This leaves open the possibility for an agent to produce an effect that
does not presuppose an antecedent subject. In other words, it’s possible for an
agent to create an entity in its entirety ex nihilo.
Furthermore, in creation ex nihilo, the communication of esse cannot be
described adequately in terms of actuality and potentiality. The agent is not
educing an effect from the patient, but is creating an entity in its entirety ex
nihilo. So creation is not a matter of influence, but is one of actual creation.
That is, the agent does not communicate substantial or accidental being to a
perduring subject, but communicates or creates “absolute being”, that is, a
subsistent substance with all its inseparable accidents. The agent creates a
substance, so to speak, “from the bottom up”.131 In the end, only God has this
creative power. This is based on the idea that creation ex nihilo requires an
infinite power, and that such a power cannot be communicated to finite
substances (ST 1.45; cf. DM 20.2).
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Given that God created the universe ex nihilo, created substances are
contingent entities that rely essentially on God for their esse and essentia.
Aquinas notes that there is nothing about a substance’s essentia that implies its
esse (De ente 46). So, a substance’s esse must come from an extrinsic principle.
Yet, in order to avoid an infinite regress, every substance that has esse through
another must be reduced to a first principle that has esse-through-its-essentia,
i.e. God. Thus, all created substances depend essentially on God for their esse
(De ente 46-47). Expressed in terms of participation, a substance’s esse
participates in God as Pure Esse, and is therefore dependent on God for its esse
(ST 1.44c).
It is important to note that, for scholastics such as Aquinas and Suarez,
the esse and essentia of substances are distinct, but not separable. They are
distinct for the reason that essentia does not imply esse, but they are
inseparable in the sense that there cannot be essentia without esse. So in God’s
act of creation ex nihilo, God does not give esse to a set of essentiae in his mind,
rather, essentiae are eminently (i.e. in a higher form) contained in God’s mind,
and they are possible only in so far as they are within God’s creative power
(DM 20.1.9; SCG 1.54, ST 1.8c). If this were not the case, then God would be
acting on a presupposed subject, namely essentiae, which is inconsistent with
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the very nature of creation ex nihilo. Thus, essentiae and their corresponding
esse, are created ex nihilo simultaneously.
Now the next step in our discussion is to examine the extent to which a
substance is dependent on God. Or alternatively, where divine causation ends
and substance causation begins. The scholastics considered four theories,
ranging from minor dependence to complete dependence, with two moderate
positions in between. They are metaphysical deism, conservationism,
concurrentism and occasionalism. The majority of the scholastics subscribed to
concurrentism, which gives substances the highest degree of dependence on
God while also allowing them to exercise their own causal powers, but they
were also well aware of the other three and argued vigorously against them.
Let’s discuss each in turn.
According to metaphysical deism, a substance’s dependence on God is
limited to the initial act of creation, and beyond that, it can maintain its own
esse, and use its powers independently of God. Suarez puts the point as
follows.
For before an entity receives esse, it is no surprise if it depends on
another for its being made, since, given that it does not have esse of
itself, it cannot have it until it receives it from another—which is just
what it is for an entity to come to be. By contrast however, after an
entity has once received esse, there is no longer any reason why it
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should continuously depend on the actual influence of another (DM
21.1.1).
For the creature’s deficiency seems to consist just in its inability to have
esse unless that esse is given by another—and not in its inability to retain
the esse unless it is given continuously (DM 21.1.2).
So even though a substance depends on God for its initial esse, that does not
mean it needs to God to maintain that esse. This is similar to a craftsman
building a house. The house needs the craftsman for its initial construction but
after that, it no longer needs the craftsman. Analogously, God creates the
world ex nihilo, and then leaves his creation to unfold according to a dynamic
system of causally interacting substances. Thus, dependence is limited to
God’s initial creation.
Scholastics deny deism on theological as well as philosophical grounds.
They argue that the world needs God’s constant influence, and without it, the
world would fall out of existence. For them, this is an article of faith that is
supported by the Fathers of the Church, especially Augustine. In De Genesi ad
Literam, Augustine, in discussing Genesis 2-3, where God rested on the
seventh day, argues that this should be taken as God merely ending creation
ex nihilo, not that he stops governing and conserving the world.
It is the creator’s power, after all, and the virtuosity, the skill and
tenacity of the almighty, that causes every created thing to subsist. If
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this tenacious virtuosity ceased for one moment to rule and direct the
things that have been created, their various species would at once cease
to exist, and every nature would collapse into nothingness. It is not,
you see, like a mason building houses; when he has finished he goes
away, and his work goes on standing when he has stopped working on
it and gone away. No, the world will not be able to go on standing for a
single moment, if God withdraws from it his controlling hand (De Gen.
ad litt. 4.12.22).
They demonstrate this by rejecting the argument that after initial
creation, substances can maintain their esse. For them, God giving creatures
their esse at creation does not change the fact that they are unable to exist on
their own (DM 21.1.12, ST 1.104.1 ad 2). This means that a substance’s
continued existence is on par with its first moment of existence. Suarez
clarifies this in terms of participation.
If a participated esse, by reason of itself alone, requires the influence of
the First Agent [God] in order to exist in reality at some given time,
then it requires that same influence at any time at which it exists. For it
is always the same esse, and whatever belongs to it per se and primarily
always belongs to it (DM 20.1.12).
Aquinas and Suarez also explicate this point by distinguishes between two
types of conservation, indirectly or mediately, and per se and immediately (ST
1.104.1-2; DM 21.3). The former is when an agent conserves an effect by
preventing its corruption or adding something to it. A craftsman conserves a
house by repairing its damage parts and preventing further damage. In this
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case, the agent is conserving a preexisting subject. The latter is when an agent
conserves the being or esse of an effect. In this case, the agent is not conserving
a preexisting subject, but is conserving the subject in its very being.
Ultimately, this means that the effect continuously depends on the cause for
its being. Without the constant influx of esse, it would fall out of existence.
Aquinas uses the sun’s illumination of the air to capture the dependence of a
creature’s esse on God. Just as illuminated air continually depends on the sun
for its light, creatures must depend of God for their esse. So, in a way,
immediate conservation can be imagined as God keeping the light of existence
on. If he turns out the light, we no longer exist, just as a room is reduced to
darkness by turning the light off. This example also shows that conservation is
positive activity or power.
Suarez uses the positive activity of conservation to demonstrate the
necessity of divine conservation. This is an argument from permission.132 He
argues that creatures continue to exist only because God permits them. This
means that God does not wish to annihilate his creation, though he has the
ability to do so. Now given the fact that all efficient causal actions
communicate esse of some sort to an effect, it follows that God cannot
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annihilate his creation by this action, because at some level esse is
communicated in the action. So even if the effect is corruptive in nature, there
is always some degree of esse that is left over. This means that the annihilation
of a substance can only come about by God withholding his conservative
power. Yet this implies that God must be conserving the substance while it
exists. If God did not continually conserve the substance, then it would be
reduced to nothing; thus, God must continually conserve the substance. So
from the premise that God is capable of annihilating his creation only by
withholding his power, it follows that he must continually conserve his
creation (DM 21.1.14).
Since a substance’s continued existence is on par with its initial
existence, creation and conservation require the same causal power and have
the same effect. This does not mean that God conserves substances through
successive [eternal/temporal] actions. In fact, since the effects of creation and
conservation are the same, namely esse, the action is the same. Thus, it is
through one action that God creates and conserves the world. Now, the action,
considered as creation, refers to the starting point of action, and considered as
conservation, it refers to the continuousness of the action in time. So, in this
case, there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and conservation.
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As we will see, Malebranche uses this conception of creation and conservation
in his divine recreation argument for occasionalism.
In the case of generated substances, however, there is a distinction
between the generation of a substance and its conservation. That is, if a finite
agent generates a substance through its own causal powers, then the
generative act is distinct from God’s conservative one. So, in this case, God
conserves the substance after its generation. But note that God is still
responsible for the creation and conservation of the matter out of which the
substance is generated.
The divine causal theory that falls out this line of reasoning is called
conservationism. According to conservationism, God’s divine causation
consists in creating the world ex nihilo and continuously conserving
substances along with all of their active and passive powers. For their own
part, substances are genuine agents that exercise their own causal powers,
independently of God, to produce corresponding effects. Thus, the scope of
God’s divine causation is limited to creation and conservation, and, therefore,
does not contribute the actions of substances. Put another way, God is only the
remote cause of a created substance’s actions as the substance is the proximate
cause.
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The next level of divine causation, which developed out of creation ex
nihilo and conservation, is the theory of concurrentism. Concurrentism is the
theory that God concurs, or cooperates, with all the actions of created
substances. Now, the difficulty of this position is not in developing
arguments, but in providing an account that does not collapse in
conservationism on the one hand or develop into occasionalism on the other.
So let’s briefly examine two arguments for concurrentism, and then focus on
an account posed by Suarez, that is, to a certain extent, supported textually by
Aquinas.
One argument is that divine conservation entails concurrentism. If
conservation is true and God immediately conserves the powers of created
substances, then God must also immediately conserve the actions and effects
produced by those powers. Therefore, God has per se and immediate influence
on the effects of created substances (DM 22.2.7-9). In terms of participation,
created agents, as beings-in-participation, necessarily produce actions and
effects that are beings-in-participation. Since this is the case, created agents, as
well as their actions and effects, require God’s per se and immediate influence.
Thus, God must, in some way, contribute to the effects of created substances.

202
Argued the other way, conservationism without concurrentism is not
really conservationism at all. Recall that the conservationism claims that God
immediately conserves created substance and their causal powers, but allows
them, as agents, to produce effects independently of his immediate influence.
But if this is the case, it seems that the effects do not require God’s immediate
conservation after their production. That is, if the cause is sufficient to the
produce the effect, then the effect requires nothing else but the cause; thus,
God’s conservation is superfluous. Suarez argues this point in terms of
actions.
If God does not have an immediate influence on every action of a
creature, then the created action itself does not require God’s influence
per se and immediate influence on every action of a creature, then the
created action itself does not require God’s influence per se and
essentially in order to exist, even though it, too, is a certain
participation in being; therefore, there is no reason why the form that is
effected by such an action should require the First Cause’s actual
influence for its own conservation (DM 22.1.9).
So conservationism without concurrentism contradicts the very nature of
conservationism. Therefore, strict conservationism is false.
Another argument, posed by Suarez, runs along the same lines as his
argument from permission. Just as God can deprive created substances of esse
by withholding his action, he can also deprive natural actions of esse by
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withholding his influence. Since God’s action in the first case entails per se and
immediate influence, it can be inferred that the second case requires the same
influence (DM 22.1.11). Thus, God is immediately involved in the causal
interactions of creatures. Now, the question is, how?
Suarez is well aware of the dangers involved in crafting an account of
concurrentism. He must craft it in such a way that God is a cooperative not a
mediate cause. That is, both God and created agents must be per se and
immediate causes of actions and effects without over-determination. This can
be done in a few ways. One option is to divide the effect so that God is
causally responsible for one part and the created agent is causally responsible
for the other. The problem with this, however, is that the created agent will
have produced part of the effect by itself, that is, without God’s concurrence,
in violation of concurrentism. Another option is to say that a single effect is
caused by two actions, one by God and the other by a created agent. Yet this
runs into the same problem (DM 22.3.4). So dividing the effect or action in this
way is not compatible with the concurrentist thesis. Suarez, however, argues
for a third option that makes God and a created agent act by the very same
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cooperative action, but through different orders of causality. In support of this
option he relies on two passages by Aquinas. 133
It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural
cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God,
and partly by the natural agent; rather, it is wholly done by both,
according to a different way, just as the effect is wholly attributed to the
instrument and also wholly to the principal agent (SCG 70.8).
One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But
nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and
secondary agent (ST I.105.5.2).
With the idea that God and created agents act by a single action through
different orders of causality, Suarez is able to provide a viable account of
cooperative action that retains the causal efficacy of created agents, as well as
avoids the problem of over-determination.
The different orders of causality correspond to the different powers of
God and his creatures. Recall that created agents, given their nature, can only
produce effects within their own species, as God, whose power is infinite and
unlimited, conserves the esse of all things. Now, in terms of a single
cooperative action, God is the per se and immediate cause of the effect in so far
as the effect is something rather than nothing, and the created agent is the per
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debate see DM 22.2.
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se and immediate cause in so far as the effect is a particular species.
Essentially, a created agent’s communication of esse, as esse-in-participation,
needs God’s immediate influence to sustain it in being. This falls right in line
with arguments for concurrentism above. Thus, the action, divided into
different causal orders, avoids the over-determination problem since each
agent is responsible for a different aspect of the action.
Given this set-up, the created agent is an immediate cause of an effect,
but is not independent of God’s power because it needs God’s concurrence to
produce the effect. God, on the other hand, is independent in his influence and
concurs freely with created agents. God’s concurrence, however, is not
whimsical or haphazard, but has a lawful order that is in accordance with his
creatures and their natural operations (DM 22.4.3). Thus, the regularities we
experience in nature are grounded in the causal powers of created substances
and in God’s lawful concurrence with their causal interaction. But these
regularities can, from time to time, be interrupted by miracles. God does this
not by obstructing or overriding the natural actions of his creatures, but by
merely omitting or withholding his concurrence (DM 22.1.11).
It should not be assumed, however, that God’s concurrence is an
indifferent or blind power that is directed by created agents towards
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particular actions. To the contrary, it is tailored according to the particular
actions of created agents.
God’s concurrence is not one and the same with all secondary causes,
but instead varies according to the diversity of the secondary causes.
For God concurs with them in such a way as to accommodate himself
to each according to its need. Thus, just as he grants numerically
distinct concurrences for numerically diverse effects, so too he grants
concurrences that are distinct in species for actions that are diverse in
species (DM 22.4.8).
Thus, God’s concurrence is as diverse as the actions of his creatures. His
concurrence is general only in so far as it makes a created agent’s effect
something rather than nothing. This distinction will be important for our
discussion of Malebranche’s occasionalism, especially his understanding of
God’s general will.
From the belief that created substances have active and passive powers
to the idea that God created the universe ex nihilo and continuously conserves
it, the scholastics articulate the doctrine of concurrentism, which makes
created substances and God cooperative agents in the production of all natural
effects without over-determination. The doctrine maintains a delicate balance
between the independence of God and the dependence of created substances
on God. In the next section, the balance is tipped in favor of God’s glory and
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omnipotent power, essentially stripping created substances of their causal
efficacy.

4.2.3

Occasionalism, al-Ghazālī and Averroes

Occasionalism, in its most rigorous form, is the theory that God is the only
causally efficacious power in the universe. Occasionalists, therefore, deny the
scholastic idea that created substances are causally responsible, in some way,
for their effects. So the regularities experienced in nature are solely grounded
on God’s lawful power, rendering created substances the occasional causes of
God’s divine actions. So, for instance, fire does not heat an object, rather, God
heats the object on the occasion of the fire’s presence (SCG 3.69.1). Substances
are merely sine qua non causes in so far as God produces effects in their
presence. Thus, the concomitance of causal events has nothing to do with the
nature of substances.
Occasionalists rely on theological as well as philosophical grounds for
their position. The former is based on God’s omnipotent and pervasive power,
and the latter entails arguments against the natural causation of creatures. The
most well-known medieval proponent of this theory is the Islamic religious
intellectual Abu Hāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 CE). Al-Ghazālī’s poses two
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arguments that strike at the heart of the scholastic claim that creatures are
causally efficacious. They also expose the fundamental tension between
Aristotelian metaphysics and occasionalism.
The first argument attacks the claim that natural causation is a brute
fact based on observation. Observation, al-Ghazālī argues, does not show the
causal interactions between substances, only the regularities between them.
The denial of causal or necessary connections stems from the claim that it is
metaphysically possible that the presence of a cause, under sufficient
conditions, does not necessitate its effect.
The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and
what is habitually believe to be an effect is not necessary, according to
us. But [with] any two things…it is not necessary of the existence of the
one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of the
nonexistence of the one that the other should not exist—for example,
the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and
contact with fire…Their connection is due to the prior decree of God,
who creates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself,
incapable of separation. On the contrary, it is within [divine] power to
create satiety without eating, to create death with decapitation, to
continue life after decapitation, and so on with to all connected things
(MM 17.1.1-20).
Al-Ghazālī concludes from this that “existence “with” a thing does not prove
that it exists “by” it” (MM 17.6.31). This argument not only undermines the
causal powers of substances, but also the regularities of nature that follow
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from them. For al-Ghazālī, however, the regularity and concomitance of causal
events are explained by the lawful power of God acting in accordance with his
own decrees, except in the case of miracles.134
The second argument is premised on the claim that causal efficacy
entails knowledge. That is, in order for an agent to produce an effect, it must
know how to do it. But there are many cases in which creatures do things that
they clearly do not have the requisite knowledge to do; therefore, they are not
causally responsible for their effects, God is. Consider the following passages.
For [in the case of] actions that proceed from the human being and the
rest of animals, if asked about their number, details and amount, [the
individual] would have no information about them. Indeed, the infant
boy as he separates from the crib, [beginning to move on his own], will
crawl by his own choice to the [mother’s] breast to suck…[Again] the
spider weaves by way of webs wondrous shapes that astound the
geometer by their circularity, the parallelism of the sides of [their
concentric shapes] and the symmetry of their organization. One knows
by necessity their having no connection with knowing [things] the
geometers are unable to know. And the bees design their cells in the
form of hexagons…Upon my word, did then the bees know these
subtle points which most rational animals fall short of apprehending?
Woe then to those who stray from the path of God, who are conceitedly
deceived by their inadequate power and weak ability, who think that
they participate with God in creation, invention and the innovating of
such wonders and signs. How preposterous, how far off the mark! May
the creatures be rendered low; the one who alone has might is the
almighty of the earth and heavens (MM[2] 304-305).
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This argument does not necessarily deny that substances have powers, only
that these powers are causally inefficacious, thereby rendering them useless.
So even if substances had powers they could not use them anyway. Powers
without efficacy, one could argue, are not really powers at all.135
The scholastics were well aware of occasionalism and its implications
for Aristotelian natural philosophy (SCG 3.69; DM 18.1). Yet, the most
revealing response to occasionalism comes from the Islamic Aristotelian
philosopher Ibn Rushd, or Averroes. Averroes, in his response to al-Ghazālī,
argues that if substances do not have causal powers, then they have no
natures. If they have no natures, then there is no way to distinguish one
substance from another. This is tantamount to destroying the entire scientific
enterprise, and more importantly, Aristotelian metaphysics.
It is self-evident that things have essence and attributes, which dictate
the specific acts of each existent, and with respect to which the essences,
names, and definitions of things differ. If each existent did not have a
specific action, it would not have a specific nature, and if it did not have
a specific nature, it would not have a specific name or definition. Thus,
all things would be one thing, or rather not even one thing, since we
could ask of that one thing: does it have an action or reaction specific to
it or not? If it does have one specific action, then since specific actions
issue from specific natures [it will have a specific nature]. And if it does
not have one specific action, then the one would not be one. Moreover,
135
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if the nature of the one is revoked, then the nature of the existent is also
revoked, and if the nature of the existent is revoked, that entails nonexistence (MK 162-3).
The chief aim of Aristotelian natural philosophy is to discover the natures of
substances, which is done by observing the activities of substances, and their
causal interactions with other substances. So, without causal powers,
knowledge of the natural world is impossible. Furthermore, given the
inseparability of powers and natures, the denial of one entails the denial of the
other. Without natures, substances lose their unity, identity and individuality.
Thus, the doctrine of occasionalism undermines Aristotelian metaphysics as
well.
As we can see, scholasticism is incompatible with occasionalism. For
the scholastics, natural causation is a brute fact of nature that must be
reconciled with God’s divine actions. The occasionalist rejects this fact, and
strips substances of their causal powers, giving causal efficacy to God alone.
So, even though occasionalism is just one small step away from
concurrentism, the consequences that result, are devastating for scholasticism.
Thus, concurrentism is as far as the scholastics can go.
Our discussion of al-Ghazālī expresses the basic motivations behind,
and arguments for, occasionalism. It also provides a natural starting point for
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our discussion of seventh-century accounts of causation, particularly
Cartesian causation, and the different levels of occasionalism that potentially
follow from them.

4.3

Cartesian Accounts of Causation: Descartes and La Forge

Cartesians also faced challenges integrating divine causation into their causal
theories of the natural world and demarcating where God’s causation ends
and created substances’ begin. As scholastics drew the line at concurrentism,
finding occasionalism incompatible with their metaphysics, some Cartesians
argued for some form of occasionalism, which they believed, followed from
Descartes’ new metaphysics and mechanical physics. The origins of Cartesian
occasionalism can be found in Descartes’ own works, particularly in his
argument for continuous creation in his second proof for God’s existence in
the Third Meditation and its application in his theory of body-body causation.
This argument, with its scholastic pedigree, was transformed and expanded
by some Cartesians to argue for occasionalist theories of causation. Louis de la
Forge used it for his occasionalist theory of body-body causation and
Malebranche expanded it to minds. In fact, some scholars believe that this is
Malebranche’s most powerful argument for his occasionalism, and is the most
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serious threat to his theory of freedom.136 Given its implications for the mind’s
self-perfection, it is best to first examine the Cartesian roots of the continuous
creation argument in Descartes and La Forge, and then see how Malebranche
uses it to argue for his occasionalism. By doing this, we can determine its
scope and understand the problems it might pose for Malebranche’s theory of
perfection.

4.3.1

Descartes and Continuous Creation

Unlike the scholastics, who think that the natural world is a dynamic system
of causally interacting substances, each with its own substantial form that
defines its active and passive powers, Descartes believes that the world is
made up of two finite substances, immaterial minds and matter. He replaces
the cumbersome scholastic ontology of form, matter, and accidents with a
more parsimonious substance/mode ontology. He believes that both
substances depend on God for their existence ex nihilo and preservation, since
they are contingent beings whose existence are not entailed by their essences.
Referring to his own existence, Descartes argues in the Third Meditation,
For a lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each completely
independent of the others, so that it does not follow the fact that I
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existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless there is some
cause which as it were creates me afresh at this moment—that is, which
preserves me. For it is quite clear to anyone who attentively considers
the nature of time that the same power and action are needed to
preserve anything at each individual moment of its duration as would
be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in existence.
Hence the distinction between preservation and creation is only a
conceptual one, and this is one of the things that are evident by the
natural light (AT VII 49, CSM II 33; cf. AT XIB 13, CSM I 200; AT XIB
23-24, CSM I 209).
Here, Descartes argues that since there is nothing about his existence now that
guarantees his existence in the future, God must sustain him with the same
creative power that brought him into existence. This argument shows that
Descartes, following Aquinas and Suarez, believes that since a created
substance’s continued existence is on par with its initial existence, creation and
conservation require the same causal power and have the same effect, that is,
being or esse. He explicates this claim in his response to Gassendi’s objection,
given in the Fifth Objections, that God does not need to continuously conserve
created substances because they have sufficient powers to sustain themselves
in existence (AT VII 300-302, CSM II 209-210). Descartes argues that Gassendi
is assuming that God’s conserving power falls under one form of causation,
that of coming into being (secundum fieri), when in fact it falls under another
form, that of causing being itself (secundum esse). Here, Descartes is using the
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scholastic distinction between conserving a preexisting subject, such as a
worker repairing a house or a parent nurturing a child, and conserving the
subject in its very being, like the sun’s causal relationship to light. Descartes
argues that the latter is properly applied to God’s creative and conserving
power, both which pertain to the very being or esse of a substance, not the
former, which has to do with maintaining the integrity of a substance. Since
creation and conservation produce the same effect, namely a substance’s being
or esse, they require the same causal power, that is, creatio ex nihilo. From this,
Descartes concludes that the action must be the same as well, with the action
considered as creation, referring to the starting point of the action, and
conservation referring to the continuousness of the action in time. So, in the
end, there is only a conceptual distinction between creation and conservation.
Given this, Descartes argues against Gassendi that created substances cannot
have their own conserving powers. In fact, it is contradictory for a created
substance to possess its own conserving power because if God made gave
them such a power, then he would be giving them the power to create ex
nihilo, which is an infinite power or perfection that only an infinite being like
God could have (AT VII 368-371, CSM II 254-255; cf. ST 1.45; DM 20.2)
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Descartes’ continuous creation argument, with its focus on conserving a
substance’s very existence, appears to place God’s causal involvement in the
world at the level of conservation, thereby leaving room for created
substances to modify themselves and other creatures.137 However, there has
been a long and lively debate amongst scholars about whether or not
Descartes

uses

the

continuous

creation

argument

to

go

beyond

conservationism to occasionalism in his account of body-body causation. We
do not have time to settle the debate here, but we can use it to determine the
possible implications of Descartes’ continuous creation argument, and then
see how it was transformed and used by La Forge and Malebranche to
support their own particular brands of occasionalism. The best way to do this,
is to briefly explain why Descartes used God as the primary cause of bodily
motion, and then examine three different interpretations of his theory of
motion that correspond to three levels of God’s continuous creation, from
conservationism to partial and full-blown occasionalism.
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4.3.2

Descartes and Body-Body Occasionalism

For Descartes, the physical world is filled with matter in motion, and all
material objects and their causal interactions can ultimately explained in
mechanical terms. In effect, Descartes replaces scholastic substantial forms
with a mechanistic physics, which he believed could provide a better
explanation of the causal structures of the world. Substantial forms,
complained Descartes, should not be used in causal explanations because their
nature and “occult” powers are unintelligible, making any explanation based
on them unintelligible (AT III 503-504, CSM III 208; cf. AT XI 25-27, SG 18). By
stripping the material world of substantial forms, Descartes essentially
removes the primary causal mechanism used by the scholastics to explain the
causal structure of the material world and forces him to find a replacement.
Matter itself is out the question because matter, whose essence is pure
extension (length, depth and breath), does not have an inherent motive force.
He fills the causal lacuna with God, who infuses motive force into matter. God
not only injects motive force into matter, but he also conserves the same
quantity of motive force that he created at the beginning of universe. To
support this claim, Descartes employs his continuous creation argument to
explicate his point.
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Thus, God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he
first created them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same
way, and by the same process by which he originally created it; and it
follows from what we have said that this fact alone makes it most
reasonable to think that God likewise always preserves the same
quantity of motion in matter (AT VIIIA 61-62, CSM I 240; cf. AT VIIIA
66, CSM I 243).
In The World, Descartes suggests that God does more than just conserve the
same quantity of motion, but that he moves bodies according to the laws of
nature:
…let us think of the differences the He creates within this matter as
consisting wholly in the diversity of the motions He gives to its parts.
From the first instant of their creation, He causes some to start moving
in one direction and others in another, some faster and others slower
(or even if you wish, not at all); and He causes them to continue
moving thereafter in accordance with ordinary laws of nature (AT XI
34, SG 23; cf. AT VIIIA 61-61, CSM I 240).
It is not clear, however, how God moves bodies “in accordance with the laws
of nature”. Does God merely conserve the total quantity of motion and let
bodies do the work or does he move them around himself? Tad Schmaltz
defends the former interpretation. He argues that as God continuously
conserves the same quantity of motion that he infused in matter and dispersed
amongst its parts at creation, generating particular modes of bodily duration
(i.e. bodies), bodies distribute motion according to their size and collision
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speed.138 Motion is not transferred upon collision from one body to another,
rather the collision causes the production of numerically distinct modes in the
affected bodies according to the laws of motion.139 The laws of motion, in this
case, are not created by God to govern the causal interaction between bodies;
rather they merely reflect the effects of these bodily interactions.140 Presenting
extremely detailed textual evidence and strong philosophical arguments in
support of his interpretation, Schmaltz partly defends it by relying on
Descartes’ causal distinction of secundum esse and secundum fieri, attributing
the former to God and the latter to bodies.141 That is, God creates and
conserves a constant quantity of matter in motion, and bodies, in turn, are
responsible for its distribution in body-body interactions.
Schmaltz’s interpretation also makes metaphysical room for Descartes’
claim that minds can make modal changes in bodies as well. Descartes
suggests this possibility in two letters, one to Henry More (August 1649) and
the other to Arnauld (29 July 1648). First More:
The power causing motion may be the power of God himself
preserving the same amount of transfer in matter as he put in it in the
first moment of creation; or it may be the power of a created substance,
138
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like our mind, or any other such thing to which he gave the power to
move a body (AT V 403-404, CSMK 381).
Then two passages from the Arnauld letter:
We are conscious, however, of every action by which the mind moves
the nerves, in so far as such action is in the mind, where it is simply the
inclination of the will towards a particular movement. The inflow of
spirits into the nerves, and everything else necessary for this
movement, follows upon this inclination of the will (AT V 222, CSMK
357).
That the mind, which is incorporeal, can set a body in motion is shown
to us every day by the most certain and most evident experience,
without the need of any reasoning or comparison with anything else
(AT V 222, CSMK 358).
In the letter to Arnauld, Descartes describes the way in which the mind
can act on the body. For Descartes, the principal seat of the soul is the pineal
gland. This is the place that the mind and body ‘interact’ with each other.
Descartes argues that the mind can adjust the flow of animal spirits by tilting
the gland in different directions. Descartes compares the soul’s movement of
the gland to a fountaineer (AT XI 131-132, SG 107). Just as the fountaineer can
impede, initiate and alter the movements of the flow of water from the tanks,
the mind can do something similar to the gland. In article 43 of the Passions
Descartes describes the mind’s action on the body.
Thus when we will to imagine something we have never seen, this
volition has the power to make the gland move in the way required to
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drive the spirits toward the pores of the brain by whose opening that
thing may be represented…Thus, finally, when we will to walk or
move our body in some other manner, this volition makes the gland
drive the spirits to the muscles conducive to this effect (AT XI 361, SV
42).
Now, how a mind, which is immaterial, can act on the body is not very clear.
Descartes suggests that the union of mind and body instituted by God affords
the mind the opportunity to act on the gland (AT XI 356-357, SV 39; AT XI 361362, SV 42-43). Unfortunately, Descartes does not explain how the mind moves
or directs the gland. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Descartes believed that
the mind is the efficient cause of some bodily motions.
The problem with this picture is that, according to the passage above,
the mind injects some kind of motive force or power into the universe by
moving and directing the pineal gland. This seems to contradict Descartes’
conservation principle that God maintains a constant quantity of motion in
matter, thereby excluding any injection of additional motive force. Some
scholars, such as Dan Garber, argue that Descartes could avoid this
contradiction by limiting the scope of the conservation principle to inanimate
bodies, thereby allowing minds to move, by force, animate bodies (i.e. the
human body via pineal gland). Schmaltz believes, agreeing with Garber, that
this was most likely Descartes’ position, but Schmaltz rejects this response on
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philosophical grounds. He argues that the quantity of force that the mind uses
to move its pineal gland, would, nevertheless, add motion to the total quantity
motion, forcing God to act to conserve these additions; thus, violating the
claim in his continuous creation argument that creation and conservation are
really one action.142 To avoid this problem, Schmaltz believes that Descartes
should ascribe to the idea, posited by Cartesians such as Johann Clauberg, that
the mind merely has directional control over the pineal gland just like the
fountaineer who merely controls the water flow, but does not add force to the
flow.143 Whether this avoids the problem or not is beyond the scope of our
inquiry.
In the end, Schmaltz believes that Descartes continuous creation
argument underlies his theory of body-body causation and that its scope is
limited to conservation, making God’s continuous creation indeterminate at
the level of modal change, leaving that up to bodies and minds. Abstracting
from this, we can see that continuous creation does not necessarily entail that
God continuously create/conserve substances with a complete set of
determinate modes, but it could be limited to conserving substances and their
causal powers, leaving modal changes up to them. Now let’s turn to Dan
142
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Garber’s account of Descartes’ theory of body-body causation that gives God a
larger causal role.
Garber believes that Descartes has an occasionalist theory of body-body
causation whereby God is not only causally responsible for keeping the
material world in existence, but also for the particular modal changes that
occur when bodies collide, excluding bodies from the causal story.144 In this
case, when two bodies collide God adjusts the motion of each body according
to its size and speed, and the laws of motion. To put this in occasionalist
terms, the contact between two bodies provides God with the ‘occasion’ to
change the motion of each body according to the laws of nature. So, contra
Schmaltz, Garber believes that Descartes’ God is also involved with the modal
changes of bodies.
Interestingly, even though Garber uses Descartes’ continuous creation
argument to buttress his occasionalist reading, he restricts God’s conserving
activity to holding the material world in existence, seeing God’s infusion of
motion, and the modal changes that follow, as a separate activity. In his
words, “God sustains bodies in their being and sustains bodies in their
motion. But, it is important to note, these two activities seem to be quite distinct”
144
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[his emphasis].145 Garber describes the second activity as God giving bodies a
“divine shove.”146 So, God, as a sustaining cause, holds the material world in
existence through continuous creation, and as a modal cause, he modifies
bodies by moving them from one place to another according to the laws of
motion.
Garber argues that one important advantage of his divine impulse
theory is that it can accommodate Descartes claim that minds can move
bodies, unlike a theory that extends God’s creating/conserving activities to
both bodies and all their modes, leaving no room for the mind to exercise its
powers.147 Moreover, as we saw above, Garber claims that he can also avoid
the problem of Descartes’ conservation of motion principle by limiting this
principle to God’s modal activities amongst inanimate bodies, freeing up
mind to move animate bodies (i.e. pineal gland) by force. With this addition,
Garber attributes a partial occasionalist theory to Descartes by dividing modal
changes between God and finite minds.
Even though Schmaltz and Garber have different accounts of Descartes’
theory, they both agree that Descartes’ continuous creation argument is
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behind his theory of bodily motions, and that the mind can act, with
directional or motive control, on bodies. As Garber believes the scope of God’s
conserving activity is restricted to keeping the material world in existence,
making God’s divine pushing of bodies a separate activity, Schmaltz widens it
to include motion as well, making bodies responsible for its distribution. As a
result, motive force is part of the material world for Schmaltz, but not for
Garber, who places it in God and minds. These two interpretations illustrate
the difficulty in pinning down Descartes’ theory of bodily motion and
identifying the scope of his continuous creation argument in body-body
causation. So it’s no surprise that Louis de la Forge, seeing himself as a faithful
follower of Descartes, interpreted the scope of the continuous creation
argument to not only include matter and motion, but also the modal changes
of bodies. Considered as one of the major sources of Malebranche’s
occasionalism, La Forge is the next logical step in providing the necessary
background for our study.148 It is to this account that we now turn.
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4.3.3

La Forge and Continuous Creation

La Forge claims that his work, Treatise on the Human Mind, is the natural
outcome of Descartes’ metaphysical principles. In the last paragraph of the
work La Forge concludes, “I think I have suggested nothing here which is not
found in the writings of Mr Descartes, or which could not be drawn as
necessary conclusions from the first truths which he demonstrated in his
metaphysics” (DC 233). Though La Forge modestly suggests that his work is a
“poor” substitute for what Descartes would have written if he had lived to
complete The Treatise on Man, he believes that he has captured the essence of
Descartes’ understanding of the mind (DC 33, 100-101). What concerns us here
is La Forge’s understanding of Descartes’ continuous creation argument, and
how his interpretation might have influenced Malebranche.
Following Descartes, La Forge argues that matter, as pure extension,
does not have a motive force for causing modal changes of motion in bodies
and that God must be the cause bodily motion (DC 145-146). Believing that the
continuous creation argument is behind Descartes’ theory of motion, La Forge
uses it to argue for an occasionalist theory of body-body causation. La Forge
does this by widening the scope of God’s creating/conserving activities to not
only matter and motion, but also to the modal changes of bodies. For him, God
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does not, as a separate activity, give a “divine shove” to a body that he wants
to move, but create/conserves the body and its modes in successive locations.
I also claim that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can
cause change in it or in any of its parts, in the second moment of their
creation, if the Creator does not do so himself. Since it was He who
produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not only must he
continue to produce it if he wishes it to continue to exist but also, since
he cannot create it everywhere or nowhere, he must put it in place B
himself if he wishes it to be there. For if he put it anywhere else there is
no force capable of removing it from that location (DC 147).
La Forge argues that continuous creation entails that God must move
particular bodies because he must create/conserve a body, with all of its
modifications, in some place in relation to other bodies. He bases this on the
Cartesian claim that bodies are parts of matter that are individuated according
to their relative motion to other parts. This motion defines a body’s size, shape
and speed (DC 146). So in order for God to create/conserve bodies he must
create/conserve their motion as well. Accordingly, if God wants to move a
body continuously from place A to place D, then God must “recreate” that
body at A, B, C, and D. If he wants to keep a body at rest, he just “recreates” it
in the same place. I put scare quotes around recreation because some scholars,
such as Garber, have misunderstood this to mean that God literally recreates
the material world anew from whole cloth at every moment. Garber calls this
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a “cinematic view” of motion.149 First, this interpretation seems to entail
multiple creative acts on God’s part which is inconsistent with the fact that
God’s creation and conservation are considered one and the same action, with
the former referring to the starting point of the action, and the latter referring
to the continuousness of the action in time. And second, La Forge argues that
even though a body cannot cause another body to move by motive force, it
can, given its size and speed at impact, determine God to move the other body
according to the three laws of motion that he established to govern the
material world.
Although God is thus the universal cause of all the motions which
occur in the world, I also recognize bodies and minds as the particular
causes of these same motions, not really in producing any ‘impressed’
quality in the way the Schools explain it, but in determining and
forcing the first cause to apply his force and motive power to the bodies
to which he would not otherwise have applied it according to the way
He decided to govern himself in relation to bodies and minds; that is,
for bodies, according to the laws of motion…(DC 148).
This suggests that La Forge does not see the world as being recreated at every
moment like at old time movie reel flickering in and out of existence, but as a
continuous unfolding of God’s creative activity, with God’s motive force
rippling through time and matter. Even though La Forge uses the continuous
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creation argument to account for bodies and their modal changes, he believes
that bodies, nevertheless, provide the conditions or occasions, for God to
modally adjust the motion of bodies. So the emphasis should be put on the
conservation or the temporal side of God’s action when discussing La Forge’s
theory of bodily motion, not the creation side. One might object that bodies,
by providing the conditions for motion, are still technically causes,
contradicting this occasionalist interpretation. This might be true according to
contemporary accounts of causation that define causation as nomological
correlations between events. La Forge, however, understands causation in
terms of forces or powers, not seeing passive bodily conditions, in this case, as
true causes, but only as determining or occasional causes. Understanding La
Forge in this way will have implications for our discussion of Malebranche’s
famous “recreation” argument for his brand of occasionalism.
La Forge restricts his continuous creation argument to bodies and their
modes and does not explicitly extend it to minds and their modifications.150
This provides metaphysical room for the mind to move bodies.
But the force which moves can be considered either as belonging to
God, who conserves in the parts of matter as much transfer or motion
as he put there in creating it (‘namely, by continuing to move them
150
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with the same force’), or as belonging to a created substance, for
example, our soul and whatever else there may be to which God gave
the power to move bodies… (DC 150).
La Forge is aware of the conservation principle and its consequences, as we
discussed above, and argues that the mind cannot inject new motion in the
material world. It can only exert directional force or control over the pineal
gland, which in turn, directs the animal spirits to the different parts of the
body, just like Descartes’ fountaineer (DC 150-151). Put in occasionalist
language, the mind’s directional influence on the gland occasions God to
move the animal spirits to the different parts of the body.
In the end, pinning down Descartes’ theory of motion is not easy, and
we do not have to figure it out here. What is important for our discussion is
the many ways in which his continuous creation argument has been
interpreted. As Garber limits its range to keeping the material world in
existence, making God’s divine pushing of bodies a separate activity, and with
Schmaltz widening it to include both matter and motion, leaving modal
changes to bodies, La Forge takes it a step further to encompass the entire
operation including all bodily modes. Malebranche, picking up where La
Forge left off, uses God’s continuous creation to argue for a strong form of
occasionalism that appears to deny causal efficacy to both bodies and minds,
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making God the only causal force in the universe. But just like Descartes, the
scope of his continuous creation argument, particularly in the case of mind’s
attentive desires, is not as clear as some scholars might think. In fact, his three
major arguments for occasionalism, from necessary connection, from
knowledge, and from continuous creation, do not explicitly cover the mind’s
attentive desires. So, in the end, I believe there is metaphysical room for the
mind to be responsible for its self-perfection. With this in hand, we can then
move to examine, in chapter five, a particular interpretation of occasionalism
that accommodates the mind’s perfection.

4.4

Malebranche’s Arguments for Occasionalism

At the heart of Malebranche’s occasionalism is the claim that “God is the only
true cause; that the nature and power of each thing is nothing but the will of
God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes…”
(OCM II 312, LO 448). Many statements like this one appear throughout
Malebranche’s work, and taken together, present seemingly undeniable
textual evidence that Malebranche is a full-blown occasionalist, whereby God
is the only efficacious cause in the universe and that minds and bodies are
causally impotent, and at most, provide the occasioning conditions for God’s
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causal activities. Couple these statements with his arguments denying the
causal efficacy of mind’s and bodies, it appears to be a closed and shut case.
Just as bodies are not causally responsible for their motions, minds are not
causally responsible for any of their own internal states, such as sensations,
thoughts, and volitions. But if we actually take a closer look at the context in
which Malebranche made these statements and examine the scope of his
arguments, we can see that Malebranche never denied that the mind could
produce its own attentive desires. In fact, he was careful enough to leave room
for them within his particular brand of occasionalism.
Malebranche marshals medieval and Cartesian assumptions and
arguments for divine causation to formulate his three main arguments for
occasionalism. Two of them have roots in al-Ghazālī’s arguments against
creaturely causation, and the third in the continuous creation argument whose
lineage goes through La Forge and Descartes, and then back to Aquinas and
Suarez. All three present problems for self-perfection, the most troubling
being the continuous creation argument because it appears to outright exclude
the mind’s attentive desires. Leaving the most difficult for last, let’s turn to the
first two arguments so that we can understand the nature and scope of his
occasionalism.
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One of his most influential arguments is the one from necessary
connection, where Malebranche, through an analysis of causation in general,
argues that minds and bodies are causally impotent. What distinguishes a
causal relation from a correlation is that there is a necessary connection
between two objects or events, such that, given the same conditions, if one
event occurs, the other must occur (OCM II 317, LO 450). Causal relations
cannot be discovered through sensible experience because witnessing a
constant conjunction between two events does not give us license to conclude
that there is a genuine causal relation between them (contra the scholastics)
(OCM III 209, LO 660). They can only be discovered through reason.
In the case of bodies, we cannot conceive a necessary connection
between a body and its own movement or colliding bodies and their
subsequent movements. We experience them in constant conjunction, but that
does not imply a causal relation. By attending to the idea of body, one
discovers that bodies can only bear the properties of pure extension (e.g. size,
shape, divisibility, motion and rest) and therefore do not have an inherent
motive force to move bodies (OCM II 313, LO 448).
The situation is same for minds. We cannot conceive a necessary
connection between the mind’s desire to move its arm and the arm’s
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movement. The mind experiences, through inner sensation, its desire to move
the arm, and the effort that naturally goes along with it, in conjunction with a
sensation of the arm’s movement, but that does not mean that there is a
necessary connection between the desire and effort, on the one hand, and the
arm’s movement on the other (OCM III 227-228, LO 670). He bases this
inconceivability

on

the

inherent

dissimilarities

between

the

mind’s

(immaterial) desires and the arm’s (material) movements.
But I deny that my will is the true cause of my arm’s movement, of my
mind’s ideas, and of other things accompanying my volitions, for I see
no relation whatever between such different things. I even see clearly
that there can be no relation between the volition I have to move my
arm and the agitation of the animal spirits… (OCM III 225-226, LO 669).
This also applies to the mind’s own inner states. The mind experiences a
strong correlation between its desire to think of something and the
presentation of a corresponding idea, but, again, that does not imply that there
is a causal relation between the two.
The same is true of our faculty of thinking. We know through inner
sensation that we will to think of something, that we make an effort to
do so, and that at the moment of our desire and effort, the idea of that
thing is presented to our mind. But we do not know through inner
sensation that our will or effort produces an idea. We do not see
through reason that this could happen. It is through prejudice that we
believe that our attention or desires are the cause of our ideas; this is
due to the fact that a hundred times a day we prove that our ideas
follow of accompany them…we do not see in us any power to produce
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them; neither reason nor the inner sensation we have of ourselves tells
us anything about this (OCM III 229, LO 671).
In fact, it is inconceivable for the mind to produce its own ideas because to
will an idea is to already presuppose the idea because the mind cannot will
what it does not know. So it is wrong to say that my produces it own ideas
(OCM III 226, LO 669).
The mind’s causal impotence goes even deeper for Malebranche. He
argues that all of the mind’s volitions are causally inefficacious as well.
Man wills, but his volitions are impotent in themselves; they produce
nothing; they do not preclude God’s doing everything, because God
himself produces our volitions in us through the impression He gives
us toward the good in general, for without this impression we would
be able to will nothings (OCM III 225, LO 669).
In the end, he leaves us with a bleak picture of the mind’s abilities.
You cannot yourself move your arm, change place, situation, posture,
do good or wrong to others, or effect the least change in the universe.
Here you are in the world without a single power, immobile as a rock,
as stupid, as it were, as a stump (OCM XII 165, JS 119).
God, however, can satisfy the ‘necessary connection’ requirement
because he has, unlike minds and bodies, an infinite power.
A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a
necessary connection between it and its effect. Now the mind perceives
a necessary connection only between the infinitely perfect being and its
effects. Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause and who truly
has the power to move bodies (OCM II 316, LO 450).
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God needs no instruments to act; it suffices that He wills in order that a
thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what
He wills should not happen (OCM II 316, LO 450).
God’s infinite power entails that whatever God wills necessarily comes to be.
We cannot conceive it to be otherwise. Malebranche explains this in terms of
bodily motion.
But when one thinks about the idea of God, i.e., of an infinitely perfect
and consequently all-powerful being, one knows that there is such a
connection between his will and the motion of all bodies, that it is
impossible to conceive that He wills a body to be moved and that this
body not be moved (OCM II 316, LO 450).
So it appears that Malebranche believes that only something with an infinite
power can satisfy the necessary connection requirement for causal efficacy.
But if this is the case, it appears that even if finite minds and bodies had finite
causal powers, they still would not be true causes. Moreover, even if God
were able to give an infinite power to finite minds and bodies, he would be
giving them not only the power to modify themselves and others, but also the
power to create and annihilate, making them omnipotent and godlike.
Malebranche outright dismisses such an idolatrous idea (OCM II 317, LO 450451). For Malebranche God does everything.
Bodies, minds, pure intelligences [i.e. angels], all these can do nothing.
It is He who made minds, who enlightens and activates them. It is He
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who created the sky and the earth, and who regulates their motions. In
short, it is the Author of our being who executes our will…(OCM II 318,
LO 451).
This argument appears to render the mind causally impotent. God is
causally responsible for the mind’s thoughts, sensations, and volitions. If this
is so, then how can the mind be responsible for anything, particularly its
attentive desires? First of all, if we examine the text closely Malebranche never
denies that the mind is responsible for its own attentive desires. Of course, he
argues that the mind’s attentive desires are causally impotent and cannot
modify the mind by producing a sensation, an idea, or move a body. But this
is consistent with his claim that attentive desires only petition or occasion God
to reveal more information to the mind about an object under investigation or
reveal different ideas to the mind so that it can move beyond it and seek other
objects. But, he never targets the mind’s ability to produce its own attentive
desires. Recall the passage cited above.
Man wills, but his volitions are impotent in themselves; they produce
nothing; they do not preclude God’s doing everything, because God
himself produces our volitions in us through the impression He gives
us toward the good in general, for without this impression we would
be able to will nothing (OCM III 225, LO 669).
The first sentence merely states the mind’s volitions cannot causally modify
the mind in anyway. The second sentence, however, appears to suggest that
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God is responsible for the volitions themselves. But we need to be careful here.
As we saw in chapter three, the will is God’s invincible impression towards
the good general and it is through this impression that the mind can love
particular goods, or for that matter, anything at all. But it is up to the mind,
through its attentive desires, to determine or direct this impression. The few
sentences that come before the passage, and follow after, support this reading.
I grant that man wills and that he determines himself; but this is
because God makes him will by constantly leading him toward the
good. He determines himself; but this is because God gives him all the
ideas and sensation that are motives by which he determines himself
(OCM III 224-225, LO 669).
There is quite a difference between our minds and the bodies that
surround us. Our mind wills, it acts, it determines itself; I have no
doubt about this whatsoever. We are convinced of it by inner sensation
we have of ourselves (OCM III 225, LO 669).
Of course, God determines the mind by producing sensations and passions,
and revealing ideas to the mind that naturally incline it towards apparent
goods, but the mind can, nonetheless, override, or move beyond, these natural
inclinations by using its attending power. Without sensations and ideas to
provide content to the mind or the will to motivate it, the attention would
have no material to work with and, therefore, desire nothing. So God’s causal
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power is necessary for the mind’s attending power by providing conditions
for its exercise, but God is not responsible for how the mind uses it.151
Secondly, the necessary connection argument with its “infinite power”
requirement does not appear to apply to the mind’s attentive desires.
Malebranche does not explicitly address this issue, but he does suggest that
the mind’s attentive desires are brute desires that do not causally require
second and third order desires, such that, for the mind to desire X it needs a
desire Y to desire X, and so on (OCM III 27, 225, LO 552, 669).152 Of course,
there are structuring or action guiding desires, such as the desire for selfperfection, which may guide the mind’s attentive desires, but the guiding
desire itself is merely an advising cause and thus not an efficient one that
requires an infinite power.
And lastly, attentive desires do not need God as a causal intermediary
as in the case of sensations and ideas. As we saw in the last chapter, a
sensation is a complex of mental and physical processes, whereby the actual
‘felt’ sensation corresponds to, and are occasioned by, a pattern of brain traces.
This dual aspect requires God to coordinate, via mind-body union, both the
151
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physical and mental side of causation. The intellectual perception of ideas is
also a complex process that requires God to form intentional relations between
the mind’s understanding and his ideas. So both sensations and ideas require
complex processes that only God can do. But attentive desires do not directly
rely on mind-body or mind-God union, but are simple volitions that come
from mind itself. Of course, attentive desires occasion bodily motions and new
intentional relations and so they are merely “immanent” acts of the mind
(OCM III 25, LO 551). In the end, the necessary connection argument is
concerned with explaining body-body, mind-body, and mind-God causation,
not with the mind’s attentive desires. So this argument does not preclude the
mind’s power of attention.
The second argument is an argument from knowledge. For
Malebranche, a true cause must not only have a necessary connection to its
effects, but it must know how to bring about the effect. So even if the mind had
the power to move its body, it would still need to know how to move it. As alGhazālī’s spider does not know how to spin its intricate web, the mind, given
the complexity of human physiology, can never meet this epistemic
requirement as well.
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For, even assuming that our volitions were truly the motor force of our
bodies…how is it conceivable that the soul should move the body? Our
arm, for example, is moved only because spirits swell certain of the
muscles composing it…but this is inconceivable, unless we allow in the
soul an infinite number of volitions for the least movement of the body,
because in order to move it, an infinite number of communications of
motion must take place. For, in short, since the soul is a particular cause
and cannot know exactly the size and agitation of an infinite number of
particles that collide with each other when the spirits are in the
muscles, it could neither establish a general law of the communication
of motion, nor follow it exactly had it established it (OCM III 228, LO
671).
Given the mind’s finite capacities, it is impossible for the mind to cause and
direct complex bodily motions. Only God, who has an infinite power and
intellect, can do this. This argument could also be expanded to include the
mind’s sensations and ideas, but I do not think it legitimately covers the
mind’s attentive desires. Unlike sensations and ideas, which require complex
interactions between the mind, its body and God, attentive desires come from
the mind alone. They do not require complex bodily movements or the
production of ideas. So they are not the kind of things that require knowledge
for their production like a workman needs when he builds a house or a
painter when rendering a portrait. The mind does not need to know how to
desire, it just does it. They are simple, immediate acts of the mind. One could
also argue that the ‘knowledge’ of desire is imprinted on the will by God’s
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continuous movement of the mind towards the good in general. In this case,
attentive desires are epistemically parasitic, as it were, on this indeterminate
movement. So, the knowledge argument seems inapplicable on its face, but it
also could be satisfied if the objection is pushed.
The most powerful argument in Malebranche’s arsenal is the
continuous creation argument, which is presented in detail in his Dialogues on
Metaphysics and on Religion. There, he follows the same lines of reasoning
behind God’s continuous creation that are found in the scholastics, Descartes,
and La Forge. He believes that God is the creative and conserving force of the
created world, and without his constant conservation, created substances, as
contingent beings, would fall out of existence. Since a created substance’s
continued existence is on par with its initial existence, creation and
conservation require the same causal power and have the same effect, that is,
being or esse. Given this, God’s creating/conserving action must be the same as
well, with creation referring to the starting point of the action and
conservation referring to the continuous of the action in time. Theodore,
Malebranche’s mouthpiece in the dialogue, succinctly presents this aspect of
the argument.
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For the world assuredly depends on the will of the creator. If the world
subsists, it is because God wills it to existence. Thus, the conservation of
creatures is, on the part of God, nothing but their continued creation. I
say on the part of God who acts. For on the part of creatures there
appears to be a difference, since by the act of creation they pass from
nothingness to being, whereas by the act of conservation they continue
to be. But in essence the act of creation does not cease, because in God
creation and conservation are but a single volition which, consequently,
is necessarily followed by the same effects (OCM XII 157, JS 112).
Here, Theodore’s is discussing God’s creating/conserving power in terms of
maintaining the existence of the world and its creatures. Taking this passage in
isolation, we could assume that divine causation, for Malebranche, is limited
to conservationism, with God only sustaining created substances in their
being, allowing them to modify themselves and causally interact with other
substances. But taken in context, Theodore is employing God’s continuous
creation to argue for a strong form of body-body occasionalism, where God is
not only causally responsible for sustaining a body in existence, but also for all
of its modal changes. Following the same line of reasoning as La Forge,
Theodore argues that in order for God to create/conserve a body, he must also
create/conserve it in a particular location. He explains this to his pupil Aristes:
But it is the will of God that gives existence to bodies and to all
creatures, whose existence is certainly not necessary. Since this same
volition that has created them always subsists, they always exist…Thus
it is the same volition that puts bodies at rest or in motion, because it is
the same volition which gives them being, and because they cannot
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exist without being at rest or in motion. For, take note, God cannot do
the impossible, or that which contains a contradiction…Thus He cannot
will that this chair exist, without at the same time willing that it exist
either here or there…since you cannot conceive of a chair existing
unless it exists somewhere…(OCM XII 156, JS 111-112).
Since existent bodies are defined by their size, shape and motion, God cannot
create a body without a determinate set of modes. For instance, an existent
house without a particular size, shape and location is inconceivable. If this is
the case, God’s continuous creation of bodies must extend to their modes. Of
course, as Aristes suggests, we can have an abstract concept of a house, but,
again, this is not a house that could exist.
That is not what I am saying to you. You can think of a body in general,
and make abstractions as you please. I recognize that…But once again I
am telling you that you cannot conceive of a body that exists, which
does not at the same time exist somewhere, and whose relation to other
bodies neither changes nor does not change, and that consequently is
neither at rest nor in motion (OCM XII 156, JS 112).
According to this schema, God’s creating/conserving act, from a temporal
perspective, initially brings bodies into existence ex nihilo and then continues
to unfold in time, conserving bodies in relative rest or motion according to the
laws of nature. If God is creating/conserving bodies with all their modes, then
there is no left room for mind-body causation according to Malebranche.
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Thus, minds cannot infuse motion into or change the direction of bodies.
Theodore, speaking to Aristes, argues,
Further, I claim, it is a contradiction for you to be able to move your
armchair…Now it is a contradiction that God wills this armchair to
exist, unless He wills it to exist somewhere and unless, by the efficacy
of His will, He puts it there, creates it there. Hence, no power can
convey to where God does not convey it, nor fix nor stop it where God
does not stop, unless God accommodates the efficacy of His action to
the inefficaciousness of His creatures (OCM XII 160, JS 115-116).
As this passage suggests, some scholars have described God’s action as
“recreation,” arguing that God moves bodies by recreating the body in
successive locations. So if God wants to move a body from place W to place Z,
then God must “recreate” that body at W, X, Y, and Z. If he wants to keep a
body at rest, he just “recreates” it in the same place.153 But I think that this is an
extreme reading of Malebranche’s theory and produces serious, but
unnecessary, problems for his occasionalism in general. Following Garber,
recreation implies a cinematic view of bodily motion, where a body is merely
a set of spatiotemporal slices, with each slice spatiotemporally related to each
other, but, nevertheless, metaphysically isolated from every other like the cells
in a movie reel that present a single image on the screen. But this runs
roughshod over Malebranche’s explanation of bodily motion. Just as La Forge,
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Malebranche uses God’s continuous creation to argue for body-body
occasionalism, but he believes that bodies, given theirs size, speed, and
position, provide the conditions or occasions for God to modally adjust their
motions (OCM III 216-217, LO 664; OCM XII 164, 244, JS 119, 188). If God is
literally recreating substances at every moment in time, then bodies do not
really occasion anything. They are merely spatiotemporal markers for God’s
recreating activities. This will be argued for in more detail in the next chapter.
So, as Descartes appears to limit the continuous creation argument to
matter, Malebranche expands it to the level of bodies, which are,
metaphysically, parts of matter that are individuated according to their
relative motion to other parts, and it is from this motion that they derive their
size, shape and speed (OCM XI 239-240, JS 184). Given this, Malebranche
believes that God’s continuous creation logically extends to the modal changes
of bodies because without them, God would not be able to create bodies at
all.154
Malebranche also extends the continuous creation argument to minds
as well. It is debatable, however, whether he limits God’s continuous creation
to the mind as a substance or extends it to all of the mind’s modifications as
154
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well. In other words, is God’s continuous creation of minds the same as his
continuous creation of bodies? If it is, then it appears that there is no
metaphysical room for the mind to produce its own attentive desires.
However, I believe that the textual evidence does not necessarily support this
conclusion. Let’s first examine the textual evidence, and then discuss the
philosophical issues.
Given our concerns, the best place to start is with Andrew Pyle’s
detailed account of Malebranche’s theory of freedom in terms of God’s
continuous creation. In his discussion, Pyle argues that Malebranche presents
two inconsistent accounts of how the mind acts freely, one depending upon an
interpretation of God’s continuous creation that does not include the mind’s
modifications, and another that does. Pyle has us consider two passages that
are representative of each account. Here is the first one.
Consequently, I propose to designate by the word WILL, or capacity of
the soul has of loving different goods, the impression of natural impulse
that carries us toward general and indeterminate good; and by FREEDOM, I
mean nothing else but the power that the mind has of turning this impression
toward objects that please us so that our natural inclinations are made to settle
upon some particular object, which inclinations were hitherto vaguely and
indeterminately directed toward the universal or general good, that is,
towards God, who alone is the general good because He alone contains
in Himself all goods (OCM I 46-47, LO 5).
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In this passage, according to Pyle, Malebranche is arguing that the mind has a
causal power that can direct God’s indeterminate impression towards the
good in general, likening God to a motor and the mind to a steering wheel.
God’s continuous creation in this case would be limited to sustaining the mind
in existence and conserving the mind’s indeterminate impression towards the
good in general, allowing the mind determine its own volitions.155
Pyle believes that the next passage makes a stronger claim about
continuous creation, eliminating the mind’s directional power.
But not only our will (or our love for the good in general) comes from
God, but also our inclinations for particular goods (which inclinations
are common to, but not equally strong among, all men), such as our
inclination toward the preservation both of our own being and those
with which we are naturally united are impressions of God’s will on us
for by the term of natural inclination. I mean all the impressions of the
Author of nature common to all minds (OCM II 13, LO 267).
God not only sustains the mind’s being and conserves its desire for the good
in general, but also modifies the mind by determining its natural inclinations.
So God is now the steering wheel, not the mind. Pyle finds definitive support
for this interpretation in a passage where Malebranche explains God’s
interventions in the mind.
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First, God unceasingly impels us by an irresistible impression toward
the good in general. Second, He represents to us the idea of some
particular good, or gives us the sensation of it. Finally, He leads us
toward this particular good (OCM III 18, LO 547).
Recognizing

the

implications

of

his

continuous

creation

argument,

Malebranche appears to have eliminated the mind’s directional power and
replaced it with God’s. In this case, God continuously creates the mind and all
its modifications, just like in the case of bodies. The mind can “in no way give
[itself] new modifications” (OCM III 21, LO 549). The only thing the mind can
do is to consent or not to particular goods that are presented to it. As Pyle
succinctly explains it in relation to sin, “The modifications that God creates
includes all our first-order inclinations, which we experience in our souls but
do not choose, the sin lies in a second-order act by which we as it were
‘endorse’ some of these inclinations.”156 As we saw in chapter three, the mind’s
act of consent is technically not a material or real modification of the mind for
Malebranche, but a moral change in the mind’s external relation to God’s
Order.157 Recall that he divides the sinful act into a material and moral aspect.
God is responsible for the material aspect of sin in so far as he presents the
mind with a false good and causes the mind’s requisite sensations and
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passions, but the mind is morally responsible for consenting to the false good.
So, the mind’s sinful consent does not materially modify the mind in any way,
but it does change, for the worse, its relation to God’s moral order. This
interpretation, consequently, appears to leave no room for the mind’s attentive
desires.
What Pyle sees as two inconsistent accounts, I see as one consistent
account. In the second and third passages above, Malebranche is merely
describing how God’s movement of the mind toward the good in general
naturally leads the mind toward particular goods. That is, the mind is
naturally led to particular goods as a consequence of God’s indeterminate
impression, not by God directly “recreating” the mind with particular
inclinations or volitions as Pyle suggests.158 To understand this distinction
better, let’s continue Malebranche’s train of thought in the third passage by
picking it up a few lines later.
Finally, God leads us toward this particular good; for since God leads
us toward all that is good, it is a necessary consequence that He leads
us toward particular goods when He produces the perception or
sensation of them in our soul (OCM III 18, LO 547-548).
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God determines or naturally inclines the mind toward particular goods only
in so far as he presents particular goods to the mind and causes the requisite
sensations in accordance with the laws of mind-body union. Both provide the
conditions for particularizing the mind’s indeterminate impression towards the
good. Malebranche states this in the following way.
We are also materially predetermined toward particular goods in this
sense, that we are urged toward what we know and relish as good. The
soul’s natural impulse toward particular goods is, in effect, but a natural
consequence of the impulse toward the good in general. Thus, all pleasure is
by itself efficacious in relation to the will, for it moves and urges it, as it
were, toward the object (OCM III 31-32, LO 555) [my italics].
Given the mind’s natural impulse toward the good in general, the mind is
naturally or instinctively inclined toward the particular goods that God
presents to it. So it is the combination of God’s indeterminate impression and
the particular goods that are presented to mind that forms the mind’s
particular volitions. In this case, particular goods, as occasional causes, are
“steering” the mind’s will. As a result, the mind instinctually, but not
invincibly, loves particular objects. This is consistent with God only
creating/conserving the mind’s impulse toward the good in general, leaving
its determination up to the particular goods.
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As particular goods naturally determine the mind’s will, the mind can
also freely direct the will with its own attentive desires. This is what is
implied, I believe, in Pyle’s first passage. Here’s the relevant part of that
passage.
By FREEDOM, I mean nothing else but the power that the mind has of
turning this impression toward objects that please us so that our natural
inclinations are made to settle upon some particular object, which
inclinations were hitherto vaguely and indeterminately directed toward
the universal or general good, that is, towards God, who alone is the
general good because He alone contains in Himself all goods (OCM I
46-47, LO 5).
Malebranche explains what he means in the next passage.
But it must be carefully noted that insofar as a mind is thrust toward
the good in general, it cannot direct its impulse toward a particular
good unless that same mind, insofar as it is capable of ideas, has
knowledge of that particular good. In plain language, I meant that the
will is a blind power, which can proceed only toward things the
understanding represents to it. As a result, the will can direct both the
impression it has for good, and all its natural inclinations in various
ways, only by ordering the understanding to represent to it some
particular object. The power our soul has of directing its inclinations
therefore necessarily contains the power of being able to convey the
understanding toward the objects that pleases it (OCM I 47, LO 5).
As we saw in chapter three, the mind directs the will by petitioning God to
present new objects to it. By presenting new objects to the understanding, God
is causally responsible for changing the will’s direction, though the mind
occasioned the change with its attentive desire. Using Pyle’s metaphor, God is
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the motor and the mind is the steering wheel, but it is God that steers it in
different directions according the mind’s requests. Piling one metaphor on top
of another, the mind is like a sailboat captain directing his sailors to tack one
way rather than another. So the “power” of conveying “the understanding
toward the objects that please it” is, I believe, the mind’s attentive desires
occasioning God to present the understanding with new objects.
Malebranche also directly confronts the problem of God’s continuous
creation and the mind’s freedom. Entertaining the objection that if God
creates/conserves the mind with a determinate set of modes, including its
states of consenting and not consenting, then the mind cannot exercise its
freedom, Malebranche responds in the following way.
I answer that God creates us, speaking, walking, thinking, willing, that
he causes in us our perceptions, sensations, impulses, in a word, that
He causes in us all that is real and material…But I deny that God
creates us as consenting precisely insofar as we are consenting or
resting with a particular good, whether true or apparent. God merely
creates us as always being able to stop at such a good…For since God
creates us, then, not precisely insofar as we are consenting or
withholding our consent, but insofar as we are able to give or withhold
it. For since God constantly creates us, not being able to will, but willing
to be happy, and since our mind is limited, a certain amount of time is
necessary to determine whether some good is a true or a false
good…(OCM III 31, LO 554-555).
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Here, Malebranche is arguing that God does not continuously create the mind
consenting or not to particular goods. God, of course, is responsible for
presenting to the mind a particular good, but not for making the mind’s
decision about it. Consenting to a false good negatively changes the mind’s
external relation to God’s moral Order, but it does not result in a material
change in the mind. But if the mind withholds consent, then it naturally
petitions God for more information about the false good or asks to be
presented with new ideas. Withholding consent provides the mind’s attention
the opportunity to examine the false good or turn towards other goods.
I grant, however, that when we do not sin and when we resist
temptation, we can be said to give ourselves a new modification in this
sense, that we actually and freely will to think of things other than the
false goods that tempt us, and we will not rest in their enjoyment (OCM
III 25 LO 551) [my italics].
Thus, God’s continuous creation does not include the mind’s consenting or
withholding activities, and as a consequence, the mind’s attentive desires.
In the end, Pyle’s two accounts are really just one account, with each
passage describing how the mind’s natural impulse toward the good in
general is a “blind power” that is determined or particularized by the objects
God presents to the mind. This can happen either by the mind’s occasional
interactions with the material world or by the mind’s attentive desires. If this
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is the case, then God’s continuous creation of the mind is different from his
continuous creation of bodies. As God creates/conserves bodies with a
determinate set of modes, he creates/conserves the mind’s with a general
volition for the good, leaving the mind’s particular volitions to the occasional
interactions between the mind, its body and God.
Even though Malebranche does not believe that God’s continuous
creation includes the mind and all of its modification, there is still a question
of whether Malebranche must extend it in order make God’s single action
consistent in the case of bodies and minds.159 Steven Nadler argues that
Malebranche must apply the argument equally in both cases.160 That is, if God
creates/conserves a body with determinate set of modes, then he must do the
same for minds as well. Andrew Pessin, however, believes that God’s action is
equally applied to both minds and bodies, but the effects on each are different.
For him, God’s continuous creation entails the “recreation” of both minds and
bodies only in terms of their essential features. As we saw earlier, the essential
features of bodies are their modes because they are defined by their size, shape
and relative positions to other bodies. Without them, God would not be able
to create bodies at all. Thus, God’s creating/conserving action must include
159
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bodies and their modes.161 Pessin argues that, for Malebranche, the mind’s
essential features do not necessarily entail a determinate set of modes. First of
all, Malebranche believes that the mind has only one essential feature, that is,
its capacity for thought, not in having any particular thoughts. Pessin finds
support for this in book three, chapter one of the Search after Truth. Here
Malebranche argues,
I do not think that, after some serious thought on the matter, it can be
doubted that the mind’s essence consists only in thought…I warn only
that by the word thought, I do not mean the soul’s particular
modifications, i.e., this or that thought, but rather substantial thought,
thought capable of all sorts of modifications or thoughts…I think,
further, that no mind can be conceived of that does not think, though it
is quite easy to conceive of one that does not sense or imagine, and that
does not even will… there can also be a mind that perceives neither hot
nor cold, neither joy no sadness, imagines nothing and even wills
nothing; consequently, such modifications are not essential to it.
Thought alone, then, is the essence of mind…(OCM I 381-382, LO 198).
Given that the mind’s only essential feature is substantial thought, Pessin
argues that Malebranche’s metaphysics does not entail that God must
“recreate” the mind with a determinate set of modes like he does in the case of
bodies. He technically only has to “recreate” the mind’s capacity for thought.
Malebranche carefully excludes the will as an essential feature of the mind
because it is only God moving the will toward the good in general. Even
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though this movement is inessential to the mind, it is nevertheless inseparable
from it (OCM I 383, LO 199). Accordingly, God could just “recreate” the
mind’s capacity for willing and thinking. If this is the case, then God is not
compelled to recreate the mind with particular thoughts or volitions as Nadler
suggests.162 Thus, God’s continuous creation is equally applied to minds and
bodies in that he recreates their essential features, but as this entails a
complete set of modes for bodies, it only includes the capacity for thinking
and willing for minds. Of course, God, following the laws of mind-body union
and presents objects to the mind that occasion particular volitions, but this still
leaves open the possibility for the mind to petition God, via its attentive
desires, to present it with new ideas.
I agree with Pessin’s assessment of God’s continuous creation, but I
disagree with the main conclusion he draws from it. He concludes that even
though continuous creation simpliciter does not entail “recreating” the mind
with a determinate set of modes, Malebranche’s commitment to full-blown
occasionalism requires him to extend God’s “recreating” activity to the mind’s
modifications.163 However, given the substantial evidence presented in this
chapter and the last one, Malebranche is not committed to full-blown
162
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occasionalism that requires God to “recreate” minds with a full complement of
modes. As we have seen, Malebranche leaves metaphysical room for the
mind’s attentive desires, and in turn, its self-perfection. Switching this around,
his commitment to the mind’s self-perfection would require him to reject fullblown occasionalism, not the other way around. Interestingly, Pessin’s
analysis helps my interpretation by blunting the objection that continuous
creation excludes the mind’s free will. In fact, continuous creation is
compatible with the mind’s self-perfection.

4.5

Conclusion

Our brief historical tour of divine causation has provided insights into the
origins and nature of Malebranche’s occasionalism. For him, God is causally
responsible for all bodily motions and for the mind’s intellectual and sensible
perceptions, sensations, and passions. Malebranche never denies, however,
the mind’s responsibility for its own attentive desires and acts of consent.
More importantly, none of his arguments for occasionalism, particularly his
infamous continuous creation argument, exclude this possibility. Given the
overarching importance of self-perfection in Malebranche’s system, we should
switch our emphasis from occasionalism to self-perfection when we question
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their compatibility. In other words, we should not try to make self-perfection
conform to the constraints of occasionalism; rather we should try to conform
occasionalism to the constraints of self-perfection. To drive this point home,
we need to compare, in the last chapter, two theories on how God actually
governs the mental and material realms. One theory, advocated by Nadler and
Pessin suggests that God, using particular volitions, directly causes the
modifications of minds and bodies by continuously “recreating” them with a
determinate set of modes. The other theory, which I support, claims that God
governs both realms through general volitions or laws, using minds and
bodies as inefficacious instrumental or advising causes to particularize the
effects of his volitions. Comparing both theories, we will see that
“instrumental” occasionalism fits better with his theory of self-perfection than
“direct” occasionalism.
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5.

5.1

Malebranche’s Occasionalism: Direct vs. Instrumental Occasionalism

Introduction

In chapters one and two, I argued that Malebranche’s Augustinianism is at the
core of his philosophical persona, that is, the belief that philosophers must
cultivate their intellectual and moral character in order to acquire
philosophical knowledge in both the intellectual and moral realms, and in
turn, act according to them. From this insight, I showed that the mind’s
perfection is at the heart of his philosophical system and that the other parts of
his system must be understood in this context. In order to properly
understand Malebranche’s theory of perfection, we needed to go back and
examine Augustine’s own theory of perfection. During our examination we
discovered an Augustinian soul that is cognitively and volitionally active,
whose goal is to imitate God as best it can by moving up the stages of
perfection: purification, illumination, and unity.
Then in chapters three and four, I presented Malebranche’s theory of
perfection and argued that the Malebranchean mind also has the cognitive
and volitional resources to perfect itself, and that it can achieve it by moving
up through the stages of purification, illumination, and unity. The mind
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begins to perfect itself by habitually performing mental exercises that help
reduce its concupiscent desires, augment its strength and freedom, and
prepare itself to receive and utilize Christ’s grace of feeling. By doing these
things, the mind becomes better able to elicit, and focus on, God’s
illumination. With God’s illumination, the mind can then order its life
according to reason, not instinct. This enables the mind to unify itself with
God by rationally following the same Order that God does. Next, I argued that
Malebranche’s theory of perfection is not incompatible with his brand of
occasionalism. As we saw earlier, Malebranche never denies that the mind is
responsible for its attentive desires and acts of consent, and that the
arguments he uses to deny the causal efficacy of minds and bodies do not
necessarily apply to these activities.
In this chapter, we will compare two different interpretations of
Malebranche’s occasionalism in relation to God governance of the mental and
material realms. Using his theory of perfection as the ultimate measure, we
will see that an “instrumental” interpretation should be preferred over a
“direct” interpretation. By working through this comparison, we will see how
Malebranche’s occasionalism and theory of perfection can come together to
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form a unified philosophical system that emphasizes God’s power as well as
the mind’s freedom to perfect itself.

5.2

Direct vs. Instrumental Occasionalism

Currently, there are two contending interpretations of Malebranche’s
occasionalism. One is a direct occasionalist reading. According to this reading,
all of God’s volitions are particular in content such that there is a one-tocorrespondence between God’s volitions and each particular event in the
world. This means that God positively and directly wills every particular
event in the world; hence, he is constantly moving individual bodies around,
and giving ideas and sensations to the mind and also dispensing grace to
them. According to this reading, Malebranche divides God’s volitions into
“general” volitions, which are dispensed according to the general laws of
nature, and “particular” volitions, which produce effects that are outside the
lawful order of nature, such as miracles and the initial act of creation. Both
types of volitions have particular volitional content that are aimed at
particular effects, but the former are lawful while the latter are not. So
lawfulness and non-lawfulness are what distinguish general volitions from
particular ones. Occasional causes, in this case, merely “occasion” or “trigger”
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God to produce particular events according to his general laws. In other
words, God’s production of a particular effect will “occasion” him to produce
another effect, and so on.164
The other interpretation is an instrumental occasionalist reading.
According to this reading, God governs the world according two types of
volitions that differ in their volitional content: general and particular. God’s
general volitions are general (non-specific) in content and can be described in
terms of general laws (if event x occurs, then event y occurs). More
specifically, God’s general volitions just are the laws of nature. Since they are
general in scope, they are not directed towards any specific event. Rather, they
are directed towards event types that fall under certain conditions, without
being specifically aimed at any particular event within any type. Under this
scheme, God uses finite substances and their modal features as occasional
causes to delimit or determine the application of his general volitions. They do
not “occasion” God to directly will a particular effect, but they are the
conditions
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God’s

general

volitions

are

individuated
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particularized so that they give rise to particular effects. So given the role of
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occasional causes, God’s general volitions are necessary, but not sufficient for
the production of particular effects. God’s particular volitions, on the other
hand, are those that have particular content, just as the direct reading.
However, some are lawful and others are not. In this case, God’s volitions are
distinguished by the scope of their volitional content, not exclusively by their
nomicity or anomicity as under the direct reading.165
Supporters in both camps, quite correctly, focus their attention on the
textual evidence. They build their case by collecting passages from different
parts of Malebranche’s oeuvre, and arrange them in such a way as to provide a
picture of his occasionalism. They also provide philosophical support by
primarily focusing on Malebranche’s occasionalist theory of bodies and then
applying this theory to minds. This method is helpful, but is ultimately not
decisive for either reading. In fact, after close examination, the textual
evidence is ambiguous at best, and could potentially support multiple
interpretations. Moreover, as we have seen, the application of his theory of
bodies to minds fails to take into account the mind’s cognitive and volitional
resources and the role they play in knowledge acquisition, requiring God to
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govern minds in importantly different ways than bodies. A better method is to
examine the textual evidence within the context of Malebranche’s philosophy
as whole. Obviously, the reading that is most compatible with his other
philosophical commitments, and best resolves the particular tensions between
them, is the one that Malebranche should subscribe to, regardless of whether
he actually subscribed to it or not.
In the end, I argue that Malebranche is, and should be, an instrumental
occasionalist. Even though the textual evidence is ambiguous, I believe that
the instrumental reading is compatible with Malebranche’s account of the
mind’s self-perfection, which is at the heart of his system. The direct reading,
though simple in its application and buttressed by strong textual evidence,
creates insurmountable problems for Malebranche’s philosophy, particularly
in terms of the mind’s freedom and perfection.

5.3

God’s Creation and Governance of the Universe

In order to understand each reading and its implications, we need to examine
Malebranche’s account of God’s creative activity and governance. For him,
God is an infinitely perfect being with infinite attributes, and necessarily lacks
nothing. Given his nature, God had no reason outside of himself to create the
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universe. That is, there is nothing intrinsically good or worthy about the
nature of the universe itself to give God the reasons, desires or motives to
create it. Such motives must be from God himself. The only explanation or
justification for God’s creative activity is his intent to express his own glory in
the Incarnation of the Word, through which the world is divinely sanctified
and worthy of God’s attention (OCM XII 205-207, JS 154-6). Unlike Leibniz’s
God, who picks the best possible world according to its intrinsic nature alone,
Malebranche’s God picks a world that best reflects his infinite attributes, not
only in terms of the perfection of world he creates, but in the way he governs
it.
He was not required to undertake the most perfect work possible, but
only the most perfect work that could be produced through the wisest
or most divine ways, so that any other work produced in any other way
could not express more exactly the perfections God possesses and
glories in possessing (OCM XII 225, JS 172).
God finds glory in both his product and his design. Just as an architect finds
glory in the house that he designed, he also finds glory in the efficient and
harmonious way it was designed and built (OCM XII 202-203, JS 153). He
strikes a perfect balance between the perfection of what is created and the
perfection by which it is created. In the end, God picked the most perfect
world that could be governed by the most simple, uniform and fecund laws.
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Our world, governed in this way, best expresses God’s infinite attributes and
is the most perfect world given this balance.
For Malebranche, this explanation of God’s governance provides
justification for the disorders, monsters, and impious people in the world.
Since God must balance the perfection of the world with the perfection of his
attributes, our world is not intrinsically the most perfect. Given this, disorders
are bound to occur. Ultimately, God could have created a world that was
intrinsically more perfect, or he could fix the disorders of this world. If God
were to do either, however, he would have to multiply his volitions
unnecessarily, thereby violating the uniformity and simplicity of his ways,
which would ultimately reflect badly on him.
Now God, having chosen this world, knew every thing about it. He
knew all creatures, their actions, and all the physical and moral consequences
that follow from their infinite relations and combinations (OCM XII 268, JS
208). Thus, God established not only the physical order of the universe but
also its moral order. In terms of physical order, God, given Malebranche’s
mechanistic science that all material bodies (including complex organisms)
can be reduced to the size, shape and relative motion of their matter, created
the initial state of the universe, with every creature in it, by a single
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impression of motion (motive force) into matter. This impression generated
individuals of every species (plants and animals) along with all of their future
progeny. Their progeny are preformed and housed, one inside another, like a
Russian doll, in the seeds and eggs of the first of their species (OCM XII 252ff.,
JS 195ff.). Thus, all the future generations in the world were established at the
first instant of creation, although they will unfold at different times according
to the laws of nature. God’s initial act of material creation, according to
Malebranche, does not follow the three simple laws of motions because, contra
Descartes, they are not sufficient to produce complex organisms. He argues
that “an infinity of laws—which would hardly make them general—would be
required in order to form the organic bodies of plants and animals by
following these laws exactly” (OCM XII 246, JS 190). Moreover, the laws of
motion presuppose, and derive from, the dispositions of bodies; thus, bodies
must be created prior to the laws of motion.
The laws of nature, therefore, were not used to create the world, but to
govern it. They are responsible for the regular motions of celestial and
terrestrial bodies, and for the natural growth and maturation of creatures. But
they also inevitably give rise to disorders in nature such as storms, drought,
famine and the development of malformed offspring (OCM V 31-32, PR 118).
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As we saw earlier, God knew that these disorders would happen, but he did
not establish the laws of nature with the purpose of creating these things, but
only to express his simplicity, uniformity and immutability. God’s glory
trumps the intrinsic imperfections of our world.
In terms of the moral order, God governs the dispensation of grace in
relatively the same way. As we saw chapter three, God distributes grace of
enlightenment in accordance with the laws of God-mind union on the occasion
of the mind’s attentive desires, and he lawfully dispenses grace of feeling on
the occasion of Christ’s attentive desires (OCM XII 320, JS 253). Recall that
Christ, limited by his finite human nature, cannot dispense grace
simultaneously or uniformly to all minds at all times, but must dispense it
according to his successive thoughts and desires, which are limited to
particular individuals or groups of people that share the same dispositions
(OCM V 174-175, PR 144). Since Christ is limited in the number of persons he
can think about at any given time, he must constantly change his thoughts and
desires in order to dispense grace of feeling to all the minds that he desires.
Nonetheless, Christ’s dispensation perfectly follows the laws of grace, even
though, at times, it yields disorders, such as dispensing grace superfluously
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on hardened hearts. So, just as in the physical realm, the simple laws of grace
sometimes yield inefficacious results.
With this brief account of God’s creative activities and governance in
hand, let’s turn to the two competing interpretations of Malebranche’s
occasionalism.

5.4

The Direct Reading

Advocates of the direct reading have ample textual support in their favor.
Malebranche seems to advocate this view throughout his works. Consider the
following representative passages:
I say that God acts by general wills, when he acts in consequence of
general laws which he has established. For example, I say that God acts
in me by general wills when he makes me feel pain at the time I am
pricked (OCM V 147, PR 195).
A natural cause is not a real and true cause, but only an occasional
cause, which determines the Author of nature to act in such and such a
manner and in such and such a situation (OCM II 313, LO 448).
Since God alone acts immediately and by himself in minds, and
produces in them all the different modifications of which they are
capable, it is only he who diffuses light in us, and inspires in us certain
feelings which determine our different volitions (OCM V 66, PR 138).
The main source of philosophical support comes from Malebranche’s
continuous creation argument that we examined in detail in chapter four.
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Supporters believe that God’s continuous creation extends, either by
metaphysical entailment or from Malebranche’s prior commitment to fullblown occasionalism, to minds and bodies, along with all of their modes.166
Recall that, according to this interpretation, God continuously creates minds
and bodies, along with all of their modes at each moment in time. For
instance, if a body is in movement, God recreates that body in a new location
at every successive moment (OCM XII 161-164, JS 115-119). If a mind switches
its attention from one object to another, God recreates the mind with a new
attentive desire along with a new object of thought. In the end, advocates of
the direct reading see God as recreating the moral and material realms anew
at every moment in time in accordance with the laws of nature and grace that
he established at creation.
Working with the textual evidence and God’s continuous creation,
Steven Nadler and Andrew Pessin have developed different accounts of direct
occasionalism, each leading to different consequences.167 For Nadler,
Malebranche’s God created the initial state of universe along with all of its
laws by (anomic) particular volitions, with each volition corresponding to a
166
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particular state of affairs. Then, in accordance with these laws, God governs
the world by (nomic) particular volitions.168 God’s volitions, according to
Nadler, are eternal by nature, residing atemporally in God’s mind, but are
temporal in application insofar as they are simultaneous with the events they
produce. This means that volitions are eternally present in God but are
activated or triggered temporally by the appropriate occasional cause.169 For
instance, when two bodies collide, God is triggered to move each body
according to the laws of motion. In the case of grace, Christ’s desire to
dispense grace to Peter triggers God to dispense grace to Peter according to
the laws of grace. Nadler uses this “triggering” account of occasional causes to
accommodate the many passages where Malebranche describes occasional
causes as determining the efficacy of the laws.170
Under this model, the laws of nature are merely the rules or reasons by
which God governs the world, leaving all the causal work to God’s particular
volitions. For Nadler, the reason why laws cannot do any real causal work is
that their content is non-specific and therefore cannot cause particular events.
Given their causal inefficacy, God must use particular volitions in order to

168

Nadler (1993), p. 43.
Nadler (1993), p. 46.
170
Nadler (1993), pp. 45-46. For examples see OCM XII 175-176, JS 129, OCM V 67, PR 139.
169

273
uphold or fulfill the laws. This implies that God must constantly fiddle around
with nature in order to keep it running in a lawful manner, with one event
triggering God to produce another event.
Pessin’s account is similar to Nadler’s insofar as God’s volitional
content must be specific and correspond to particular events in the world. But
Pessin’s description of God’s activity shows two important differences. One
has to do with Pessin’s account of the laws of nature. Unlike Nadler, Pessin
argues that God did not first will the laws of nature and then act according to
them; rather, God’s particular volitions just are the laws of nature. “A natural
law is not the general content of a divine volition but rather a uniform pattern
of particular content volitions.”171 In this case, God never wills the laws of
nature, they are merely the expression (or description) of God’s uniform
activities in the world. Pessin uses this reduction to accommodate, like Nadler,
Malebranche’s frequent claims that occasional causes determine (or establish)
the efficacy of laws. Since the laws are just patterned sets of volitions, every
patterned event qua occasional cause, in effect, establishes the efficacy of the
laws.172 In terms of volitional scope, Pessin’s God has one type of volition:
particular volitions (nomic or anomic), as Nadler’s God seems to have two
171
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types: (1) the laws of nature (general in content) that God established at
creation and (2) particular volitions (nomic or anomic) to produce particular
effects, the latter upholding the former. Pessin rejects this distinction and
reduces the laws of nature to God’s particular volitional acts. Even though their
accounts differ in this way, they agree that God must constantly uphold the
lawful order of the world by particular volitions, and that general laws of
nature cannot do the necessary causal work.
The other difference has to do with the way Pessin describes the nature
of God’s activity. At first, Pessin seems to follow Nadler’s line that God has
patterned sets of discrete particular volitions that are temporally activated by
the proper occasional causes.173 But he also describes God’s activity as single,
eternal volition that encompasses all the state of affairs that constitute the
entire created world throughout time. This eternal volition unfolds in time
and produces every event in the universe.174 Pessin seems to think, given that
he switches from one description to another without qualification, that both
describe the same thing, but from different perspectives. From one
perspective, God wills everything at once by a single super-volition that
captures the world in its entirety, but from another perspective this super173
174
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volition can be delimited into discrete volitions by the individual events that
are produced. The former description is used to accommodate God’s
simplicity and immutability, and the latter is used to show that every event is
accounted for by a specific volitional content in God’s mind. This dual
description, coupled with Pessin’s reduction of the laws of nature, gives us a
more accurate account of God’s governance under direct occasionalism. In
fact, it shows that Nadler’s account fails to describe accurately the relationship
between occasional causes and particular volitions under the direct
occasionalist model.
The problem of Nadler’s model can be seen from Pessin’s dual
perspective. From the super-volition perspective, God’s single volition unfolds
in time, producing temporal effects according to the order and lawful patterns
specified in the volition’s content. This unfolding does not require occasional
causes to temporally trigger or activate anything; they are merely the result or
by-product, as it were, of God’s will. From the discrete volitions perspective, it
is not the occasional causes that trigger particular volitions, but rather the
previous volitions in the sequence. It is not Christ’s desire that triggers God to
dispense grace to Peter, but the particular volition that produced Christ’s
desire. That is, the model is not that a volition produces x and then x in turn

276
triggers another volition to produce y (Model A), but that the volition that
produced x triggers, or in this case causes, another volition to produce y
(Model B).
V1

E1

V2

V3

E2
E3
Model A

V4

E4

V1
E1

V2

V3

E2
E3
Model B

V4
E4

Model B suggests that God’s atemporal particular volitions unfold in time
successively creating lawful patterns of effects without occasional causes
triggering or determining anything. Since particular volitions are sufficient to
cause their corresponding effect, there is no reason to appeal to occasional
causes in order build a temporal bridge, as it were, between the volitions’
eternity in God and temporality in nature. Occasional causes merely indicate
the lawful ordering of God’s governance in time. Hence, occasional causes do
not really have a role to play at all; they are merely the result of God’s causal
activities, just as in the super-volition description.175 These dual descriptions
provide us with a clear account of direct occasionalism that reveals the nature
of occasional causes.
175
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Direct occasionalism has its costs and benefits. One benefit is that it
clearly upholds the fundamental principle of Malebranche’s occasionalism
that God alone is causally responsible for every event in the material and
moral universe. Since the universe is just the temporal unfolding of God’s
eternal will, there is no room or need for secondary causes. Another important
benefit, suggested by Nadler and Pessin, is that it is consistent with
Malebranche’s theodicy contrary to a standard objection to the direct
occasionalist account.176 According to this objection, direct occasionalism runs
contrary to Malebranche’s claim that God does not directly will the disorders
of nature because he works by simple, general (non-specific) laws (OCM V 35,
PR 119; cf. OCM XI 25-26, CW 50). The direct occasionalist counters by arguing
that the main argument for Malebranche’s theodicy is that God must act
lawfully not that he does not directly will particular events. Even though God
knows that his governance will produce disorders, his aim is not to produce
these disorders, but to create a world that best reflects his attributes in terms
of his activity and the ends of the activity. Now this is consistent with God
acting by (nomic) particular volitions because God is bound to work in a
lawful manner that best reflects his attributes. So it does not matter if God
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works by general (non-specific) laws or by (nomic) particular volitions, only
that he acts lawfully. So the instrumental interpretation may remove God
from directly producing disorders, but it does not remove him from
producing disorders altogether since his general (non-specific) laws gives rise
to disorders as well.
The main costs, however, clearly outweigh the benefits. The costs are
the position’s incompatibility with some of Malebranche’s statements
concerning occasional causation, the undesirable consequences of the position
itself, and its incompatibility with other important aspects of Malebranche’s
philosophy such as his theory of freedom and self-perfection. Let’s examine
each in turn.
The direct reading undermines the purpose of Malebranche’s
occasionalist system. It appears that direct occasionalism reduces occasional
causes merely to denotative features of God’s general volitions, rendering
their “triggering” or “occasioning” role superfluous. Under this model, the
mind is merely a sequence of God’s general volitions that unfold in time as
discrete creative actions. But this seems to run contrary to Malebranche’s
descriptions of occasional causes as “establishing” or “determining” the
efficacy of God’s general laws. Here are two representative passages.
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For in order that the general cause act by general laws or wills, and that
his action is lawful, constant, and uniform, it is absolutely necessary that
there be some occasional cause which determines the efficacy of these laws, and
which serve to establish them (OCM V 67, PR 139).
But recall that creatures do not act upon each other by their own
efficacy, and that God communicates His power to them only because
He established their modalities as occasional causes which determine
the efficacy of the general laws He prescribed. Everything depends on
this principle (OCM XII 318-319, JS 252).
According to these passages, occasional causes are necessary for the
application of general laws, not merely the necessary effects or by-products of
God’s volitions. This is clearly seen in the Christ’s dispensation of grace.
Christ, given his finite human nature, does not dispense grace as a real cause,
but as an occasional cause (OCM V 72, PR 143). Christ’s thoughts and desires
qua occasional causes determine the laws of grace in particular ways. Simply
put, God dispenses grace through Christ’s human nature. This is also true for
the mind and its attentive desires. Attentive desires are occasional causes that
determine God to reveal new ideas or objects to the understanding. Both
examples show that occasional causes are not just effects in Malebranche’s
occasionalist system, as the direct reading suggests, but play an important role
in God’s governance. Even though both Nadler and Pessin attempt to
accommodate this position by giving occasional causes a “triggering” role in
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God’s governance, they cannot sustain this given the consequences of direct
reading described above.
In terms of undesirable consequences, the direct reading undermines
the ontological status of substances. If God’s causal activity results only in the
lawful production of patterned effects, then created substances are just finite
sets of event patterns with their identity and unity defined by their unique
event pattern. This appears to strip creatures of any real substantiality and
puts Malebranche’s philosophy in serious danger of collapsing into
Spinozism, which is something that he clearly wanted to avoid.177
In terms of incompatibility, the direct reading fails to accommodate
Malebranche’s theory of freedom and self-perfection. Despite the intense focus
of scholars on his occasionalism, perfection, as we have seen, is the ultimate
goal of his philosophy. Simply reading the preface to the Search will show that
Malebranche’s work is an attempt to demonstrate how people can turn away
from the pleasures of the body and turn to God in order to achieve perfection
by following his immutable order (OCM I 9-26, LO xxxiii-xliii). If minds are
merely concatenations of patterned effects, as the direct reading suggests, then
177
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perfection is excluded, since there is no metaphysical room for the mind to
exercise its cognitive and volitional resources.
Advocates of the direct reading are not unaware of the free will
problem. In fact one major advocate, Andrew Pessin, has attempted,
admittedly

unsuccessfully,

to

reconcile

direct

occasionalism

with

Malebranche’s theory freedom.178 He bases his attempt on the idea that the
content of God’s general volitions are incomplete insofar as they do not
contain all possible applicable descriptions of the effects they produce. Just as
we can have beliefs with different intentional contents that refer to the same
object, God can produce effects under limited or incomplete descriptions.
After providing some textual evidence to support his

claim that

Malebranche’s God actually uses incomplete general volitions, Pessin argues
that God continuously creates minds and all their modifications only under
physical or real descriptions, excluding moral descriptions. In the case of
mind’s freedom to give or withhold consent, God creates everything that is
real about the state of affairs, but not under the moral description of
withholding or giving consent. That is, he does not create us qua consenting or
not consenting. For Pessin, this “immanent” act is merely the mind’s
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experience of God shifting (producing different) its inclinations to other
objects.179 It is nothing over and above the mind’s modifications.
From this, Pessin argues that even though God only continuously
creates minds and all their modifications under physical descriptions, they are
still morally evaluable in terms of their relation to God’s order. Minds that
conform to order are meritorious and those that do not are sinful. This
supposedly removes moral responsibility from God and preserves the mind’s
freedom.
To preserve our freedom and remove Himself [God] from
responsibility for our sins, He creates the states of affairs constituting
our behaviour under descriptions leaving open their moral features. He
continuously creates us, then, with all our features (sensations,
thoughts, inclinations, volitions, etc.), and that is everything real and
intrinsic to us. Nevertheless, these sequences of states of affairs may be
morally evaluable by virtue of their external relation to the moral
law…But in so far as God’s volitional contents are neutral relative to
the moral mode of description, He is not directly causally responsible
for the moral features of our behaviours, and in this way our freedom is
preserved. Yet in so far as He does indeed create all states of affairs,
occasionalism is preserved.180
In the end, Pessin admits that his account does not reconcile direct
occasionalism with freedom. At best, it may free God from moral
responsibility, but it fails to attribute to minds a meaningful conception of
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freedom. Pessin confesses that, “once God has full causal responsibility for all
states of affairs, regardless of the descriptions under which He wills them,
freedom is precluded.”181
Pessin’s account reveals some of the fundamental problems with
interpreting Malebranche’s theory of free will and self-perfection through the
lens of direct occasionalism. Even though this interpretation can accommodate
the mind’s “immanent” act of withholding and giving consent, it cannot take
into account the mind’s attentive desire. Recall that the attentive desires give
the mind the ability to examine objects, and move beyond them, by
occasioning God to enlighten it. Without them, the mind cannot possibly
contribute to its own perfection.
Susan Peppers-Bates, who subscribes to both the direct reading and the
idea that Malebranchean mind is causally responsible for its attentive desires,
does not explicitly address their compatibility. But one way to do this is to say
that God continuously creates minds and bodies, with all of their
modifications, except for the mind’s attentive desires.182 They in turn, provide
the occasional “trigger” for God to present a corresponding idea or object to
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the mind, thereby falling under the Model A, while everything else falls under
Model B. This interpretation is plausible, but the direct reading has the
consequence of God recreating minds at every moment in time, making them
mere concatenations of patterned effects. This does not leave the necessary
metaphysical or temporal room for the mind to exercise its attention and
produce its own attentive desires. Consequently, the direct reading seems to
entail that God causes all of the mind’s attentive desires. In the end, the direct
reading cannot accommodate Malebranche’s theory of freedom and
perfection.
In conclusion, there are serious textual problems as well as
philosophical problems with the direct reading. Even if Malebranche
subscribed to the direct reading, which appears to be unlikely, he should not
have subscribed to it given the reading’s philosophical problems and
incompatibility with other aspects of his philosophy.

5.5

The Instrumental Reading

Given the problems with the direct reading, let’s turn to the instrumental
reading. Just as the direct reading, the instrumental reading has ample textual
support. Consider the following passages:
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An occasional cause was actually required for a general cause…in order
that this general cause, acting continually in a uniform and constant
manner, could produce an infinity of different effects in its works, by
the simplest means and by general laws which are always the same
(OCM XII 12, JS 60; cf. OCM III 212-214, LO 663, 664-5).
He is able to communicate His power to them [minds] by carrying out
their desires, and thereby establish them as occasional causes in order
to act through them in a thousand ways (OCM XI 23, CW 48).
But, because God acts in consequence of general laws which He has
established, we rectify his work without offending His wisdom. We
resist His actions without resisting His will, because He does not
positively and directly will each deed that He does (OCM XI 26, CW
50).
These passages suggest that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
God’s volitions (single super-volition) and particular events, and that God
actually “uses” or “acts through” occasional causes to diversify the effects of
his general (non-specific) laws. In fact, the laws just are God’s general volitions
(OCM II 315, LO 449; OCM V 67, PR 139).
According to this reading, God created the initial state of the world by
particular (specific) volitions, yet he governs the world by general (nonspecific) volitions or laws. In this case, God knew everything about the world,
and created the initial state of the world with every species, along with all
their preformed progeny, with a single super-volition. After this, God, given
his infinite wisdom and perfect foreknowledge, decided to govern the world
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by general laws (volitions) that would best reflect his attributes, such as his
simplicity and immutability. God knows all the events that will result from
these laws, but he does not directly and immediately will the events with a
single, eternal super-volition or with an infinite set of particular (specific)
volitions as the direct reading suggests, rather, the events follow from the
laws. So there is no need for God to govern the world by directly producing
particular events.
Since God’s governing laws (volitions) are general in scope, they are
not directed towards any specific event. They are, however, directed towards
event types that fall under certain conditions, without being specifically aimed
at any particular event within any type. Given the undetermined nature of his
general volitions, God uses finite substances and their modal features as
occasional causes to delimit or determine the application of his general volitions.
So occasional causes do not denotatively “trigger” God to directly will a
particular effects, as in Model A, rather, they are the conditions by which
God’s general volitions are individuated or particularized so that they give
rise to particular effects.
Occasional causes, according this reading, simulate efficient causes
insofar as they are sine qua non conditions. This means that they must be
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spatially or temporally contiguous with their effects, and the effects produced
are proportionate to them. However, they are not considered efficient causes
because they lack one critical element: they have no active power in terms of
motor force, grace or power of enlightenment. For Malebranche, in order for
something to count as an efficacious cause it must actually have its own causal
powers (OCM III 203-205, LO 658). Without such powers, occasional causes are
causally inefficacious and, therefore, not really efficient causes, even though
they are responsible for particularizing or individuating God’s general
volitions.
The instrumental reading is similar to, but essentially different from,
the scholastic concurrentist models of causation. Recall that concurrentism is
the causal theory that sees God and his creatures act through the same
cooperative action to produce particular effects according to different orders
of causality. Creatures, through their innate causal powers, determine the
action by ensuring that a specific kind of effect is produced. God, on the other
hand, cooperates by conserving the creature’s causal powers and by
determining the singularity of the effect insofar as one singular effect will occur
rather than another. Thus, creatures determine the type of effect that will be
produced, and God determines what token of that type will be produced.
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Malebranche, according to instrumental occasionalism, keeps the basic
structure

of

concurrentism,

but

switches

around

the

cooperative

responsibilities. First, Malebranche shifts all causal powers to God, essentially
stripping creatures of their causal powers, except for the mind ability to
produce its attentive desires. God exercises his causal powers through his
general volitions which are directed towards event types that fall under
certain conditions, without being specifically aimed at any particular event
within any type. Second, Malebranche shifts the singular or particular
determination of effects from God to occasional causes. This is how occasional
causes “determine the efficacy” of God’s general volitions or laws. Simply put,
all causal powers and type determinations are attributed to God, and all token
determinations are attributed to substances and their modes as occasional
causes. In fact, token determinations activate, so to speak, God’s general
volitions.
The instrumental reading, in this case, does not see God’s continuous
creation as recreating minds and bodies, each with a determinate set of modes,
at every moment in time. If God is literally recreating substances at every
moment in time, then minds and bodies do not really occasion anything, but
are mere by-products of God’s volitions. Again, minds and bodies are not
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patterned sets of temporal slices, with each slice temporally related to, but
metaphysically isolated from, each other like cells in a movie reel that present
a single image on the screen. Malebranche uses recreation language to express
the fact that creation and conservation requires the same causal power and
that only God has this power, not that God recreates the world anew at every
moment. God actually uses the body’s size, shape and speed to determine its
motion and the mind’s sensations, perceptions and attentive desires to
determine the effects that follow from the general laws (volitions) that govern
mind-body and God-mind union.
Following our discussion in chapter four, God creates/conserves the
essential and inseparable features of minds and bodies. In the case of bodies,
the creation side of the action is the initial creation of bodies from the bottom
up with all of their modal features along with the general laws (volitions) that
govern them. The conserving side of the action is the conservation of bodies
and their modes in time, and the laws are responsible for diversifying God’s
conserving action in time. So when Malebranche speaks of God moving
bodies by creating them in successive places, he is discussing this dual aspect
of God’s creating/conserving activity where God maintains bodies in their
being while also governing their motions through general laws. In the end,

290
Malebranche uses the continuous creation argument to show that God is
responsible for all bodily motion, not to explain how God moves bodies.
In the case of minds, however, God continuously creates them with
only the general capacities for thinking and willing (i.e. indeterminate
impression toward the good in general), not with any particular thoughts or
volitions. The mind’s thinking and willing, as we discussed in chapter four,
are determined or particularized either by the particular goods that are
naturally presented to it through its body or freely by the mind’s attentive
desires to acquire more knowledge. Of course, the general laws of mind-body
and mind-God union govern what particular thoughts and volitions a mind
might have at any given moment depending on the occasional cause. So the
mind requires God to first maintain it in being and then use his general laws
to produce its particular modifications.
In general, we can see the relations between God’s general volitions
and occasional causes as analogous to those between a modern power grid
and the appliances that are plugged into it. A grid’s power is general insofar
as it can accommodate a variety of appliances within certain physical
parameters. The appliances, given their particular physical structure, channel
the grid’s power to produce particular effects. A lamp channels the power to
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produce light, a toaster to toast bread, and a fan to distribute air. In this case,
the grid’s power acts through the appliances to produce particular effects. The
power and appliances can produce nothing on their own, but they are
necessary, and together sufficient, to produce particular effects. So it is the
complex of the power and the appliance that produces a particular effect.
In the same way, God general volitions work through occasional causes
to produce particular effects. In order for the laws to be efficacious, the
appropriate occasional cause must be in place. This is exactly what
Malebranche is suggesting when he states:
For in order that the general cause act by general laws or wills, and that
his action be lawful, constant and uniform, it is absolutely necessary
that there be some occasional cause which determines the efficacy of
these laws, and which serve to establish them. If the collision of bodies,
or something similar, did not determine the efficacy of the general laws
of the communication of motion, it would be necessary that God move
bodies by particular wills (OCM V 67, PR 139; cf. OCM III 216-217, LO
664).
God’s general laws of motion produce particular effects only when they are
instantiated by the particular dispositions or modes of bodies. God uses the
collision of bodies to diversify his general volition and to establish the second
law of motion which regulates the communication of motion among bodies
(OCM V 25, PR 117; cf. OCM III 217, LO 664; OCM XII 319, JS 252).
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Similarly, God’s general laws of grace are instantiated by, or dispensed
through, Christ’s attentive desires, which are the occasional, not productive,
cause of grace. So Christ plays a directive role, as the redeemer and intercessor
for humankind, in the dispensation of grace. This is much different from the
direct reading. That reading would have us believe that God produces
particular attentive desires in Christ, and that these in turn, “trigger” God to
produce particular effects of grace, as models A and B indicate. But
Malebranche clearly rejects this account, since this implies that Christ’s
dispensation is really God’s dispensation; therefore, Christ’s occasional role is
superfluous. In fact, this is the model that is used in the second objection in the
Illustration to the Treatise on Nature and Grace. Malebranche’s responds to this
objection in the following way.
I grant that the particular wills of the soul of Jesus Christ are always
conformed to those of the Father: but it is not the case that the Father
has particular wills which answer to those of the Son, and which
determine them; it is only that the wills of the Son are always
conformed to order in general, which is necessarily the rule of divine
wills and of all those who love God…All the different thoughts of this
soul, always given over to the execution of his plan, also come from
God, or from the Word to which it is united. But all these different
thoughts certainly have his desires for occasional causes; for he thinks what he
wants (OCM V 162-163, PR 208) [my italics].
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In this passage, Malebranche is clearly rejecting the direct reading. Even
though God is the productive cause of grace, it is up to Christ to dispense it
according to his own attentive desires, which are, nonetheless, in conformity
with the immutable order. So as Christ is responsible for thinking and desiring
what he wants, God is responsible for presenting him with corresponding
ideas and sensations.
In a similar way, the instrumental reading is also compatible with the
mind’s attentive desires. Just as Christ is responsible for the dispensation of
grace insofar as he directs God’s productive power, the mind is also
responsible for its own enlightenment by determining or particularizing God’s
illumination with its attentive desires. Consider the following passage.
Now, God had established us as the occasional cause of our knowledge,
for several reasons, the chief of which is that otherwise we would not
be able to be masters of our wills. For since our wills must be
enlightened in order to be excited, if it were not in our power to think,
then it would not be in our power to will. Thus, we would not be free
with a perfect freedom nor, for the same reason, would we be in any
condition to merit the true goods for which we are made. The mind’s
attention is thus a natural prayer by which we obtain Reason, which
enlightens us…there is no other way to obtain light and understanding
than by the effort of the attention (OCM XI 60, CW 75-6).
Here, Malebranche assumes that the mind can produce its own attentive
desires, and that attentive desires themselves, as occasional causes, play a
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substantive role in knowledge acquisition insofar as they occasion God to
enlighten the mind. Recall that the mind’s attentive control over the “blind
power” of the will means that the mind petitions God to present new
intellectual, imaginative or sensible objects to the understanding, which in
turn, attracts the will and moves it towards new objects (OCM I 47, LO 5). The
mind’s attention, in this case, is not the true cause of the will’s change of
direction, as it were, but it nevertheless occasions God to cause the directional
change. In the end, the mind must produce attentive desires in order for the
laws governing God-mind union to be efficacious. If they are merely byproducts or denotative features of God’s particular volitions, as the direct
reading suggests, then there is no room for the mind’s free will and selfperfection.
In each case, God’s power, manifesting itself either as motive force,
grace, or power of enlightenment is directed by occasional causes to produce
particular effects. The modal dispositions of bodies diversify God’s power in
the material world, and the attentive desires of minds determine God’s power
of enlightenment. Moreover, unlike bodies, which are determined to move in
particular ways, the mind is cognitively active insofar as it can freely direct its
attention towards different objects. Hence, the instrumental reading does not
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make occasional causes the direct effect of God’s particular (nomic) volitions,
but gives them a substantive role in God’s governance of the world.
Furthermore, unlike the direct reading, it nicely conforms to Christ’s
dispensation of grace, and the mind’s perfection.
Admittedly, the instrumental reading has issues of its own. One major
objection with the instrumental reading is that is seems to violate both poles of
Malebranche’s occasionalism. At one pole, it seems to be inconsistent with
Malebranche’s claim that God does not use instruments and that his will alone
is sufficient for particular effects.
God needs no instruments to act; it suffices the He wills in order that a
thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what
He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will, and to
communicate His power is to communicate the efficacy of His will
(OCM II 316, LO 450).
On its face, this passage suggests that God does not use occasional causes, in
any way, to produce particular effects. God’s is the sufficient cause for every
effect. Yet the instrumental reading implies that God’s general volitions by
themselves are insufficient to produce particular effects because they are in
need of occasional causes to determine their efficacy. Thus, God’s will alone is
not sufficient for particular effects in terms of his general volitions. However,
the context in which Malebranche makes this claim clearly shows that he is
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rejecting the idea that God uses minds instrumentally by communicating
causal powers to them, and letting them causally contribute to the effect. Here
is the rest of the passage.
But to communicate this efficacy to a man or an angel signifies nothing
other than to will that when a man or an angel shall will this or that
body to be moved it will actually be moved. Now in this case, I see two
wills concurring when an angel moves a body; that of God and that of
the angel; and in order to know which of the two is the true cause of the
movement of this body, its is necessary to know which one is
efficacious. There is a necessary connection between the will of God
and the thing He wills…and consequently it is God who is the true
cause of its movement, whereas the will of the angel is only the
occasional cause (OCM II 316, LO 450).
Here, Malebranche uses “instruments” in terms of God communicating
powers to the mind so that it can produce their own effects, with God’s
cooperative help of course. His argument, it seems to me, is leveled against
concurrentism, not the fact that God uses occasional causes to diversify his
effects. Malebranche is merely arguing that the angel’s will is not causally
responsible for the action, God is. Yet, Malebranche assumes, like he does with
other minds, that the angel is responsible for willing or desiring the movement
of a particular body, and that that desire occasions God to move the body. The
angel’s desire, in the case, delimits or determines the efficacy of the laws of
motion. Moreover, Malebranche is not arguing that God never uses
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instruments, but that he does not need to use them. This does not exclude the
possibility that God, given the simplicity of his ways, set up the world in such
a way that he uses occasional causes instrumentally to determine the effects of
his general laws, without having to constantly govern the world with
particular volitions. There are plenty of passages, some quoted above, in
which Malebranche states that God “uses” occasional causes in the way.
Recall that God “uses” the collision of bodies to distribute his motive force,
and uses Christ’s attentive desires to distribute grace. So the passage above
does not rule out the possibility that God uses occasional causes
instrumentally in his actions.
At the other pole, the instrumental reading seems to be inconsistent
with Malebranche’s claim that occasional causes are not real causes because it
makes occasional causes necessary for the production of particular effects.
Since God’s general volitions are insufficient to produce effects, occasional
causes must causally contribute in some way to make up for their causal
deficiency. Now, it is true that occasional causes are part of the causal
explanation for particular effects, but, as noted above, they are merely sine qua
non conditions that make God’s general volitions efficacious, that is, produce
particular effects. However, they do not really causally contribute because
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they have no causal powers of their own. As noted above, occasional causes
are not real causes in Malebranche’s sense of the term, since they do not
possess their own causal powers (OCM III 204-205, LO 658). Therefore, the
instrumental reading is consistent with the claim that occasional causes are
not real causes.
Along the same lines, another objection is that even though God does
not communicate causal powers to occasional causes, the passive powers of
occasional causes satisfy Malebranche’s definition of true cause in terms of a
necessary connection between a cause and its effect (OCM II 316-317, LO 450).
Now, in the case of motion, there is a necessary connection between the
impenetrability of bodies and the motive changes those bodies undergo after
impact. That is, irrespective of God and his general laws, when one body
strikes another there must be some change in the motion of both bodies.
Hence, if there is a necessary connection between the motions of bodies before
and after impact, then there is a real causal connection.183
Malebranche was well aware of this objection and responds to it in the
Dialogues (JS 118-19). He agrees that there is a necessary connection between

183

This objection was first raised by Malebranche’s contemporary, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle,
and is still used today by commentators such as Nadler (2000), pp. 118-19.
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the motive states of bodies when they collide, but denies that bodies are true
causes of motion. For something to count as a true cause, according to
Malebranche, it must not only have a necessary connection to its effects, it
must also have an active power. He describes active powers in the terms of
will, power, and force (OCM III 204, LO 658). Clearly, the property of
impenetrability does not fall into this category. So bodies satisfy the first
requirement, in virtue of their impenetrability, but they do not satisfy the
second.
Matter is essentially mobile. By nature it has a passive capacity for
motion. But it does not have an active capacity…thus one body cannot
move another by an efficacy belonging to its nature. If bodies had in
themselves the force to move themselves, the stronger would—as
efficient causes—overcome those bodies they encounter. But, as a body
is moved only by another body, their encounter is only an occasional
cause which, in virtue of their impenetrability, obliges the mover or
creator to distribute his action (OCM XII 164, JS 119).
So, in Malebranche’s conception of efficient causation, occasional causes are
not true causes. This is consistent with the instrumental occasionalist reading.
The final, and most powerful, objection is directed towards the mind’s
attentive desires and their incompatibility with Malebranche’s frequent claim
that God is the only efficacious cause in the universe. If the mind can produce
its own attentive desires, which appear to count as a “real” or “material”
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change in mind if anything does, then the mind causally contributes to God’s
governance, making both God and the mind casually efficacious (OCM III 25,
LO 551). How can this be reconciled with his full-blown occasionalism? The
problem with this objection is that Malebranche, when it comes to the mind, is
not a full-blown occasionalist as many scholars believe. Of course, God is
responsible for all of the mind’s perceptions, passions, and its natural impulse
towards the good general. The mind also cannot move bodies, produce its
own ideas, sensations and perceptions, and cannot will anything without God
pushing it towards the good in general. The mind’s power, both in terms of its
attentive desires and it acts of giving or withholding consent, is parasitic on
the will’s indeterminate and invincible movement toward the good in general.
As a consequence of this invincible movement, the mind is not invincibly
drawn to particular goods, giving it the freedom of mind to give or withhold
consent. If the mind withholds its consent, then it can, depending on its
strength of mind, attend to other objects by petitioning God to produce new
perceptions in the understanding. The mind, in this case, does not have an
independent power, but it harnesses, so to speak, God’s power. As we saw in
chapter three, Malebranche is more than willing to accept the fact that the
mind’s attentive desires are real changes in the mind.
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We can be said to give ourselves a new modification in this sense, that
we actually and freely will to think of things other than the false goods
that tempt us, and we will not rest in their enjoyment…For in the final
analysis, if willing different things is said to be a matter of giving
oneself different modifications, or if our consent, which I view as
inactivity or voluntary suspension of seeking and examining, is taken
to be a material reality, then I agree that in this sense the mind can
modify itself in different ways through the action or desire to be happy
that God places in it, and that in this sense it has a real power (OCM III
25, LO 551).
Even though Malebranche immediately rejects the claim that an act of consent
“materially” modifies the mind because it merely rests its attention on the
object, he never denies the fact that the mind is responsible for its own
attentive desires and that they are, in themselves, real modal changes. What
he does deny is that attentive desires can, in turn, cause new modifications. So
God’s general volitions do not account for the mind’s attentive desires.
More importantly, Malebranche’s occasionalism does not force him to
be

a

full-blown

occasionalist.

Given

our

detailed

examination

of

Malebranche’s arguments for occasionalism, particularly his continuous
creation argument, he can easily accommodate the mind’s attentive desires
without violating his claim that the mind is causally impotent when it comes
to moving bodies, producing its own perceptions, sensations, passions, and
willing anything on its own, that is, independent of God’s power. Thus,
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Malebranche is a full-blown body-body and mind-body occasionalist, but not
a full-blown mind-mind occasionalist, at least in terms of the mind’s attentive
desires.

5.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to show that Malebranche is, and should be, an
instrumental occasionalist. Even though the textual evidence is ambiguous, I
argued that the instrumental reading fits better with Malebranche’s
philosophy as a whole. Moreover, it provides us with a coherent and complete
picture of Malebranche’s occasionalism. The direct reading, though supported
by strong textual evidence, does not give us a satisfactory account of
Malebranche’s occasionalism in terms of its consequences, and its
compatibility with other areas of Malebranche’s system, particularly the
mind’s perfection. Concerning the former, it strips creatures of any real
substantiality by turning creatures into finite event patterns (ala Averroes),
which, I believe, puts Malebranche’s in serious danger of collapsing into
Spinozism. Concerning the latter, it creates insurmountable problems for
Malebranche’s philosophy as a whole, especially in terms of Christ’s
dispensation of grace and the mind’s perfection. The instrumental reading
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avoids these problems and does not undermine the integrity of his
occasionalism. This interpretation clearly goes against the current scholarly
consensus that makes Malebranche an uncompromising occasionalist in all
three areas, but seen within the context of the mind’s perfection, and the
central role it plays in Malebranche’s system, it seems obvious.
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